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'Abstract' 
This thesis examines the nature of U.S. 
mainstream media discourse concerning the 
Palestinian Arab/Israeli conflict throughout the 
period of the Oslo 'peace process' i.e., from 
September 1993 until September 2000. The 
discourse analysis itself is conducted through 
the utilisation of selected 'media frames' 
chosen because it was felt that they could be 
considered singularly to represent a major 
dynamic of the conflict that has led 
precipitously to the present Palestinian/Israeli 
impasse. 
Indeed, the objectives of this study have been 
twofold, firstly, it was intended, that the 
narratives of the 'media frames' could stand 
each alone as a substantive essay. Secondly, 
and conversely, however, it was also the aim of 
this study to cover as much of the socio-
political history of this turbulent period as 
possible in a relatively short amount of space. 
The central tenet of this work however, is that 
throughout the entire Oslo 'peace process' 
Palestinian Arabs in a majority of the channels 
of the U.S. mainstream media were subject to a 
mildly racist media portrayal, which fluctuated 
in the severity of its denigration as and when 
the much maligned 'peace process' (In the 
specific language of Oslo.) swerved 'off and 
'on track'. Moreover, it is argued, that all the 
while a Pax Americana/lsraelica exists, then 
negative U.S. mainstream media portrayals of 
the Palestinian Arab, and other Arabs, shall 
continue unabated. Therefore, what this work 
requests is a debunking of this mildly racist 
xenophobia within the channels of the U.S. 
mainstream media specifically through 
intelligently addressed criticism. 
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A Discourse Analysis of U.S. Mainstream Media Reportage from Selected 
'Media Frames' of the Arab/Israeli Conflict throughout the Oslo Peace Process: 
September 1993- September 2000 * 'Introduction and Methodology' 
'Most Americans picture Arabs as "backward, scheming, fanatic 
terrorists who are dirty, dishonest, oversexed and corrupt". On the 
other hand the Israelis are seen as "tough, energetic, hard-working, 
persecuted and courageous people". They are modern pioneers who 
have made the desert bloom and democracy a reality in the midst of 
the backward Middle East'. 1 
'Similarly Americans tend to identify with foreign societies or 
cultures projecting a pioneering new spirit (e.g., Israel) of wresting 
the land from ill use or savages'. 2 
This thesis sets out primarily to determine the nature of American mainstream 
media reportage of the Arab/Israeli conflict throughout the ill-fated Oslo 'peace 
process' i.e., from the historic signing of the 'Declaration of Principles' of 
September 13, 1993 until the unfortunate collapse of the process at the end of 
September 2000.3 The main argument proposed is that there still exists a 
tangible, if undeclared anti-Arab, pro-Israeli 'bias' in the corpus of the American 
mainstream media's reportage throughout the vast majority of its channels. 
Indeed, 'today, newspapers, magazines, radio, and television are the potential 
media of the public sphere in the United States. ' 4 
It shall also be argued however, that throughout certain periods during the much 
maligned 'peace process', Arab (in this instance Palestinian) media portrayals 
improved moderately against a backdrop of an overall U.S. enthusiasm felt 
during intervals of progress in the process per se. Yet as soon as there was a 
* From the outset a 'media frame' is defined as a specific event i.e., crisis, anniversary, festival, 
etc., that solicits a detectable increase in media reportage. A 'media frame' opens when the 
reportage specifically focuses upon an aforementioned event, and closes when the nature of such 
reportage focuses upon a subsequent, or related event. See: Rabinovitz, Lauren, & Jeffords, 
Susan, [Eds.], Seeing Through the Media: The Persian GulfWar, pp. 6-9. 
1 Ghareeb, Edmund, 'Imbalance in the American Media'. In Ghareeb, Edmund [Ed.], Arab 
Portrayal in the American Media, p. 17. 
2 Said, Edward, Covering Islam: how the media and experts determine how we see the rest of the 
world, p. 54. 
3 This thesis determines that September 28, 2000 represents the termination of the Oslo 'peace 
process' more for convenience than out of conviction. 
4 Roache, Thomas, 'Competing News Narratives, Consensus, and World Power'. In Kamalipour, 
Yahya, R. [Ed.], The U.S. Media and the Middle East image and perception. p. 31. 
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deadlock in the negotiations, or a derailment in the process, the Palestinians were 
usually portrayed as the intransigent party.5 And, moreover, when the 'peace 
process' broke down altogether, the more familiar 'traditional denigration' of the 
Palestinian Arab reappeared in the vast majority of media portrayals.6 
By 'traditional denigration' reference is being made to the recognised negative 
stereotyping of Arabs and Palestinians (The mainstream media more often than 
not portrays the Arabs as a single homogeneous entity, which of course they are 
not.), 7 that was typical of U.S. reportage throughout the channels of the 
mainstream media, i.e., as a militarily inept force after the Arab defeat of June 
1967, as terrorists rather than Palestinian guerrillas (Fedayeen), during the 
1970's, 80's, and 90's, and as 'corrupt oil-merchants' after the 1973 Arab oil 
embargo etc. 8 
This 'traditional denigration' was to continue relentlessly until the outbreak of 
the Palestinian Intifada (Shaking Off) in early December 1987, which seriously 
challenged the usage of such stereotypes and temporarily overturned the Western 
perceived 'David and Goliath' myth.9 The explicit usage of 'myth' in this thesis 
is based upon a simplification of Roland Barthes' definition, in that myth is 
firstly a parole (speech or narrative) and secondly, something inherently more, a 
'message' or 'tradition', 10 (conveyed via discourse) that is a popularly held idea 
·or belief, which is not founded wholly upon the truth. In this instance, however, 
this study is dealing specifically with political myth, and the role that this plays 
in assisting a hegemonic power either through the use of 'rhetoric' or 
propaganda. 11 
5 Dempsey, Judy, 'Clinton keeps low profile ahead of the polls'. The Financial Times, October 5, 
2000. And: Borger, Julian, 'How a virtuous circle turned vicious', Guardian, October 13, 2000. 
6 Fisk, Robert, 'Peace is dead. My people will no longer be the victims'. (An interview with 
Hanan Ashrawi.) Independent, November 8, 2000. 
7 Ghareeb, Edmund, Op-cit., p. 18. 
8 Said, Edward, E. Orientalism, pp. 285-286. 
9 Daniel, Anne Marie, A. U.S. Media Coverage of the Intifada and American Public Opinion. In, 
Kamilipour, Yahya, R. The U.S. Media and the Middle East. pp. 61-62. Concerning the 'David 
and Goliath' myth, see Aronoff, Myron, J. Myths, Symbols, and Rituals of the Emerging State. In 
Silberstein, Laurence, J. New Perspectives on Israeli History: The Early Years of the State, p. 
178. 
10 See: Barthes, Roland, Mythologies, p. 215. 
11 Barthes, Roland, trans. Lavers, Annette, Mythologies, p. 150. 
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In many ways however, it shall be argued that this later denigration i.e., post-
Camp David 11 (July 11-25, 2000), was even more virulent in manner than during 
previous times in the conflict, as blame for the 'wasted opportunity' required 
apportioning to either one of the parties. 12 Thus, once again the Palestinians 
received a bad press and the old negative stereotypes were re-evoked. 
It shall further be argued that the U.S. Administration needs to maintain a pro-
Israeli attitude, which is expressed by its utilisation of the U.S. mainstream 
media, and that such an attitude is thus reflected in the bias of the mainstream 
reportage of the conflict. The U.S. Administration relies upon the support of the 
'Jewish Lobby' i.e., the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC et 
al.), to maintain its power within U.S. Congress. 13 Any criticism of Israel, and 
its treatment of Palestinians, even in her handling of the 'peace process' results in 
accusations of anti- Semitism, and is met with the subsequent threat of the 
removal of the 'Jewish Lobby's' support from Congress. 14 
Numerous citations can be offered to support this commonly understood 
phenomena, consider former U.S. president Bill Clinton's reluctance to condemn 
the Israeli's opening of the 'Hashmonean Tunnel' in September 1996 for fear of 
upsetting the Jewish electorate in the run up to the elections for his second 
term. 15 Or more recently: the former President's refraining from castigating the 
Israelis for their excessive use of force during the 'Uprising of the al-Aqsa 
Mosque' (Fall 2000), once again for fearing the alienation of the Jewish 
electorate, and turning support away from (then vice-president) Al Gore's 
12 Camp David 11 refers to the failed 'talks' hosted by former U.S. President Bill Clinton (July 11-
25, 2000) as opposed to the successful 'talks' hosted by Jimmy Carter, which led to the 
Israeli/Egyptian Peace Accord of September 17, 1978, Officially and famously 'celebrated' on 
the North Lawn of the White House on March 26, 1979. See, Mostyn, Trevor, Time-bomb 
Under Jerusalem'. The Tablet, August 5, 2000. pp. 1040-1041. Bickerton, Ian, J. Klausner, Car la, 
L. A Concise History of the Arab Israeli Conflict, p. 187. And: Whitaker, Brian, 'Camp David' 
gates reopen'. Guardian, July 7, 2000. 
13 The 'Jewish Lobby' comprises many organisations all dedicated to the maintenance of Israel, 
i.e., AIPAC, the Jewish Agency for Israel Appeal, the World Zionist Organisation, The Jewish 
Fund, and the World Jewish Congress are just a few examples. See: Becket, Andy, 'Caught in the 
blast'. The Guardian Weekend, October 21, 2000. 
14 Ghareeb, Edmund, Op-cit., p. 29, pp. 121-122. 
15 Dempsey, Judy, & Jurek, Martin, 'US calls summit to revive peace process'. The Financial 
Times, September 30, 1996. 
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candidacy. The phenomenon also naturally works in apposition to this, for 
example, George W. Bush's newly appointed team of Middle East experts 
refrained from even attempting to end the Arab/Israeli impasse until after the 
Israeli elections on February 6, (2001). 
Furthermore, as a continuation of this argument in regards to the 'Jewish Lobby', 
appeasement of this umbrella organisation insures the smooth continuation of the 
U.S. 'special relationship' .16 (A concomitant relationship that ensures the 
survival of Israel, and the maintaining of U.S. 'hegemony' in her Middle Eastern 
'sphere of interest'.) It is necessary here to briefly define what this thesis implies 
by the use of 'hegemony'. Antonio Gramsci in his seminal work, the 'Prison 
Notebooks' whilst 'restructuring' an interpretation of Marxian philosophy, 
conceptualised an understanding that 'ideological struggles' are correctly defined 
as struggles for hegemony. This is to say: hegemony is a struggle for the 
consensual basis of an existing political system, attained when a ruling elite has 
its ideology accepted by the subordinated class; or the acceptance of a 
replacement ideology by that subordinated class. 17 Gramsci understands 
'ideological struggles' as conflicts undertaken explicitly to attain hegemony. 
Therefore, in essence hegemony is a struggle for the support of the populace.18 
Nevertheless, within the dynamics of this aforementioned hegemonic 
relationship it is necessary to recognise that the media is in essence a 'voice' of 
the U.S. Administration: it works largely for, and on its behalf. Indeed, 'the 
media is increasingly playing a quasi-governmental role in American politics and 
. ,]9 
secunty. 
This is not however, to suggest that there is some grand conspiracy between the 
U.S. Administration and the U.S. media per se for it is to be recognised that 
journalists and editors have partial autonomy and that the U.S. mainstream media 
16 Taylor, Alan, R. The Superpowers and the Middle East, p. 51. 
17 Forgacs, David, [Ed.], The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916-35. pp. 422-444. 
18 Urmson, J. 0. & Ree, Jonathan, [Eds.], 'The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy 
Philosophers', pp. 120-121. 
19 Ghareeb, Edmund, Op-cit., p. 20. 
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is still very much an apparatus of freedom of expression in the U.S.Z0 That 
politicians and journalists have known social contacts:21 and the media 
companies in several instances share their directors with the large corporations 
whom receive much of their financing through Congress, the link between the 
policies that the Administration in Washington wishes to promote, and those 
which it does not, is evident in some aspects of the collective U.S. mainstream 
media.22 
This collective mainstream media disseminates many of the U.S. 
Administration's views throughout its media channels. These views find 
reflection in the tabloid press, the broadsheets, TV news coverage, 
documentaries, cinema, and even in cartoons and advertisements. The U.S. 
populace receives most of its education, i.e., 'cultural awareness' and 
understanding of international affairs through the medium of the TV.23 
Therefore, if this education (view) is heavily biased or even distorted, then the 
general public's view is also subsequently biased and distorted.24 The 
relationship that exists between the U.S. Administration, the U.S. mainstream 
media, e.g., the big three TV networks CNN, ABC, and NBC, and the 
'prestigious press', the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Chicago 
Tribune etc., and between the large U.S. conglomerates, for example General 
Electric, Boeing, Lockheed Martin etc., is not new.25 In fact, it has been growing 
since its inception, i.e., since the early 1950's, and is a relationship of reciprocity 
directed solely so that each interested party can maintain a hegemonic control 
over the other. 26 
20 Hudson, Michael, C. The Media and the Arabs: Room for Improvement. Hudson, Michael, C. 
[Ed.], The American Media and the Arabs. p. 91. 
21 Said, Edward, Covering Islam, p. 151. And: Chomsky, Noam, & Herman, Edward, S. 
Manufacturing Consent, p. XI 
22 Kellner, Douglas, The Persian Gulf TV War. p. 61. 
23 Daniel, Anne-Marie, A. 'U.S. Media Coverage of the lntifada and American Public Opinion'. 
In Kamilipour, Yahya, R. Op-cit., p. 64. 
24 Kassimeris, George, Europe's Last Red Terrorists: The Revolutionary Organization 17 
November, p. 153. 
25 Kellner, Douglas, Op-cit., pp. 59-60. 
26 Ronson, Jon, 'Who pulls the strings?' The Guardian Weekend, March 10, 2001. 
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In addition to the aforementioned arguments, it shall also be argued that 
throughout the Oslo peace process various players shaped and characterised the 
peace through their personal inputs in a bid to support and maintain this 
aforementioned U.S. hegemony over the Middle Eastern region.27 These players 
in many ways represent the 'cutting teeth' of the 'hegemonic paradigm'. (By the 
term 'hegemonic paradigm' suggestion is being made to the tools that the 
hegemonic power, in this instance, the United States, utilizes to maintain its 
control and authority, viz. its key players, its rhetoric and propaganda etc.) The 
likes of Martin Indyk, the native Australian, and U.S. appointed 'special envoy' 
to the Middle East (1995-1997), whose subsequent reappointment (due to the 
flare up of a major crisis), was effected purely because of his clear understanding 
of the U.S. 'special relationship' with Israel, is a good example of such a 
player.28 
An even better example of one of these cutting teeth can be found in the persona 
of the once disgraced Benyamin Netanyahu, a completely 'Americanised' Jew 
(i.e., culturally assimilated with the U.S.), whom authored a book ominously 
entitled How to Deal With Terrorists. 29 This leading Israeli politician is perhaps 
one of the closest of Israeli links to the White House, (Having held the post of 
Israeli Ambassador to the UN.), and he offers strong evidence of a hegemonic 
relationship existing between the U.S. and the Israelis.30 Indeed, even former 
U.S. President Bill Clinton spoke of his 'special friendship' and admiration for 
the 'warrior turned peacemaker', Yitzhak Rabin, with the words: Shalom, chaver 
('Goodbye, friend'), at the funeral of this former Israeli Prime Minister after his 
unfortunate assassination.31 Furthermore, in the aftermath of the ineffectual 
Camp David II 'talks', Clinton suggested upon Israeli television that he once 
again personally favoured the move of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem from Tel 
27 Fisk, Robert, 'Peace is dead. My people will no longer be the victims'. (An interview with 
Hanan Ashrawi.) The Independent, November 8, 2000. 
28 In Cambell, Matthew, & Mahnaimi, Uzi, 'U.S. puts security ban on own envoy'. The Sunday 
Times, September 24,2000. 
29 For a good analysis of this work see Said, Edward, W, 'The Essential Terrorist', in Hitchins, 
Christopher, & Said, Edward, W. [Eds.], Blaming the Victims, p. 151. 
30 See, Netanyahu, Benyamin, Fighting Terrorism: how the democracies can defeat the domestic 
and international terrorists. London: Allison & Busby. 1996. 
31 In Brown, Derek, 'Israel's darkest hour: Future of peace process in doubt'. Guardian, 
November 6, 1995. And: Shlaim, A vi, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, p. 548. 
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Aviv, therefore recognising Israel's claim of sovereignty over Jerusalem, and 
subsequently rejecting any Arab claim. 32 
Although it is evident that there are many strong characters representing such 
cutting teeth in this hegemonic paradigm, recognition is made to the fact that not 
all Americanised Jews are ardent supporters of Israel, or her Zionist policies, and 
certainly are not all anti-Palestinian, or anti-Arab. Examples of such players are 
to be found in the likes of Madeleine Albright (former U.S. Secretary of State) of 
whom it is said 'does not allow the recent discovery of her Jewish identity to 
cloud her judgement concerning the Arab/Israeli conflict. ' 33 And also in the 
highly regarded Connecticut Senator, Joseph Lieberman, who is an apparent 
agent of liberalism on the U.S. political scene. 
Examination of some of the activities carried out by many of these cutting teeth 
would however, surely add weight to the argument that the 'special relationship' 
is one that works both ways, but at the expense of a balanced media portrayal of 
the 'Arab' in the U.S. media. Furthermore, it is perhaps churlish to consider that 
the weight of a pro-Israeli bias will undergo a dramatic shift in favour of the 
Arabs with the passage of time. It is argued that this pattern of negative 
stereotyping of the Arabs as an entity, which opposes the U.S. at all levels, is 
very deeply entrenched,34 so how would the media be able to suddenly change 
the nature of its reportage without losing credibility in its reporting, or giving 
credence to an active anti-Arab policy at the governmental level? 35 
The reality of the situation is this: that since the demise of communism and the 
dissolution of the former USSR, the U.S. has required its bogeyman.36 This is 
what has been aptly called the 'villain vacuum' for it could be cynically, and 
wrongly argued, that the U.S. needs, and must maintain a constant state of 
belligerency, either against an ideological (i.e., Communism, Islam etc.), or a 
32 Mostyn, Trevor, 'Time Bomb Under Jerusalem'. The Tablet, August 5, 2000. pp. 1040-1041. 
33 Hardy, Jeremy, 'Doves of war' Guardian, October 21, 2000. 
34 Said, Edward, W. Covering Islam, p. 157. 
35Daniel, Anne-Marie, A The Intifada and American Public Opinion, in Kamalipour, Yahya, R. 
Op-cit. p. 69. 
36 Chomsky, Noam, Peace in the Middle East. pp. 95-96. And: Halliday, Fred, Islam and the 
Myth of Confrontation, p. 81. And: Said, Edward, W. The End of the Peace Process, p. 48. 
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physical enemy (i.e., Colombian drug barons, perceived Middle Eastern state 
sponsored terrorists etc.), for the sake of the health of her 'military-industrial 
complex' viz. the cornerstone of her economy. 37 
In previous times the Communists sufficed and the Arabs came in useful for their 
oil and manipulation during the Cold War, being utilised specifically as a barrier 
against regional penetration of the communist ideology. At this juncture 
however, recognition is made to the fact that Israel was herself utilised by the 
U.S. as a satellite thwarting communist penetration,38 as well as representing a 
symbol of U.S. global domination and supremacy in the Middle Eastern region.39 
Indeed, this relationship allowed for the U.S. to urge the Israelis to use caution in 
many of her foreign policy objectives (both strategic and political, viz. war), 
particularly in relation to the Lebanon and Syria in the 1970s and '80's i.e., 
during 'Operation Litany' (March 1978), and during the 'Siege of Beirut' (June 
1982). This desire for Israeli caution was mainly driven from the U.S.'s fear of 
provoking a Russian response, and interfering with a carefully balanced state of 
detente.40 
Today, however, Israel's importance as a friendly regional bastion opposmg 
conflicting ideologies and their threat of regional penetration is much 
diminished, and it is this factor which largely underscores Washington's 
determination to negotiate a lasting peace in order that Israel can stand alone.41 
This allows the U.S. to concentrate on other issues i.e., the growing threat from 
the South American drug cartels, and the perceived 'global' terrorists that 
impinges upon, and largely influences the U.S. domestic political arena. 42 In 
37 Bell, Steve, American Journalism - Practices, Constraints, and Middle East Reportage: In 
Hudson, Michael, C. Op-cit, p. 54. And: Chomsky, Noam, /bid And: Cromwell, David, 'The 
hack and flack machine'. New Internationalist, Issue, 328, October 2000. And: Halliday, Fred, 
Op-cit, p. 107, and p. 113. 
38 Hersh, Seymour, M. The Samson Option, p. 153. Guyatt, Nicholas, The Absence of Peace, p. 
77. 
39 King, John, Handshake in Washington: The Beginning of Middle East Peace? p. 4. And: 
Smith, Charles, D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 290, and p. 292. And: Said, 
Edward, W. The Question of Palestine, p. 29. And: Guyatt, Nicholas, Ibid. 
40 Evron, Yair, War and Intervention in Lebanon, p. 30. 
41 Faour, Muhammad, The Arab World After Desert Storm, p. 7. 
42 Reed, Christopher, 'Dirty hands and finger of guilt'. Guardian, November 19, 1996. And: 
Lennard, Jeremy, 'A War Run On Drugs'. Guardian Weekend, November 13, 1999. 
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essence, the motivations underpinning the sustaining of the once promoted 
'special relationship' have shifted, and although the U.S. will never completely 
abandon Israel, (the relationship is too protracted and entangled), there is a 
tangible distancing by the U.S. Administration from many of the policies pursued 
by the Knesset, as these policies threaten to undermine her [America's] relations 
with other Middle Eastern states.43 (This distancing, however, rarely manifests 
itself in open condemnation of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians, or border 
incursions into southern Lebanon where she operates with carte blanche against 
the perceived 'global' terrorists.) 
Nevertheless, Israel has found herself in the position of being an almost totally 
expendable asset (indeed, even a liability), in some eyes in Washington. Being 
told frequently to quieten down her regional belligerencies, and attempt to find 
peace with her Arab neighbours.44 1f her complaints concern her national security 
from both internal and external threats, she is often placated by a fresh delivery 
of Black-Hawk and Apache helicopters, but very much kept at arms length.45 
Israel today however, is no longer on the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda, a 
fact that has yet to be recognised within the minds of many Israelis, and indeed 
many members of the Knesset with regards to their conduct in the Arab/Israeli 
conflict.46 
After August 2, 1990, and greatly assisted by Saddam Hussein's foolhardy 
invasion of Kuwait, the Arab came to be considered as an even more legitimate 
target as the causer of the 'ills in the world', and this was reflected in the U.S.'s 
mainstream media portrayals i.e., 'terrorists' (the Palestinians), 'religious 
fundamentalists' (the Iranians), and 'usurpers of Western values' (the Iraqis). 
The Palestinians did not help themselves duly when they sided with Iraq's 'often 
misunderstood' leader.47 This action was born out of frustration with the U.S.'s 
43 Sluglett, Peter, & Sluglett, Marion, F. [Eds.], The Times Guide to The Middle East, pp. 117-
118. 
44 King, John, Handshake in Washington: The Beginning of Middle Eastern Peace? p. 5, p. 52, 
and p. 134. 
45 Ibid. p. 138. Bregman, Ahron, & El-Tahri, Jihan, The Fifty Year War: Israel and Arabs, 
p. 188. 
46 King, John, Op-cit, pp. 64-65. 
47 Halliday, Fred, Op-cit, p. 84. 
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constant endorsement of Israeli policy against the Palestinian entity. Of course, 
Kuwaitis are Arab, but the ruling Al-Sabah family now promotes U.S. 
hegemonic domination in the Persian Gulf region. This very minute detail 
however, is very often overlooked.48 
There are exceptions to this pattern of negative stereotyping evident in some 
channels of the U.S. mainstream media, and some very balanced reportage of the 
Arab/Israeli conflict during the Oslo 'peace process' does exist. For example, the 
Christian Science Monitor is generally regarded to report upon the conflict in an 
unbiased manner. This balanced reportage however, is the exception, rather than 
the rule. Nevertheless, it shall also be argued that although the U.S. mainstream 
media has primarily portrayed their 'Arab' during the lulls of the Oslo peace 
process with such stereotypes as the Palestinian 'terrorist': elements undoubtedly 
exist within the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, (e.g., the Izzedin al-Qassim, 
Hamas' armed wing, and The Jewish Brigade, the armed wing of the Islamic-
Jihad, [often referred to as 'Holy War' in the U.S. 'prestigious press'] whom 
have themselves acted in a way that has not helped remove these deeply 
entrenched negative stereotypes.)49 
The Palestinian Authority's leadership has also not acted in a way to improve the 
media's portrayal of the conflict in favour of the Palestinians. 5° There are several 
reasons for this: Firstly, it appears that there are many articulate Israelis ready 
and willing to utilise the U.S. media's channels in putting over their point of 
view.51 This is partly because of the length and nature of the 'special 
48 Hitchins, Christopher, 'Realpolitik in the Gulf a Game Gone Tilt', in Si fry, Micah, L. and Cerf, 
Christopher, [Eds.], The Gulf War Reader, pp. 107-108. And: Farrel, Stephen, 'Iraqis try to move 
on while regime plays statues' The Times, February 27,2001. And: Faour, Muhammad, Op-cit, p. 
89. 
49 Hamas: Harakat al-Muqawalat al-lslamiyya, in Hisham, Ahmad, H, Hamas: from religious 
salvation to political transformation. p. 9, and p. 29. And: Smith, Charles, D. Palestine and the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 301. The Jewish Brigade in Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Proliferating Islamic 
groups worry Israelis'. Guardian, November 3, 2000. 
50 At times Y as sir Arafat had acted irascibly and illogically during interviews concerning his 
handling of the Palestinians. However, recognition is made to the extreme pressure he was under. 
In response to Ehud Barak's ultimatum regarding the continuation of Palestinian violence. Yassir 
Arafat laughingly responded by saying "threats, threats, threats". In Goldenberg, Suzanne, Arafat 
laughs off new Barak ultimatum. Guardian, October 11, 2000. 
51 Ghareeb, Edmund, Op-cit., p. 21. 
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relationship', and also partly because traditionally the Israelis have always been 
gifted users of the media to promote and sustain their Zionist cause. 52 
This is to suggest that the Israelis understand the power of the media as a weapon 
of popular persuasion, and therefore seek to court it. 53 Indeed, it is possible to go 
further and claim that a large proportion of the negative stereotyping of the Arab 
in the U.S. mainstream media is in itself generated by prominent Israeli 
appearances on CNN, ABC, etc., or in interviews conducted by Newsweek or 
Time Magazine for example. And furthermore, the rhetoric that these prominent 
and articulate Israeli's promote in these TV appearances is absorbed and 
transmitted by the journalists and editors within the media channels. 
This is, in the main, also true of British media reportage of the conflict. It is quite 
usual to have the opinion of a prominent Israeli politician or intellectual such as 
Shimon Peres, or Amos Oz printed in a mainstream 'broadsheet' such as the 
Guardian, or the Independent, whereas it is highly unusual to have an opinion of 
someone representing the Palestinians of such high political calibre. 54 (Arguably, 
because such a polity does not exist within the 'youthful' Palestinian Authority, 
and moreover, because of the many apparent divisions within this polity.) 55 This 
apparent lack of representation, it has previously been argued by some, is due to 
an Arab misunderstanding of the power of the media in promoting their cause.56 
(In the utilisation of the media as a tool for public awareness, Arab entities have 
traditionally been considered as slow to catch on. Nevertheless, this is certainly 
no longer the case.)57 
52 Said, Edward, W. The End of the Peace Process, p. 56. 
53 Ibid. p. 110. 
54 Said, Edward, W. The Question of Palestine, p. 40. 
55 Recognition is made of the not too infrequent appearance of Hanan Ashrawi in the British 
media however, although she represents the Palestinians, she does not necessarily reflect the 
position of the Palestinian Authority per se. 
56 Ghareeb, Edmund, (An interview with Nick Thimmesch.) Op-cit, p. 78. 
57 In the latest flare up i.e., post Sept 28, 2000, two examples show how the Palestinians 
understand the power of the media. Repeated TV broadcasting of the killing of Muhammad al-
Durrah, in the West Bank, and the utilisation of an Italian camera crew's footage of the 'bloody' 
reprisal i.e., the lynching of the two lost Israelis soldiers. See, Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Boy's death 
stokes up battle for Jerusalem'. Guardian, October 2, 2000, and Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'When 
they blundered into the baying mob they sealed their fate'. Guardian, October 13, 2000. And: 
Corn well, Rupert, 'Can presence of photographers distort events and alter history?' Independent, 
March 23, 2001. 
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In this aspect, TV journalism reporting upon the conflict potentially conveys 
more accurate and reliable reportage, as the mainstream broadsheets lack the 
ability to report live coverage and are not as quick in their delivery of news to 
their target audiences as is satellite conveyed TV reportage. 58 Furthermore, 
journalistic accounts that are targeted for the broadsheets go through a process of 
recasting by editors and are very often traditionally formulaic in their style of 
reporting the conflict.59 (In this instance, reflecting a pro-Israeli bias). In Israel 
TV camera crews, however, still undergo rigorous censorship and militarily 
imposed restrictions upon their reportage. Therefore, in many ways we should 
consider what we are not being shown of the conflict on TV if we are to reach a 
more thorough conclusion. This obviously gives rise to some surmise and 
supposition, which arguably is not necessarily overly damaging in any overall 
analysis of events. 
In light of the above considerations, it seems reasonable to suggest that a large 
proportion of the negative Arab stereotyping found within U.S. mainstream 
media, is on the whole generated in Israel itself through both its laws of 
censorship and by its own propaganda machine. This is aimed at keeping a 
constant public awareness of the much lauded threat to Israel from the Arab 
World, and a constant awareness of the vulnerability of the physical, and 
ideological position of Zionism viz. Israe1.60 
Furthermore, it gives credence to the hegemonic aspect of the 'special 
relationship' in as much as Israel enacts a heavily U.S. influenced foreign policy, 
and enforces her own regional hegemonic superiority over her Arab neighbours, 
usually, but not always backed by the tacit approval of the White House.61 In 
essence, the closeness of the 'special relationship' at times renders Israel as the 
58 Hughes, John, 'New media technology increases the pressure to get the story right.' Christian 
Science Monitor, May 3, 1996. 
59 Said, Edward, W. Covering Islam, p. 52. 
60 Benziman, Uri, Sharon: An Israeli Caeser, p. 64 
61 Consider the reluctant condemnation of Israel's fatal 'shelling' of the UN compound of Qana 
(south Lebanon), April 18, 1996, or the subtle wording of the U.S. call for Israeli moderation in 
the post September 28, 2000, violence. See: Fisk, Robert, 'Truth brings reality to PR show at 
Qana', Independent, April22, 1996, and Reeves, Phi!, 'Bombs, bullets and accusations fly across 
Gaza'. Independent, November 23,2000. 
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U.S. sponsored regional enforcer of U.S./Israeli jointly dictated Middle Eastern 
foreign policy. Furthermore, the U.S. very often acts on behalf of the West as a 
judge and jury (the global policeman), whilst Israel acts at times as the 
executioner of U.S. perceived justice in the Middle Eastern sphere of the West's 
collective 'interests'. 62 
Moreover, because of the sheer military and political power that Israel can 
generate for herself through the dynamics of the 'special relationship' with the 
U.S., she is able to pursue her own agendas with an almost unrestrained 
'freehand' .63 Therefore, in this context, the analogy of Israel representing a 
Mediterranean based American state is not wholly invalid. Nevertheless, 
historical and cultural reasons can also be proffered to explain the closeness of 
this 'special relationship'. 
Many U.S. citizens empathise with the Israelis as pioneers surrounded by 
savages due to their own history. For this cultural affiliation they draw an 
analogy to the Israeli pioneering with that of the early New Englanders whom 
settled the Americas, and overcame their own created savage i.e., the indigenous 
American Indian.64 Furthermore, in the U.S., there exists today a cultural 
attachment to the 'Wild West' and an affinity with the image of the cowboy i.e., 
the righteous pioneer opposing the immoral savage: the bringer of good, as the 
avenger of evil: the propagator of moral righteousness, the teacher, the judge and 
sometimes as the executioner. 65 
62 This is certainly evident in the field of counter terrorism through the close connection that 
Mossad has with its U.S. counterpart the CIA. See Netanyahu Benjarnin, Op-cit. And Walker, 
Christopher, and Dunn, Ross. 'Major pledges to sever Hamas charity lifeline'. The Times, March 
14, 1996. 
63 Again consider Israel's 'preventative' incursions into southern Lebanon in search of Hizbollah 
positions, See: Fisk, Robert, 'UN evidence heaps more blame on Israelis'. Independent, April 22, 
1996. And in Fisk, Robert, 'Truth brings reality to PR show at Qana'. Independent, April 22, 
1996. 
64 Hague, Mazharul, 'Elements of Cross Cultural communication and the M.E'. In Kamalipour, 
Yahya, R. Op-cit., p.l9. 
65 Orkin, David, 'The complete guide to the Rio Grande'. Independent: The Traveller, May 20, 
2000. And: Hoggart, Simon, 'Ride 'em cowboy', Guardian, February 24, 2001. 
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It is arguable, however, that the cultural attachment to the 'Wild West' has 
somewhat been supplanted by other forms of pioneering, which are no less 
attached to the concept of the morally righteous crusader opposing the immoral 
savage. Nevertheless, there does remain a committed hardcore cowboy (and 
cowgirl), element in U.S. mainstream society, particularly in the southern states 
e.g., in Texas, New Mexico etc. For further evidence of an attachment to a 
general concept of pioneering consider the tradition of game hunting in the U.S. 
(and Canada), as immortalised in the classic anti-Vietnam movie Deer Hunter 
(1978).66 
These other forms of pioneering that have largely superseded a cultural 
attachment to the old 'Wild West', is firstly, U.S. militarism per se, as embodied 
in her experiences and lessons both given and received during the Vietnam 
imbroglio, which was clearly an exercise in pioneering and colonialism for some. 
Consider Captain Kurtz 'going up river' in the dubiously fictional account of 
U.S. intelligence's special operations in Nam, Laos, and Cambodia: immortalised 
in the movie Apocalypse Now (1979). 67 Indeed, 'Americans in Vietnam, for 
instance, referred to Vietcong-controlled territory as 'Indian country' a phrase 
reporters sometimes adopted.68 The second form is the U.S. obsession with the 
pioneering of space (the final frontier), embodied in her achievements of landing 
on the moon (1969), or the Ronald Reagan envisioned 'Star Wars' project 
(1983), as it was nicknamed to connect with the definitive science fiction movie 
of the same name (Lucas Films, 1977).69 
This pioneering spirit IS further evidenced in an American obsession with 
extraterrestrial life forms that are invariably portrayed as threatening, immoral, 
66 Rabinovitz, Lauren, & Jeffords, Susan, [Eds.] Op-cit, p. 26. 
67 Dubious because Kurtz played by Marlon Brando was apparently based on a genuine top U.S. 
military brass that went rogue whilst undertaking an insurgency mission in Laos. For a far 
superior account of colonialism see Comad, Joseph, The Heart of Darkness (1902), which 
Apocalypse Now, was loosely based upon. See: Campbell, Duncan, 'Apocalypse again with new 
version of cult film' Guardian, February 28, 2001. And: Said, Edward, W. The Question of 
Palestine, p. 76. 
68 Hallin, Daniel, C. 'Images of the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars in U.S. Television'. In 
Rabinovitz, Lauren, & Jeffords, Susan, [Eds.] Op-cit. p. 40. 
69 See: 'Film in Context: Star Wars' by Kramer, Peter, in History Today Vol., 49 (3) March 1999. 
pp. 41-47. 
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bloodthirsty, etc. These demonised extraterrestrials it is argued have replaced the 
King Kong (1933) and the Godzilla (1955) creations i.e., the representatives of 
the Fascist threat ravaging Europe, and the Communist 'Cold War' other. 
In essence, it is argued, that in many ways a healthy approach to the principles of 
pioneering typify what it means to be a true and good American. This cultural 
identification has its reflection in Israel, and indeed, the constant low-level nature 
of the conflict, her handling of the Occupied Territories, and her frequent border 
incursions, alongside the phenomenon of Zionist colonial settlement of Judea and 
Samaria (the Palestinian's West Bank), are loosely reflective (minus the whisky 
and fur-traders), of the 'Plains Culture' that ravaged the Americas between the 
1860's and 1890's.70 This is particularly evidenced in the phenomenon of 
'spoliation' .71 Indeed, 'the colonial policy of the Zionists in Palestine, 
implemented with the assistance of the imperialist states, especially that of the 
USA, applies the same racist methods which the North American colonizers 
applied towards the indigenous Indians' .72 
Furthermore, in the context of Israel, the Palestinian terrorist is equated with the 
scalping Red Skin. Both peoples (latterly the Palestinians and the American 
Indians) have therefore been equally denigrated and dehumanised. Consequently, 
their struggle against the self-appointed colonial overseer(s) is not considered 
legitimate because of the colonialist's artful use of labelling. The Palestinian 
resister cannot be considered as a soldier, and the youthful martyr becomes an 
insane religious fanatic, just as the Indian savages of the early American colonial 
settlers could never have been considered as braves. 
The purpose of this negative labelling is first and foremost as a means of 
legitimising the nefarious activities of the colonialists, which in their early form 
were directed at the total annihilation of the indigenous host race. (Consider the 
plight of the indigenous American Indians and their suffering on their 'trail of 
70 Brown, Dee, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, p. 11. 
71 See Brogan, Hugh, The Penguin History of the United States of America, p. 67. 
72 Goranov, Stefan, 'Racism a Basic Principle of Zionism' in Zionism and Racism, International 
Organisation for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. p. 28. 
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tears' etc.) 73 Second, and clearly, constant negative labelling is used as one of 
the means of sustaining the subjugation of such a host. In an extreme form, if you 
are the colonialist using such a method, then your aim is the total dehumanisation 
of your host, and the consigning of them (as in a peoples), into a psychological 
oblivion, for this assists in embarking upon a little regional genocide. Such was 
the methodology that underpinned the genocide of the Armenians, the Ibo of 
Nigeria, the Bengalis of Bangladesh, and of course the Shoah or Jewish 
Holocaust. More recent examples can be found in both Bosnia, Rwanda, and to 
some extents in Chechnya. 74 
In the U.S., in the context of Israel, a twisted logic and perverse reflection of this 
righteous pioneer thinking is frequently referred to as 'The David and Goliath' 
analogy. (David represents morality: Goliath is the perceived evil to be 
overcome.) Furthermore, and significant in this thinking, Israel is surrounded by 
many aggressive Arab states wrought with anger, and bent upon the total 
annihilation of the Zionist entity. 75 
With regard to American empathy for Israel resting upon the principles of the 
pioneer vs. savage or the good vs. evil dictum, this is further compounded 
through a consideration of the actions of the American Christian missionaries 
that arrived in the Middle East, who, whilst searching for converts in the 19th 
century came across many barriers evident in both Muslims and Islam, namely in 
culture and religion.76 It is to be noted that it was much of the literature written 
by these missionaries on their experiences in the Middle East, Africa, and South 
America that shaped the American populace's perceptions of the others who 
lived outside of the New World. It is this aspect that has a great deal of 
responsibility for the way that the other is perceived in the U.S. today. The 
American perception and fear of Islam as perpetuated by the 'media complex' 
73 Brown, Dee, Op-cit., pp. 1-30. 
74 Politkovskaya, Anna, 'How the heroes of Russia turned into the tormentors of Chechnya.' 
Guardian, February 27,2001. 
75 Daniel, AnneMarie, A. 'U.S. media Coverage of the lnifada and American Public opinion'. In 
Kamalipour, Yahya, R. Op-cit, p.66. 
76 Ibid. 
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however, is worthy of a separate study.77 With regards to the Arab/Israeli conflict 
it is sufficient to state that Islam has a pervading influence upon both perceptions 
of the conflict, and upon many of its internal dynamics, as will be discussed. 
In addition to the above, and perhaps of a slightly lesser importance within the 
dynamics of the 'special relationship' is the legacy of the Jewish Holocaust of 
Europe (c.1942).78 Such a profound catastrophe impacts many people's psyches, 
no less so than the congenial American.79 Moreover, the Holocaust is still a 
relatively recent event in Jewish history, and therefore, any criticism of Israel, 
further mitigates accusations of anti-Semitism, even though the U.N. charged 
Zionism of being a racist entity much to the disapproval of the U.S. mainstream 
media at the U.N. summit of November 1975.80 (UN Res. 3379, was revoked, 
however, in December 1991.)81 
Americans further empathise with Israel and with many Israelis, because of what 
could be considered to represent a feeling of cultural proximity, and also because 
of a considered existence of cultural universals i.e., language (but obviously not 
with lvrit 'modem' Hebrew), moral values, and applied ethics, etc. 82 This can be 
taken further however, for it can be argued that just as the 'modem' U.S.A. was 
founded through the liberal usage of the Winchester repeating rifle and the Colt 
'peacemaker' revolver (purposefully ignoring the very early European settlers 
and their flintlocks.), so too was Israel founded, through the usage of a British 
supplied Enfield. (Reference is being made to the British suppression of the Arab 
revolt of 1936-39, arguably the real 'beginning of the end' of Palestine.)83 And 
furthermore, this dubious 'Right to Bear Arms' has found expression through 
both Israeli law and societal militarism.84 
77 See: Said, Edward, Covering Islam. 
78 Hudson, Micheal, C. The Media and the Arabs: room for improvement, In Hudson, Michael, C. 
[Ed.], The Media and the Arabs. p. 98. 
79 Hersh, Seymour, M. The Samson Option, p. 90. 
80 The Executive Council of the International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, Op-Cit. p. vii. And: Said, Edward, W. The Question of Palestine, p. 111. 
81 Davis, Uri, The State of Palestine, p. 15. And: King, John, Handshake in Washington: The 
Beginning of Middle East Peace? p. 145. 
82 Hague, Mazharul, 'Elements of Cross Cultural Communication and the M.E'. In Kamalipour, 
Yahya, R. Op-cit., p. 19. 
83 Kimmerling, Baruch, & Migdal, Joel, S. The Palestinians: The Making of a People, p. 279. 
84 Whitaker, Brian, 'Israelis gear up for armed struggle'. Guardian, October 26,2000. 
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Ideologically, Zionism was founded upon an amalgam of European ideologies.85 
And its chief architects came from a known and understood Western European 
intellectual tradition. 86 (Herbert Spencer's Eugenics, Social Darwinism, and 
Friedrich Nietsche's Ubennensche [the concept of the Superman i.e., man 
overcoming himself],87 were all philosophical concepts that were in vogue in the 
latter half of the 19th century.) Therefore, accessibility to the Zionist (rather than 
Jewish in this instance) mind, viz. psyche, it is argued, is comparatively easier for 
an American to facilitate than it is with the more frequently unknown Arab. 
This empathy with Israel however, is founded upon an oversimplification of 
what 'modem' Israel actually represents, as it does not take into account the 
multifarious divisions evident in Judaism, and in Israel's political and social 
structure where several Jewish denominations compete against a populace with 
strong secular sentiments. Furthermore, it also fails to recognise the cultural 
differentiation and social stratification evident within these groups. The reality is 
that Judaism, like Islam and Christianity (the American religion) is far from 
being a simple religious homogenous entity, as is so often interpreted by many 
home-grown Americans. 
Israel, to many observers also represents a supposed 'lone democracy in a sea of 
dictatorships'. 88 This consideration however, is in reality another myth that 
requires critical examination on account of Israel's own behaviour in her 
administration of the Occupied Territories since 1967.89 Furthermore, such a 
consideration is born out of ignorance and suspicion of the other, once again a 
consideration of Israel that could be associated with the phenomenon of a 
perceived cultural proximity with the U.S. Nevertheless, the very term 
'democracy' in the case of Israel is a misnomer; for the definition of the state is 
85 Chomsky, Noam, Peace in the Middle East, p. 12. 
86 See: Leo Pinsker, Autoemanzipation, 1882, Theodore Herzl, Der Judenstaat 1896, et al. In 
Laquer, Waiter, A History of Zionism. pp. 54-84. 
87 Urmson, J.O. & Ree, Jonathan, [Eds.], The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and 
Philosophers, p. 225. 
88 Shlaim, A vi, Op-cit, p. 507. 
89 Guyatt, Nicholas, Op-cit, p. 77. 
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that it is Jewish, i.e., a theocracy, which automatically excludes approximately 
one million Arab-Israelis from proper democratic representation. 90 
Recognition however, is given to the fact that Israel was for a brief spell at the 
beginning of her history i.e., during her 'War of Independence' (1948-49), which 
is equally referable to as the Arab's al-Nakbah (Catastrophe), considered to 
represent the biblical David opposing an Arab 'Goliath'. Such a consideration 
possesses no validity today, and has not since the defeat of the Arab Coalition in 
the June War of 1967. If the analogy is still credible then Israel may well 
represent David, but the U.S. could be considered to represent 'the stone for the 
slingshot' for such is the nature of the 'special relationship'. Several examples 
could be cited for evidence of this statement, ranging from the military hardware 
supplied to Israel, and the CIA's involvement in the Gaza and West Bank 
controlled by George Tenet (another cutting tooth), to maintain U.S. hegemonic 
control over the 'peace process's implementation on the ground.91 
Moreover, Israel in reality has nothing to fear from a potential holocaust. And 
quite contrary to any Israeli fear from mass extermination, or an Arab inspired 
genocide, it could be argued (and has) by the most ardent anti-Zionists that the 
Palestinians are the ones that actually are at threat from such an act of gross 
inhumanity. (Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War did however threaten to bring 
down a rain of fire over Israel, and turn the state into an oven with Scud missile 
attacks upon Tel Aviv, in a cynical reference to the ovens of Aushwitz.) 92 To 
many, however, (usually disenfranchised Palestinians), the Gaza Strip represents 
the largest prison on earth, the identity card is considered a synonym of the 
infamous Jewish Star; the curfews, the forerunner of total incarceration. 93 
Although the Arab Coalition did supposedly once threaten to 'drive Israel into 
the sea' when war broke out (May 1948), no real evidence for the veracity of this 
90 Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Outsider finds his way in Sharon's inner sanctum'. Guardian, March 
27,2001. 
91 Black, Ian, 'Playing the security game, with CIA as referee'. Guardian, October 20, 2000. 
92 Caldarola, Victor, J. 'Time and the Television War'. In Rabinovitz, Lauren, & Jeffreys, Susan, 
Op-cit. p. 102. 
93 Goldenberg, Suzanne, '3m Palestinians trapped in prison that once was home'. Guardian, 
October 24,2000. And: Guyatt, Nicholas, Op-cit, p. 97, and p. 113. 
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statement exists. 94 And furthermore, although recognition is given to the call for 
the disestablishment of Israel in the founding covenant of the PLO (1964), this 
much quoted Arab statement was effectively repealed in November 1988 at the 
Algiers Summit when Arafat recognised Israel's de jure existence, and agreed to 
a 22% claim of territory.95 
On the contrary, evidence does exist to prove that the Israelis did practice an 
active policy of disenfranchisement and enforced an Arab Exodus during the 
Jewish War of Independence.96 The realisation of this aforementioned Arab 
threat however, even if now desired by the majority of Arabs, which it is not, 
isn't militarily viable.97 Furthermore, they (the more moderate Arab states) have 
realised that the expending of any energy in trying to dislodge the thorn in the 
Arab side is a waste, and that it is in fact far better to concentrate on economic 
development in which the Arabs require an accommodation with Israel. This is a 
far better prospect for the future than a constant state of belligerency with an 
uncompromising, and indefatigable Israeli fait accompli. In short, the Arabs can 
no more dismantle Israel today than they could at any time in the past, a fact that 
the Arab moderates now well recognise. 
Therefore, referral to the Holocaust, and any reference to the potentiality of one 
occurring in the future by Israel as a legitimisation of their activities is to play 
upon the sympathies of the misinformed i.e., for the sake of this study, the 
general subscriber of the U.S. mainstream media. In Israel there exists an 
obsession with reflection upon the Holocaust: Israeli conscripts are route 
marched to Yad Vashem, the Holocaust Remembrance Authority's memorial 
94 Peretz, Kidron, 'Truth Whereby Nations Live', in Hitchins, Christopher & Said, Edward, W. 
[Eds.], Op-cit, p. 88. And: Shlaim, A vi, Op-cit, p. 463. 
95 Engleberg, Stephan, 'Christopher is said to have given impetus to Israeli-Palestinian deal'. New 
York Times, August 30, 1993. And, Schiff, Ze'ev, & Ya'ari, Ehud, lntifada; The Palestinian 
Uprising -Israel's Third Front, p. 284. 
96 Said, Edward, W. The Question of Palestine, p. 101. 
97 Moughrabi, Fouad, 'The Oslo Process and the Arab World' In Giacamon, George, & Lorring, 
Dag, J. Op-cit, pp. 48-49. 
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museum (f.1953) regularly throughout the period of their service.98 And so too 
are schoolchildren in a bid to endorse a 'lest we forget' culture as-
'Forgetfulness leads to exile. 
Remembrance [my emphasis] is the secret of redemption.' 
(Baal Shem Tov) 99 
It is arguable that this 'lest we forget' culture is an unofficial Israeli export. 100 
Many Americans (and others), it is suggested, helped make Israel strong through 
their work on the Kibbutzim etc., whilst U.S. servicemen 'bought it in Nam'. 
Nevertheless, many of these Kibbutzniks however, took home with them fond 
memories of the former Palestinian orange groves and a visit to Masada 
(Capemeum)101 with many of the myths of Israel firmly supplanted in their 
minds i.e., the Zionists had indeed 'made the desert bloom', and all the while 
they had suffered relentless persecution: 102 then in June 1967, Israel founded the 
greatest myth that underpins her existence, for she miraculously smashed the 
Arab Coalition, 103 in a spectacular display of militarism that so impressed the 
Western world they were inspired by it, 104 particularly as the U.S. were at that 
time having their behinds kicked in Vietnam, all the while believing that their 
David was morally right and militarily unbeatable. 105 
Israel was no longer a timid David though: for she had now become the confident 
regional Goliath, 106 and for the next three and a half decades she would act 
towards her Arab neighbours debatably in an arrogant and chauvinistic manner 
98 Porat, Dina, 'Attitudes of the Young State of Israel Toward the Holocaust and its Survivors', in 
Silberstein, Lawrence, J. [Ed.], New Perspectives on Israeli History: The Early Years of the State, 
p. 169. 
99 Quoted in Pilcer, Sonia, 'Viewpoint: 2G' The Jerusalem Post, June 11, 1993. 
100 See: Brittan, Samuel, The Holocaust Industry (A book review of Norvick, Peter, The 
Holocaust in Collective Memory, and Finkelstein, Norman, G. The Holocaust Industry), 
Prospect, November 2000. 
101 Masada (Caperneum) is the site of the Jews final resistance to Roman persecution, which led 
to their [the Jews] mass suicide in AD 70. 
102 Isaacs, John, D. American Jews in Israel, pp. 35-36, and pp. 105-168. 
103 Wallach, Janet, & Wallach, John, Arafat: In the Eyes of the Beholder, p. 480. 
104 Hersh, Seymour, M. The Samson Option, pp. 167-168. 
105 Woolacott, Martin, 'The militarised rivals who upstage the rest of the world'. Guardian, July 
21,2000. 
106 Wallach, Janet & Wallach, John, Arafat in the Eyes of the Beholder, p. 34. 
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upon the strength of this one single conclusive victory. 107 Furthermore, this 
victory would have massive repercussions on Israeli politics and society, a theme 
that is picked up later in the 'media frame' concerning the 'Hebron Massacre' .108 
Moreover the myth that Israel is an entity which the Americans possess a cultural 
proximity with may once have had validity in the period of the first three Aliyas 
(Migrations), i.e., in the days of the Yishuv (proto-state) and in the very early 
period of the post 1948 period when the early Jewish settlers (homesteaders) 
could very loosely be considered as pioneers. But even in this, such a considered 
cultural proximity rests upon the scantest evidence of validity for the early 
Jewish settlers of then Palestine were of two sorts, those of a sophisticated, 
educated and in some ways elite of Western Europe, (Herzlian Jews), and those 
quite the opposite from the East separated by great differences in language, 
culture, and religious orientation. 109 Neither, in reality possessing very much in 
common with the principles of pioneering and both quite capable of finding a 
closer cultural proximity with other surrogates, for example, arguably for a time 
with Russia when there was economic stability (1900's), or even at the point of 
the inception of 'political' Zionism, with Imperial Germany (c.1896). Today, 
however, Israel is a well developed and ultra modem, but much divided country, 
that could almost be rent in two, leaving a strict orthodox religious north, and an 
equally austere secular south, with very little in common with the pioneering 
opportunism of 'Uncle Sam'. 110 
Finally, and as has been suggested, Israel as a 'lone democracy in a sea of 
dictatorships' has to be questioned. Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben 
Gurion it is argued purposefully kept Israel in a state of belligerence with her 
107 Chomsky, Noam, 'Middle Eastern Terrorism and the American Ideological System', in 
Hitchins, Christopher, & Said, Edward, W. [Eds.], Op-cit, p. 102. 
108 Said, Edward, Peace and its Discontents, p. 56. 
109 Levy, Richard, S [Ed.], Antisemitism in the Modern World, p. 20. And: Sluglett, Peter, & 
Sluglett, Marion, F. [Eds.], Op-cit. p. 116. 
110 Cornwell, Tim, 'US Jews fear that Israel is casting them adrift'. Independent, November 16, 
1996.Cockburn, Patrick, 'Haredi tighten grip on Jerusalem'. Independent, November 16, 1996. 
And: Champion, Daryl, Religious Fundamentalism- A Threat to Israel? In White & Logan [Eds.], 
Remaking the Middle East. pp. 298-299. And: Reeves, Phil, 'Revenge attacks spread to Israel's 
secular heartland' Independent, October 11, 2000. And: Avishai, Bernard, Lost Tribes of Israel, 
Prospect, June 2001. 
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Arab neighbours in the formative years of the state, i.e., 1948-63 offering no 
accommodation with them whatsoever. It was this foreign policy that has meant 
that Israel's democracy has been partially determined by an aspect of 
militarism.lll This is to say, that nearly all the leading figures in Israel's history 
have come through an academy of militarism (Allon, Dayan, Begin, Rabin, 
Netanyahu, Barak, Sharon, et al), and as such, certain militaristic doctrines 
underpin Israel's so called democracy. This can be seen in a visit to Jerusalem on 
any stone-throwing Friday afternoon, nominally called 'days of rage' (full strike 
days), 112 where the Gaza Strip and West Bank are sealed off by the Israeli 
Defence Forces and both Palestinian and Israeli civilians arguably have equally 
restricted ease of movement although the armed Jewish settlers of the West Bank 
have a personal bodyguard comprising a proportionately large contingent from 
the IDF. 113 
Examination of Israel's human rights abuses and her failure to comply with 
several articles of the Geneva Convention (1948), in this instance particularly 
article 19, and the lack of compliance with UN Resolution 242 (1967), and 338 
(1973), further illustrate this point. 114 Israel might have the apparent outside 
appearance of a democracy, but this should not be understood to represent a 
democracy in the Western sense. In many of Israel's aspects she has more in 
common with other regimes in the Middle East that rely on their intelligence 
services (Mukhabarat), and police to maintain their hegemonic control i.e., Syria, 
Iraq, or to some extents Egypt. 115 Moreover, this observation stands outside of 
what Israel is, namely, a Jewish state comprising a mixed Jewish and Arab 
111 Said, Edward, W. The End of the Peace Process, p. 245. And: Said, Edward, W. The Question 
of Palestine, p. 105. 
112 Burke, Jason, 'Child martyrs line up to die'. Observer, October 8, 2000. And: Schiff, Ze'ev & 
Ya'ari, Ehud, lntifada: The Palestinian Uprising -Israel's Third Front, p. 247. 
113 Times Magazine, Diaries of Hope and Hate: five days in the Middle East, October 30, 2000. 
pp. 36-43. 
114 Article 19 of the Geneva Convention 1948, states that: 'Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.' See, The 
Committee for the Protection of Journalists, Journalism under Occupation. October 1988. p. XI. 
UN Resolution 242 calls for Israel's withdrawal from the Occupied Territories to a prewar state. 
(June 1967) UN Resolution 338 confirms this, and urges the recognition of the Palestinians right 
to self-determinism explicitly through a 'negotiated settlement'. See: Ashrawi, Hanan, 'This Side 
of Peace' p. 85. Regarding the texts pertaining to these resolutions, see: King, John, Handshake 
in Washington: The Beginning of Middle East Peace, Appendix VI, pp. 224-225. 
115 Faour, Muhammad, Op-cit. p. 46. 
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populace. The state with its theocratic nature however, cannot recognise Arabs, 
and therefore, is not remotely democratic in a Western sense, because as was 
suggested, it excludes approximately one million of its citizens. (A potential 
source of much future trouble for Israel's domestic stability.) 
The reawakening of the Uprising (lntifada) i.e., post September 28, 2000, may 
gain the Palestinians some support in Western, particularly U.S. media 
interpretations, as the young stone-throwers (Shabab), and al-Fatah's 'apparatus' 
(Tanzim) units reverse the traditional U.S. interpretation of the conflict. 116 In the 
long term, however, images of the Palestinian youth as martyrs (Shuhada), 
hooded Hamas activists, and the ululating female relatives of the deceased, shall 
only serve to disaffect the audiences of the U.S. mainstream media channels. 117 
This American audience shall probably determine that the best course of action 
for a resolution to the conflict is to listen and empathise with the more rational, 
democratic, and culturally similar Israelis. Influenced primarily by the long 
tradition of a pro-Israeli anti-Arab reportage in the mainstream media and 
facilitated as has been suggested, by the nature and closeness of the 'special 
relationship', and furthered by such horrific media frames depicting the conflict 
either visually, or by a narrative, which have a dulling switch off effect (empathy 
fatigue) in the long term amongst the audience. 
In reality, some members of a media audience (armchair Generals) might hanker 
after reportage of the glory of war. To most, however, the Arab/Israeli conflict is 
far removed from their consciousness both spiritually and physically. 118 It could 
therefore be argued, that this is one of the dynamics of the constancy of negative 
stereotypical Arab portrayals in the U.S. and Western mainstream media per se. 
It can also be considered however, to represent a question of audience proximity, 
116 Shabab, 'Youths', in Daniel, Anne-Marie, A. 'U.S. Media Coverage of the lntifada and 
American Public Opinion'. In Kamalipour, Yahya, R. Op-cit., p. 68. Al-Fatah: Harakat al-Tahrir 
al-Falistin. In Chailand, Gerard, The Palestinian Resistance. p. 60. 
117 Ghareeb, Edmund, Op-cit., p. 127. 
118 King, John, Handshake in Washington: the Beginning of Middle East Peace, p. 140. And: 
Moughrabi, Fouad, 'The Oslo Process and the Arab World' In Giacamon, George, & Lorring, 
Dag, J. [Eds.], Op-cit, p. 57. 
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i.e., the more liable that an audience is to be directly affected by a conflict, the 
more likely the need for, and desire of, a more balanced reportage. 
Another potential reason for eventual preferred empathy with Israel in the 
conflict is that the Israelis have traditionally been able to manipulate media 
portrayals of their position within it, using the many channels that are a by-
product of Israeli and U.S. hegemony. For example, the two large American 
broadsheets the Washington Post, and the New York Times are both Jewish 
owned. 119 Yet again, this is not to suggest that a Jewish conspiracy exists, as it is 
estimated that this ownership is approximately only 3.2% of the U.S. media 
conglomeration, generating some 8% of U.S. media reportage. 120 What is 
accepted though, is that there are many Jews working within the 'media-
complex', i.e., journalists, editors, media moguls etc. This aspect, coupled with 
the power of persuasion possessed by American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
and others in the 'Jewish Lobby', over Congress suggests that pro-Israeli 
reportage is the order of the day: perhaps, for no other reason, than self-interest. 
One last point needs to be broached, however. What of the power of the 
American 'Arab Lobby', and why has this umbrella organisation failed to raise 
the status of U.S. mainstream media led Arab perceptions? The answer, it is 
feared, is that the 'Arab Lobby' although extant, (i.e., The Council of American 
Islamic Relations) it has in the main, historically been frozen out from 
participation in American political life, generally at all its levels. (There are of 
course some exceptions.) This is also true of the 'Arab Lobby' in Canada where 
the large Arab community of Toronto is also poorly represented. The reason for 
this, it is suggested, derives from the nature of the U.S./Israel 'special 
relationship' and its longevity. The power of the 'Jewish Lobby'; its persuasive 
capability over the 'media complex' and its self preservationist instincts, resting 
upon the premise that 'all is for Israel', dictates that there exists an impenetrable 
119 Bell, Steve, 'American Journalism Practices, Constraints and Middle East Reportage'. In 
Hudson, Michael, C. & Wolfe, Ronald, G. [Eds.], The American Media and the Arabs. p. 56. 
120 Isaacs, Stephen, 'Jewish Bank, Newspaper Control Myth Continues', The Washington Post, 
November 21, 1974. In Hudson, Michael, C. Op-cit, p.96. 
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wall, that shall for a long time shroud U.S. perceptions, and mainstream media 
portrayals of Arabs, and particularly of Palestinians, perhaps indefinitely. 
The theoretical framework that underpins this thesis utilizes a hegemonic 
interpretation (model) of the U.S. mainstream media. This allows for and 
recognizes existing differences between the classes of the established and ruling 
elites, leading influential movements, and members of the general public. 121 
Furthermore, and importantly, it also recognizes existing differences between the 
principles of good i.e., fair and honest journalism, with those interests of the 
leading corporations. In addition, differentiation is made between what is 
considered as real information, and government or otherwise engineered 
propaganda. 122 
Furthermore, this thesis shall refer to the relationship that exists between the 
ruling elites i.e., for the sake of this study the U.S. Administration and the U.S. 
mainstream media as the 'media complex'. This 'media complex' comprises the 
U.S. governmental apparatus, namely, the policy implementers, policy makers, 
and its spokespersons, and their symbiotic relationship with the media moguls, 
editors, journalists, and finally the columnists. And it shall also be argued that 
the U.S. Administration implicitly utilizes the media and its networks to advance 
its own agendas, interests, and naturally its hegemonic control over emergent 
groups within the U.S., as well as over established hierarchies from outside of 
this once non-interventionist superpower. 123 
Never more tangible is the U.S. Administration's usage of the U.S. mainstream 
media than at a time of national crisis. Indeed, the U.S. Administration's control 
i.e., censorship and manipulation of information transmitted by the mainstream 
media channels dates back to the U.S./Vietnam War where freedom of 
expression in the media threatened to seriously erode public support for that 
121 See, Kellner, Douglas, Op-cit., pp. 58-59. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Said, Edward, W. The End of the Peace Process, pp. 54-55. 
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war! 24 The first recognised 'live-time' TV war, The Gulf War, January 17, 1991-
February 26, 1991 125 showed conclusively that the U.S. Administration's 
manipulation of the U.S. mainstream media was evident on a large scale in both 
the usage of propaganda to justify the ensuing war against Iraq, and in the 
manipulation of the debate concerning the legitimacy and worthiness of the mass 
mobilization of the U.S. armed forces for the express conduct of that war. 126 
Nevertheless, it is argued that the manipulation of the U.S. mainstream media by 
the U.S. Administration occurs outside of the times of national crises. This is 
conducted purely as an exercise of maintaining governmental authority over the 
U.S. general public, as well as a means of maintaining and furthering U.S. 
hegemonic domination over the Middle East and Third World spheres of interest. 
Therefore, within the dynamics of the Arab/Israeli conflict it is argued that the 
pro Israeli bias that is still evident in the channels of the U.S. mainstream media 
today exists as a voice of the U.S. Administration. Indeed, this voice is used in 
the manipulation of the general public's opinion regarding the conflict, and 
subsequently directs this opinion towards a pro-Israeli orientation, which eases 
the case for legitimising the U.S. Administration's unwavering support for Israel, 
and the continuation of the 'special relationship'. In other words, the U.S. 'media 
complex' helps to propel the many myths that surround Israel through the 
channels of the mainstream media, in order to purposefully legitimise the 
continuation of the U.S. 'special relationship' with Israel, thus advancing Israel's 
own regional hegemonic superiority and also maintaining and furthering the 
U.S.'s own international hegemonic superiority. 
Alongside an hegemonic model of the U.S. mainstream media this study shall 
also utilize the principles expounded in Edward Said's 'Orientalism' (1978), to 
support and bolster many of the arguments proposed within the selected 'media 
124 Fletcher, Elaine, R. Israelis find news that fits only in print, Christian Science Monitor, May 
13, 1996. And: Said, Edward, W. The End of the Peace Process, p. 278. 
125 Thedoulou, Micheal, 'Saddam defeated but not destroyed'. The Times, February 26, 2001. 
And: Halliday, Fred, Op-cit, pp. 77-78. 
126 For accounts of the hegemonic relationship between the U.S. Administration and the U.S. 
media as practiced during the Gulf War see, Rabinovitz, Lauren, & Jeffords, Lauren, [Eds.], Op-
cit. And: Kellner, Douglas Op-cit. 
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frames' under analysis. 127 This is to suggest that partial recognition is given to 
the principle of the West's absorption of the East's cultural heritage since 
Napoleon's arrival at Alexandria in 1798, purely as a means of further advancing 
the West's imperial domination over the region. Furthermore, recognition is 
made to the tradition of the negative portrayal of the Turk, the African, and 
Oriental as the other, the savage, and the white man's burden; in relation to the 
Eastern Question, in the literatures of the West, concerning the Orient. 128 Indeed, 
this tradition of negative stereotypical portrayals of the Oriental that commenced 
at the close of the 181h century has been an ongoing Western generated tradition 
for two centuries. And, although at times throughout the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, this denigration fluctuated between a patronising romanticism of the 
Orient and the Oriental (i.e., Ms. Freya Stark, Major T.E. Lawrence, H.A.R. 
Gibb et al.) and a mildly racist deprecation, it has in the main remained largely 
negative to the point of becoming an almost unquestioned wisdom of the West. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider that much of the U.S. mainstream 
media's 'traditional denigration' of the Arab is nothing more than a continuation 
of this aforementioned 'Orientalism'. It is also possible to argue that the 'media 
complex' actually recognises these deeply entrenched notions of the other within 
the majority of the American general public, and utilizes methods to further 
entrench these notions, in order to purposefully promote their hegemonic 
practices. 129 This is not to suggest that the majority of the American general 
public are outright racists, but that such deeply entrenched notions can become 
equally deeply buried in collective consciousness. 130 Simply put, a racial 
statement or act by one person may not be considered necessarily as racially 
prejudiced by another person. Indeed racial prejudice can oftentimes become the 
norm for a society, and any veering away from this prejudice can be considered a 
perverse act, very often making it very difficult to overcome such conventional 
wisdoms. 
127 See, Edward Said W. Orientalism. London: Vintage Books. 1978. 
128 Early Western literature concerning the Orient made no differentiation between the Turk, the 
Muslim, and the Oriental. 
129 Said, Edward, W. Covering Islam, p. 157. 
130 Said, Edward, W. The Question of Palestine, p. xxxxii. 
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An analysis of the language employed in the construction of the reportage shall 
be undertaken i.e., is the language openly derogatory, anti-Arab, obviously pro-
Israeli, or just misleading? Furthermore, does it rest upon traditional negative 
stereotypes, and is there any evidence of 'semantic distortion'? 131 In other words, 
has there been a purposeful utilisation of pro-Israeli phraseology in reference to 
historical dates, place names, etc., over and above the usage of their Arab 
equivalents? 
Secondly, an overall evaluation of the proportion of the reportage relating to the 
conflict shall be undertaken, i.e., whether there is a tangible bias in the amount of 
Israeli reportage in ratio to Arab reportage evident in the media channels? 
Moreover, a consideration shall be made as to the location in the media source 
that such reportage is placed as traditionally Arab reportage has always followed 
Israel's in order of prominence in the U.S. 'prestigious press'. Indeed, if such 
potential Arab reportage was reported at all, for in the dynamics of the conflict 
many events frequently repeat themselves to the point of becoming un-
newsworthy i.e., Palestinian house demolitions, or nominated days of rage, 
arrests and detentions, etc. 
Thirdly, analysis shall also be undertaken of 'pop-art' and cartoons (although 
now rare) associated with the conflict and 'peace process'. Recognition is made, 
however, of the need to be cautious in any analysis of cartoons. As caricatures 
are by definition simplistic interpretations of the characters that they attempt to 
portray, and as such many of the negative stereotypes associated with the Arabs 
are hard to step away from, i.e., the flowing galabiyyah (robe), the kaffiyah 
(headdress), indeed, even the depiction of a camel evokes negative antiquarian 
stereotypical portrayals. 
Analysis shall also be undertaken of images utilised in the storyboards of 
newspapers and magazines. Does the mainstream media's utilisation of images to 
131 With reference to this use of language in U.S. media reportage it is recognised that 'semantic 
distortion' does occur. Consider the use of Temple Mt over 'Dome of the Rock', or the Yom 
Kippur War, which could also legitimately be referred to as the Ramadan War, or the Israeli's use 
of Judea and Samaria instead of the Palestinian's West Bank, i.e., the west bank of the Jordan 
River. 
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consolidate news coverage initially depict the Israelis as protagonists and the 
Arabs as antagonists? Is there a constant 'hero versus villain' depiction? Is there 
a bias of Palestinians being portrayed as 'terrorists' over and above the depiction 
of the Israeli's as 'vanguards'? In film footage, i.e., CNN, ABC, etc., are the 
Palestinians purposefully portrayed as poor, unaccomplished, degenerate, 
desperate, and fanatical, in comparison to the wealthy, successful, sophisticated, 
contented and rational Israelis? Additionally, does the dialogue that accompanies 
this media format consolidate any pro-Israeli depiction? (In other words, is TV 
film footage guilty of being the peddler of the myths that the U.S. empathy for 
Israel resides upon?) 
Such is the nature of the type of questions that shall be raised concerning the 
U.S. mainstream media's reportage concerning the Arab/Israeli conflict during 
the Oslo 'peace process'. It is not the aim of this thesis, however, to condemn 
such media coverage outright, as recognition is given to the reputation and 
overall integrity of the journalism conducted by the agents of the 'prestigious 
press'. 
Furthermore, journalists on the whole tend to report the facts as they receive 
them, and moreover, they tend to report truth. The fact that such reportage 
possesses a pro-Israeli bias, has more to do with the tradition of the U.S. 
mainstream media's coverage of the conflict since its beginning, and the 
continued pursuance of U.S. hegemonic practices. It is also not the aim of this 
thesis to argue which of the two combatants in this protracted and bitter conflict 
possesses the greater legitimacy to their claims. Recognition is given, however, 
to the fact that concessions need to be made and met on both sides, and a solution 
to the conflict cannot be found with a continued pursuance of the initiatives 
undertaken so far. 
This thesis determines to analyse the U.S. mainstream media's reportage of the 
Arab/Israeli conflict during the 'ill-fated' Oslo peace process objectively, and as 
best as it can be conducted, impartially. It is hoped that the 'media-frames' 
selected for analyses shall, firstly, lead to a strong overall interpretation of the 
major dynamics that have shaped both the conflict and peace process, and shall 
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result in a readable and contemporary historical narrative; because as was 
suggested, regardless of any pro-Israeli bias within the medium of the U.S. 
mainstream media, journalists tend to report both the facts as they are received, 
and moreover, they tend to convey truth. 
Although the 'media frames' selected might not appear to cover every issue, or 
indeed, the whole of the peace process, they have been selected because they 
cover themes that are recurrent within the general dynamics of the conflict and 
peace process, or that they constitute, oftentimes regrettably, real media events 
that cannot fail to solicit either media coverage or debate within the United 
States. Moreover, it is argued that these themes evident in the selected 'media 
frames' shall reoccur with unlimited frequency within the general dynamics of 
the conflict, until such a time as there is any real tangible shift in both the 
approach and attitudes of the players that attempt to orchestrate a lasting Middle 
Eastern peace settlement. Such a peace has regrettably never come to fruition in 
the Middle East for reasons that are well documented, but what this thesis, in the 
main, shall silently argue, is that as long as there is a continuation of a pro-Israeli 
bias within the channels of the U.S. mainstream media, then an unfair 
interpretation of the Arab/Israeli conflict shall continue to be perpetuated. This in 
the long term shall hinder the search for a lasting solution, because the peace 
process requires an honestly informed general public within the international 
community to get behind it, and apply pressure upon the players to deliver 
working solutions for peace. In essence, the Arab/Israeli conflict demands a fair, 
and even-handed justice, which the democratically minded West, could, if it 
really wished for it, comfortably administer. 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
'Birth or Stillbirth of the Oslo Peace Process?' 
Evidence exists to suggest that the signing of the Oslo 'peace accord' on 
September 13, 1993, was greeted with an overwhelming enthusiasm by the news 
hungry U.S. mainstream media channels. The argument that forms the basis of 
this particular 'media frame' however, is that such an enthusiasm was tentative, 
nervous, and very often cynical. 1 Moreover, many of the mainstream media's 
portrayals of the Palestinians and their leadership, were, in some instances, 
mildly racist. Indeed, it is argued, that much of the reportage continued to reflect 
a pro-Israeli bias/slant that had been a tradition of the West's since the birth of 
the state of Israel i.e., since May 14th 1948.2 
This tentative nervousness and mild racism however, can be evidenced in an 
examination of many of the headlines that were connected with this celebrated 
'media frame' and also in much of the discourse that commented upon it.3 It is 
·argued that through a selective usage of imagery, alongside an admixture of 
comments and analyses in the open editorials, the media perpetuated and 
sustained a pro-Israeli, anti-Arab orientation throughout the entire period, which 
has, for the sake of this particular study been determined to run from September 
1, 1993, until September 15, 1993. 
1 Tisdall, Simon, 'Symbolic gesture seals hope to end blood and tears.' Guardian, September 14, 
1993. And: Woolacott, Martin, 'Three men in search of a peace that is already working.' 
Guardian, September 13, 1993. And, Terry, Don, 'Accord a bittersweet occasion for Arabs in 
U.S.' New York Times, September 8, 1993. And: Said, Edward, W. Peace and its Discontents, p. 
XX. 
2 Mostyn, Trevor, & Hourani Albert [Eds.], The Cambridge Encycopedia of the Middle East, p. 
352. Hiro, Dilop, Dictionary of the Middle East, p. 138. And Laquer, Waiter, A History of 
Zionism, p. 586. 
3 Haberman, Clyde, 'How Oslo helped mold the Mideast Pact.' New York Times, September 3, 
1993. And: Reuters, 'PLO rejects resignation of peace negotiators.' New York Times, August 13, 
1993. ;'' 
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September 1st was selected because firstly, the date denotes the unprecedented, 
and to some, shocking announcement of the decision to sign a 'Declaration of 
Principles' .4 Secondly, it was at this point that media interest concerning the 
unfolding events that heralded the impending birth of the 'peace process' 
escalated. Furthermore, it was chosen because of the rapidly undertaken efforts 
to ensure the closing of the deal by the negotiators i.e., all signed, sealed, and 
delivered within a phenomenally short space of twelve days, something of a 
political coup when considering the protracted length of the Arab/Israeli conflict. 
Indeed, the noose of peace had been cast around Arafat's neck, and therefore, it 
was not possible to allow the formerly perceived terrorist to escape the revenge 
of the executioner in the form of a benevolent Israel, and a conniving America.5 
September 151h however, denotes the transition from reportage concerning the 
'handshake' to coverage of the ramifications of implementing such a proposal. 
It is not the aim of this study however, to analyse the events that led to the 
creation of the Oslo 'peace process' for this is already well documented.6 It is 
sufficient to acknowledge that there are many arguments that surrounded the 
'Declaration of Principles', and the by now very overworked media sound-bite 
'Clinton's brave gamble for peace'? Indeed, these arguments have been taken up 
by many academics representing various political affiliations on behalf of both 
sides.8 Moreover, the debate concerning the perceived betrayal of the collective 
Palestinian dream of statehood through bad or ill-orchestrated diplomacy by 
4 Greenberg, Joel, 'Gazans dare to hope, but hope diluted by fear.' New York Times, September 2, 
1993. And: Lamis, Antonio, 'Israeli deal stuns Palestinians.' Christian Science Monitor, 
September 1, 1993. And: Greenberg, Joel, 'For the settlers in Gaza: total shock.' New York 
Times, September 7, 1993. And: Ashrawi, Hanan, This Side of Peace, p. 274. Recognition is 
given to the fact, however, that the DOP was initially signed privately in Oslo on August 20, 
1993. See: Smith, Charles, D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 318 
5 Cohen, Roger, 'Arafat's move: acting before he became irrelevant.' New York Times, 
September 6, 1993. 
6 See: Edward W. Said's vehemently polemical and anti-Arafat anthology Peace and its 
Discontents, or Hanan Ashrawi's This Side of Peace. And: Avi Shlaim's The Iron Wall: Israel 
and the Arab World, pp. 512-516. 
7 Tisdall, Simon, 'Symbolic gesture seals hopes to end blood and tears.' Guardian, September 14, 
1993. 
8 Most notable among them are the eminent scholars Edward Said and Noam Chomsky writing 
on behalf of the Palestinians, and Amos Oz and Shimon Peres writing on behalf of the Israelis. 
For an outline of the dynamics pertaining to this debate see A vi Shlaim's 'work' as above, pp. 
512-516. And: Lonning Dag, J. 'Vision and Reality Diverging: Palestinian Survival Strategies in 
the Post-Oslo Era.' Giacaman, George, & Lonning Dag, J. [Eds.], After Oslo: New Realities, Old 
Problems, p. 179. 
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members of the Palestinian Authority shall continue no doubt for some time, or 
at least until Oslo is replaced by an alternative 'peace process' bringing with it its 
own insufficiencies and criticisms. 
Nevertheless, this study recognizes that such a debate exists and furthermore, it 
gives recognition to its implications; its negative effects upon the entirety of the 
'peace process', either within the general dynamic that was Oslo itself, or upon 
any resurrection of a future 'peace process'. Many observers it would seem 
consider that this debate gives rise to the conclusion that Oslo was little more 
than a 'stillborn' peace process.9 Indeed, it has been argued by some that Oslo 
was a 'sham' creation. 10 Reflecting the interests primarily of the Israelis, and the 
U.S., whilst utterly freezing out and polarizing all Palestinian national 
aspirations. A fundamentally flawed declaration: 11 both purposefully ambiguous 
in wording and ultimately exclusive to Palestinian self-determinism. 12 Casting 
these often quoted polemical observations and one-sided criticisms aside 
however, this study focuses upon the U.S. mainstream media's reportage of this 
auspicious event i.e., a morale crushing defeat for the Palestinians, and an 
outright victory for Israel. 13 
Nevertheless, this study really commences with an examination of some of the 
headlines from the period, as it is hoped that they shall categorically prove that 
the whole period was one of false optimism, underpinned by an admixture of 
doubt felt on behalf of the Palestinian's ability to deliver upon their side of the 
bargain. 14 Such an examination would also prove that it was a period of 
pessimism surrounding the realistic potential of a 'peace process' ever taking 
root and flourishing in former Palestine. All these negative, somewhat prejudicial 
9 Helm, Sarah, 'It may take along time, but this Middle East violence will subside.' Independent, 
May 23, 2001. 
10 Said, Edward, W. Peace and its discontents, p. XI. 
11 Moughrabi Fouad, 'The Oslo Process and the Arab World' In Giacamon, George, & Lorring, 
Dag, J. [Eds.], Op-cit, p. 57. And: Guyatt, Nicholas, The Absence of Peace, p. 65. 
12 Terry, Don, 'Accord a bittersweet occasion for Arabs in U.S.' New York Times, September 8, 
1993. And: Khoury, Rami, G. 'Palestinians have reason to take part.' New York Times, 
September 3, 1993. And: Said, Edward, W. Peace and its Discontents, p. 5. 
13 Said, Edward, W. Peace and its Discontents, p. XIII. 
14 Time Magazine, 'Can they pass the test?' Issue 11, Vol., 142, September 13, 1993. And: 
Newsweek (Special Edition) 'Can they govern?' September 13, 1993, Issue 11, Vol. 122. Etc. 
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and racist sentiments were in the main encapsulated by the express utilisation of 
a rhetorical question mark. 15 A device utilised by the Western mainstream media 
channels frequently throughout the whole of the Oslo period as a means to 
continue casting negative aspersions regarding the Palestinians ability to be 
actively involved in an imposed 'peace process' .16 
Indeed, this rhetorical question mark abounded everywhere: in the questions that 
posed as headlines of the U.S. broadsheets: in the insinuating voices of the 
commentators and newscasters, as well as in the very cynical actions of several 
leading representatives of the U.S. Administration, i.e., 'we advise you Arafat 
that you should leave your Mauser (pistol) at home, when you come to the 
ceremony' in an oblique reference to his [Arafat's] 'perceived' terrorist past. 17 
It is argued that this question mark still abounds, and shall probably continue to 
do so with regards to the solution of the 'Palestinian Question'. (Itself a mildly 
racist sentiment.)18 For example, consider the New York Times leader for 
September 1, 1993, which ran 'Israeli people divided but are willing to give 
peace a chance.' 19 Note the choice of 'willing', and 'a chance', surely an 
insinuation that the peace process was doomed to failure from the outset. To 
continue: the New York Times also ran an article penned by Rami Khourey on the 
third of the month, which was entitled 'Palestinians have reason to take part' this 
might not be overtly derogatory, however it does imply that the Palestinians 
might not have had reason to take part. 20 
15 It is to be noted that this use of the rhetorical question mark was not exclusively utilised by the 
mainstream media but also in the realm of academia as well. Consider: King, John, Handshake in 
Washington: The Beginning of Middle East Peace? 
16 Consider: Newsweek (Special Edition), 'The face of peace?' September 13, 1993, Issue 11, 
Vol., 122. And: /bid, (inside cover), 'PLO Chairman Arafat: A historic gamble or death wish?' 
And: Ibid. 'Can they govern?' p. 24. And: Time Magazine 'Can they pass the test?' September 
13, 1993. Issue 11,Vol., 142. 
17 Sciolini, Elaine, 'Hottest ticket in town only 2,500 have been invited'. New York Times, 
September 11, 1993. 
18 Said, Edward, W. The Question of Palestine, p. 4. 
19 Haberman, Clyde, 'Israeli people divided but are willing to give peace a chance.' New York 
Times, September 1, 1993. 
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This begets a simple rhetorical question. Did the Palestinians actually have any 
choice or alternative? Of course not,21 Arafat acted secretly, decisively, and 
apparently without any mandate from the Palestinians.22 The Chairman saw the 
window of opportunity being closed by the activities of the Palestinian and 
Israeli hawks evident in Hamas, Kahane Chai, et al. 23 Furthermore, the PLO was 
close to bankruptcy, and if the PLO was going down, then so to was its 
charismatic leader, along with his lifelong dream of autocratic rule over a 
liberated Palestinian state.24 Regarding the near bankruptcy of the PLO, this 
octopus organisation had been gradually losing both its political prestige, and 
subsequently its financial backers.25 In effect, it had spent too long in enforced 
isolation away from the epicentre of Palestinian political realities that were 
gradually falling under the auspices of the political division of Hamas, which 
mitigated a sentiment of act now before its too late.26 Indeed, if Arafat sensed 
this, so to did Yitzhak Rabin, the former Israeli Prime Minister whom wished to 
crown his own tempestuous life by being lauded as the forger of 'modem' Israel 
and the creator of the great Arab reconciliation. 
It would seem then, that it was little wonder that the peace process was 
fundamentally flawed from the outset. Indeed, well before the ambiguities 
evident in the text of the now defunct declaration became apparent. For it appears 
that Oslo was all about personalities and egocentrism, far over and above what 
the 'people on the ground' actually wanted.27 This sentiment was beautifully 
expressed by Muhammad Amin, a fifty-seven year old Palestinian born in 
21 Guyatt, Nicholas, The Absence of Peace, p. 64. 
22 Hedges, Chris, '3 Palestinians threaten to resign from talks in a rift with Arafat.' New York 
Times, August 9, 1993. (Faisal al-Hussaini, Saeb Erekat, and Hanan Ashrawi) And: Cohen, 
Roger, 'Arafat battling for Israel accord in his own Fatah group.' New York Times, September 3, 
1993. And: King, John, Handshake in Washington: The Beginning of Middle East Peace? p. 43. 
And: Butenshon, Nils, A. 'The Oslo Agreement: From the White House to Jabal Abu Ghnaim' In 
Giacamon, George, & Lorring, Dag, J. [Eds.], Op-cit, p. 31. 
23 Ashrawi, Hanan, This Side of Peace, p. 293. 
24 Engleberg, Stephen, 'Christopher is said to have given impetus to Israeli Palestinian deal.' New 
York Times, August 30, 1993. 
25 Smith, Charles, D. Op-cit, pp. 312-313. 
26 Cohen, Roger, 'Arafat's move: acting before he became irrelevant.' New York Times, 
September 6, 1993. And: Said, Edward, W. Peace and its Discontents, p. 2. 
27 Ashrawi, Hanan, This Side of Peace, p. 292. 
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Jerusalem, 'We support the peace plan not because we believe in it [but] because 
we have no choice.' 28 
Indeed, to emphasize this point, the reality was that the Oslo 'peace process' was 
first and foremost about three large egos, each needing careful grooming. 29 
There was Clinton, who believed that the deliverance of a Middle Eastern peace 
plan was his own political inheritance, and that by pulling off a political coup he 
would earn himself a heroic pioneering status of Olympian proportions.30 We 
know of the motivations of Arafat, however his age and failing health may have 
been additional factors. 31 As for Rabin, again we know several of his personal 
motivations. 
Returning to the rhetorical question mark type of headlines that were responsible 
for evoking doubt and negativity, primarily through insinuation of a Palestinian 
incapacity to deliver peace: consider the Time Magazine's leader 'Can they pass 
the test?' Arguably the title could imply that 'they', in this instance, could mean 
both Palestinian and Israelis alike. 32 But closer examination of the narrative 
within the various subtexts indicates that a questionably impartial lead title on 
the outside cover is in fact a dubious representation of equality at best because 
the negative anti-Arab portrayal is reinforced by further rhetorical questions, 
images, etc., that arguably tip the balance very much in favour of the Israelis. 
Indeed, it is argued that an article has to be analysed as a complete 'whole'. The 
language of the subtexts should be read in conjunction with the supporting 
Imagery, and other associated media tools i.e., cartoons, statistical data, 
interspersing comments, and even in some cases related advertisements etc. 
These all combine to tell a particular story, no matter how biased or loaded. If an 
analysis is conducted upon subtexts and images outside of this whole then a 
28 Terry, Don, 'Accord a bittersweet occasion for Arabs in the U.S.' New York Times, September 
8, 1993. 
29 Ashrawi, Hanan, This Side of Peace, p. 277. 
30 Whitaker, Brian, 'Leaders seeking a place in history'. Guardian, July 26, 2000. 
31 Said Edward, W. Peace and its Discontents, p. XII. And: King, John, Op-cit, p. 38. And: Hirst, 
David, 'Supreme test for Mr Palestine'. Guardian, October 13,2000. 
32 Newsweek, 'Can they pass the test?' (Special Edition), September 13, 1993. And: Time 
Magazine, Issue 11, Vol., 142, September 13, 1993. 
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deconstruction of the article occurs, reducing its contextual meaning, and thus 
demeaning the article's credibility and impact. 
It is to be noted, that the argument posited stating that the U.S. mainstream 
media's reportage of the Arab/Israeli conflict is not pro-Israeli, rests upon such a 
deconstructionist approach to the articles, or citations of particularly balanced 
news pieces, whilst steering attention away from the open editorials, letters and 
opinions, as these are considered as part of the debate and criticism, and as such 
are not news casts per se. Whilst this argument may well have some legitimacy, 
it does not take into account that media discourse works, and is in itself, a 
complex 'whole'. Therefore, suggestion is made that the article in Time 
Magazine is mildly racist, pro-Israeli, and casts negative aspersions concerning 
the Palestinians ability to succumb to an imposed peace process. 
Furthermore, consider Brent Scowcroft's article in Newsweek's 'Special Edition' 
of the celebrated media event. His essay's title was 'The kick start that gave 
peace a chance'. 33 Apart from being an incredibly cliched use of phraseology; 
the idea that you are 'giving [the] peace a chance' is bound up with a moral 
conception i.e., that you are indeed the donor, the teacher, etc. 34 Once again, this 
use of 'chance' implies that there is little hope of success, and is a rather 
pessimistic outlook. An examination of the British mainstream media's reportage 
will evidence much of the same pessimism: consider, for example, the 
Guardian's leader after the day of the 'handshake' for it read 'Symbolic gesture 
seals hopes to end blood and tears'. Note again the usage of 'hope' in such an 
overtly negative fashion, and the doubtful sentiments are so lucid that it is not 
necessary to push this point too far. 
An examination of the texts that accompanied this 'media frame' will reveal that 
there was a subtle racist discourse evident within many of the comments and 
33 
'The kick start that gave peace a chance.' Newsweek (Special Edition), Issue 11, Vol., 142, 
September 13, 1993. 
34 Consider: Sciolini, Elaine, 'Arafat arrives in U.S. to make peace.' New York Times, September 
12, 1993. And: Haberman, Clyde, 'Everyone's clamouring for peace', New York Times, 
September 6, 1993. And Tisdall, Simon, 'Symbolic gesture seals hopes to end blood and tears'. 
Guardian, September 14, 1993. 
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analyses proffered. Consider, for example, how the Israeli settlers were 
portrayed: It seems that there was an anxious desire to restrict direct association 
with the militarised aspect of such pioneering principles. 35 Instead of overt 
reference to the settler's obvious recourse to machineguns for alleged defensive 
purposes, there existed an explicit distancing from this aspect, and a subsequent 
distortion of the truth. 36 
It appears that there was an overstated insistence to portray the settlers as 
peaceable people, always standing in their 'hothouses' amongst the healthy rosy 
glow generated by the tomato plants; or ankle deep amongst the foliage of an egg 
plant, (aubergine).37 It is axiomatic indeed, that Israeli settling is portrayed as 
their (the Israeli's) tilling of the soil, whilst to the Arabs it is seen as rape and a 
further expropriation of Arab lands. 
The obverse of this reader friendly portrayal of good, healthy, adventurous 
pioneering, however, was the discourse describing Palestinians and Arabs, often 
homogenously, as fanatical hotheads i.e., as quick tempered, and always thirsting 
for revenge. Indeed, it is argued that the morbid fascination that the U.S. has with 
state sponsored terrorism that was fuelled earlier in that year (February 1993) 
with the bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York, had added grist to its 
mill with the Palestinian populace. 
The language speaks clearly for itself i.e., 'the PLO must denounce terrorism' as 
outlined in the founding PLO covenant of 1964, implying that the organisation 
openly encourages acts of terrorism, nothing but a distortion of the true picture.38 
For as has already been stated, Arafat had openly denounced terrorism in Algiers 
in 1988 when he accepted just 22% of the contested territories, and subsequently 
35 Hoffman, David, 'Israeli settlers in Gaza un-persuaded: farmers say weary compatriots are 
dodging responsibilities.' The Washington Post, September 2, 1993. 
36 Hoffman, David, 'Army assault in Hebron kills 4 Muslim suspects.' The Washington Post, 
March 24, 1994. 'Human rights organisations (B'tselem) have charged that Jewish settlers are 
almost never brought to the police for illegal use of fire arms.' 
37 Hoffman, David, 'Israeli settlers in Gaza un-persuaded: farmers say weary compatriots are 
dodging responsibilities.' The Washington Post, September 2, 1993. Greenberg, Joel, 'For the 
settlers in Gaza: total shock.' New York Times, September 7, 1993. 
38 Cohen, Roger, 'Arafat battling for Israel accord in his Fatah group.' New York Times, 
September 3, 1993. 
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recognised Israel's de facto 'right to exist' .39 Moreover, it is a far too simplistic 
representation of the PLO, which is an umbrella organisation that, in the main, 
conditions allowing, desires reconciliation with the colonizing overseer(s).40 
This brings this study to a point of examination into the mainstream media's use, 
or misuse, of imagery regarding the now infamous handshake. Firstly, the 
argument posited is that the mainstream media was mildly schizophrenic, 
inasmuch, as there was a positive depiction of the handshake i.e., the mirth and 
obvious relief of Arafat, the grave concern of Rabin.41 Even the comical Clinton 
was all smiles, with a winsome expression on his face, like a first time father 
being called into the maternity room to meet his first born.42 
These positive images were however, contrasted to the very negative but 
descriptive images of hooded Hamas activists, the Khaffiyah enclosed faces of 
the Shuhada', (Martyrs) alongside the seemingly obligatory, and crazed wielding 
of AK47s.43 Regrettably though this negative imagery acts, as it is designed to 
act in unison with the titles of the articles, it is therefore, a powerful force useful 
for further infusing negative stereotypical portrayals of the Palestinians deep into 
subliminal consciousness viz. the American mainstream media's readership. 
Once again, this is also true to some extent of the British media's reportage, 
however it does not appear to be fuelled with such a ferocious anti-Arab 
discourse.44 It would seem that British journalists and editors draw on a long 
tradition of reportage of their other knowing the pitfalls of such racially 
39 Engleberg, Stephan, 'Christopher is said to have given impetus to Israeli/Palestinian deal.' 
New York Times, August 30, 1993. And: Said, Edward, W. 'Peace and its Discontents' p. XIII, 
and p. 22. 
4
° Cohen, Roger, 'Arafat battling for Israel accord in his Fatah group.' New York Times, 
September 3, 1993. And: King, John, Handshake in Washington: The Beginning of Middle East 
Peace, p. 173. 
41 Ashrawi, Hanan, This Side of Peace, p. 271 
42 Tisdall, Simon, 'Symbolic gesture seals hopes to end blood and tears.' Guardian, September 
13, 1993. 
43 Krauthammer, Charles, 'Israel's enormous risk.' The Washington Post, September 3, 1993. 
And: Drozidak, William, 'PLO allies criticize Arafat.' The Washington Post, September 3, 1993. 
Drozidak, William, Issues blocking joint negotiation.' The Washington Post, September 8, 1993. 
44 This consideration of the British 'mainstream media' is on the whole valid, however, 
recognition is made of the debate that emerged concerning Comad Black's (owner of The Daily 
Telegraph, and The Jerusalem Post) alleged pro-Israeli bias in the pages of the Spectator. See: 
McCann, Paul, 'Black fires back over Taki's 'anti-Semitism' The Times, March 3, 2001. And: 
Wells, Matt, 'The Black arts leave writers riled' Guardian, March 16, 2001. 
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prejudicial representations. Furthermore, it would seem that there is a more 
informed consensus concerning media portrayals of the Arab world per se in 
Britain. 
Nevertheless, the schizophrenia of the media worked in an alternative way, for it 
had turned the outlaw Arafat, into a likeable portly rogue (a Shakespearian 
Falstaff if you will).45 A man who had turned himself in, moreover, he had 
become a man who had awoken to the realisation that all he need do was comply 
too the wishes and demands of the imperialists, and then everything would be 
forgiven. Arafat could have his Gazan based throne, for the asking price of one 
innocuous little handshake. Indeed, 'a giant handshake for mankind.' (Clinton's 
I . h' ) 46 transparent c 1c e. 
Yet this schizophrenic media also showed the jubilant Arafat peering out from 
the news-pages, and the various newsmagazines, with a giant rhetorical question 
mark emblazoned across his forehead, implying Arafat's incapability to promote 
peace. Consider Newsweek's full-page portrait of the Chairman, for not only was 
the title negative but loaded with heavy bias. ('The Face of Peace'? was how it 
read.) It was also bolstered by a supporting article to further express the point 
that Arabs are vicious, vindictive, scheming and nasty, in the story of Terry 
Anderson's kidnap. ('My Hostage Ordeal' that other U.S. mainstream media 
bugbear pushed to the ultimate during the Iranian hostage crisis.) 47 A reading of 
the text conveyed the horrors of his detention at the hands of Islamic radicals.48 
Why publish such a potentially ground breaking piece of news in conjunction 
with such an obviously negative article? The reason it is argued is that it is 
purposeful and that it serves to always suppress Arab progression. This is the 
language of the Pax Americana-Israelica.49 Indeed, of neo-colonialism per se. 
45 Said, Edward, W. Peace and its Discontents, p. 12. 
46 The Christian Science Monitor, September 14, 1993, p. 20. 
47 See: Newsweek (Special Edition), 'The face of peace?' September 13, 1993, Issue 11, Vol., 
122. 
48 Ibid. p. 20. 
49 Said, Edward, W. The End of the Peace Process, p. 47. 
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For in truth it means 'the little peoples' must do as we say there are now no 
alternatives. 50 
Examination of the Christian Science Monitor's reportage throughout the period, 
proffered a refreshing alternative to the predominantly pro-Israeli oriented U.S. 
'prestigious press'. Consider for example, 'Israeli deal stuns Palestinians', or 
'PLO-Israeli deal creates rift with Arab states.' Such plain and uncommitted 
language however, makes for quite a dull read. Nevertheless, this more generous 
i.e., Arab friendly reportage was also evident in much of the language used to 
express the actualities of the 'birth or stillbirth' of the Oslo 'peace process'. 
Furthermore, the images that the paper used reflected its stance of impartiality. 
Two examples spring to mind. The first was an image of peace marchers on a 
rally carrying banners in both Hebrew and Arabic. (A mixed group of both Jews 
and Arabs are admittedly perhaps to be expected at a peace rally.)51 The other 
was an image of an Israeli protester being taken away by some Israeli riot police. 
An unusual image in that it certainly was not the norm in the majority of the 
mainstream media channels that largely focused upon the assembly on the South 
Lawn of the White House. 52 
Concerning the media's vacillating attitude towards Arafat, and perhaps the best 
indicator of the false enthusiasm that surrounded the whole inception of Oslo 
was a rather humorous cartoon (charmingly satirical), inked by Danzinger that 
the Christian Science Monitor printed. For it showed a broad smiling, roly-poly 
'Chairman' with 'Kiss me I'm Palestinian' emblazoned across the front of his T-
shirt.53 
50 See: Power Pax: a brief history in megalomania, New Internationalist, Issue 330, December 
2000. 
51 Lynfield, Ben, 'Israeli-PLO deal spurs fierce debate on security.' Christian Science Monitor, 
September 1, 1993. 
52 Lynfield, Ben, 'Israel's Rabin banks on a reformed PLO.' Christian Science Monitor, 
September 2, 1993. 
53 Danzinger, Christian Science Monitor, (back page) September 2, 1993. 
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This little image summed up the entire period perfectly: the cynicism of the 
Washington Administration, the mainstream media itself, and moreover, the 
subordinate role of the Palestinians in the deal. The Palestinians, their leadership, 
the concept of peace and of Palestine, were, and to a large extent still are vague 
entities and concepts. They remain on the whole the whimsies of Washington,54 
the mainstream media, and any other party wishing to moralistically crusade for 
peace in the 'modern' Middle East. By dint of their struggle, both Palestinians 
and Arabs per se deserve better treatment, and much fairer media portrayals in all 
the channels of the Western media. The nature of the American mainstream 
media that continues to fuel the mildly racist and xenophobic anti-Arabism 
however, needs to be debunked through intelligently addressed criticism. 
54 Wallach, Janet, & Wallach, John, Arafat: In the Eyes of the Beholder, p. 479. 
CHAPTER2 
'Black Friday' • 
'Even the Israelis who are most insensitive to Arab life are not proud 
of this' said Harry Well, the representative of the anti-Defamation 
League in Israel. 'It reinforces the view that what goes on out there is 
the Wild West- theirs and ours- and Israel should separate itself from 
there.' 1 
'Indeed, even the defenders of the movement now wonder if Ramati 
and his breed are the spiritual 'pioneers' they claim to be- or some 
sort of Torah bound terrorists whom need to be reigned in. ' 2 
13 
On February 25, 1994, a catastrophe occurred that was 'just waiting to happen' 
which was to have severe future consequences for the by now already heavily 
beleaguered 'peace process' .3 Just waiting to happen for several reasons: Doctor 
Goldstein's unwarranted, but pre-meditated, murder of twenty-nine Muslims at 
the Tomb of the Patriarchs (Hebron) was not, in reality, a singularly unique 
event.4 It is understood that victimisation of Palestinians by Jewish settlers is 
commonplace enough, as too is the harassment of settlers by certain elements 
within the Shabab, and activists of Hamas.5 
Several factors had coalesced however, to make such a catastrophe possible. For 
fifteen years Likud policy (1977-1992), had been to encourage further settlement 
of all areas of Eretz Israel as outlined in the '100,000 Plan', which commenced 
in 1981. This policy was to offer arms and protection to those settlers whom 
• The title for this media event was taken from the New York Time's opinion page. See: 'Refugee 
camps echo with calls for revenge'. New York Times, February 27, 1994. 
1 Goldstein, Lawrie, & Wilgoren, Debbi, 'An ocean away, area Muslims, Jews share the anguish 
ofHebron'. [Sic], The Washington Post, February 27, 1994. 
2 O'Shea, James, & Rowley, Store, W. 'We are reclaiming the land of Israel' Chicago Tribune, 
February 28, 1994. 
3 Khalidi, Ahmad, & Raviv, Moshe, 'Israel and Palestine: what now? Independent, March 1, 
1994. And: Hundley, Tom, 'West Bank bloodbath at holy site; Jewish settler guns down ten', 
Chicago Tribune, February 25, 1994. 
4 Goldstein, Lawrie, & Wilgoren, Debbi, 'An ocean away, area Muslims, Jews share the anguish 
ofHebron'. The Washington Post, February 27, 1994. 
5 Numbers vary from source to source on the actual amount of fatalities at Hebron, however 
twenty-nine seems to be the most frequently cited assessment. See, Jones, C!ive, 'Ideo-theology: 
Dissonance and Discourse in the State of Israel', in Karsh, Efraim, Op-cit, p. 30. And: Dunn, 
Ross, 'Double suicide bomb attack on Israel kills 25', The Times, February 26, 1996. 
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chose to homestead in the obviously more uncomfortable areas i.e., areas already 
occupied by Palestinians, such as the West Bank, or where Arab villages abutted 
fresh Jewish settlements,6 such as in the south easterly Jerusalem district of Har 
Homa. 
It was this Likud policy that partially drew the native New Yorker to Israel, in 
1983.7 Dr. Goldstein could find in Israel what was partially lacking in New York 
viz. further spiritual fulfilment, by following the path of his mentor and friend 
Rabbi Meir Kahane who had himself made Aliyah (migration) back in 1971, 
forming the militant, and vehemently anti-Arab Kach party. 8 The Likud policy of 
encouraging settlement with the reward of land, rights, and citizenship, not to 
mention rank (Goldstein was a Captain), within the Israeli Defence Force was in 
part too great a lure for the gifted doctor. 
It has been argued but not entirely convincingly, that the most ardent supporters 
of an ideology are those that come to it from a distance, i.e., are not born into it. 
The ideology is seized upon and becomes the adherent's raison d' etre. In some 
it becomes an obsession, to the point that the 'message' that the ideology 
purports is often demonised, and takes over the rational mind. This tendency 
towards obsession however, is no less true of the Messianic religions, where 
fanaticism and distorted ideology can invariably lead to disaster. For it is to be 
noted that if Zionism attracts radicals, so too does Islam. 
In the case of Dr. Goldstein however, he certainly was not a recent convert to 
Judaism, fuelled with a religious fervour that often accompanies fresh adherents 
to an ideology. Indeed, the doctor was a member of a traditional orthodox family, 
had attended two Jewish yeshivas (religious seminaries) before graduating with 
full honours from the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in 1981. Indeed, he 
had always been political, bringing himself to the attention of the New York 
Times in June 1981, by submitting a letter outlining a solution to the 'Arab 
6 Smith, Charles, D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 293. 
7 Mitchell, Allison, 'A killers path of militancy: From Brooklyn to West Bank', New York Times, 
February 26, 1994. 
8 Said, Edward, W. Peace and its Discontents, p. 56. 
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problem of Israel' vzz. their [the Arabs] ultimate expulsion or annihilation. 9 
Furthermore, after making Aliyah 'he was almost messianic [my emphasis] in his 
strong commitment to the land.' 10 
These aforementioned factors suggest that Dr. Goldstein's primary motivation 
for the massacre is not to be understood as an attempt to derail the 'peace 
process' per se, (a political act). 11 But, has a greater attribution to a Jewish 
theological concept (Hillul ha she m), and a furtherance of a Kahanist inspired 
anti-Arabism. 12 This theological aspect underpinning the massacre, it is argued, 
was largely not emphasised by the channels of the U.S. mainstream media. 13 
Indeed, the 'media complex' considered the event largely in political terms, viz. 
What impact the massacre would have upon the implementation of Oslo's vague 
timetable, and Israel's forestalling over the scheduled withdrawal from the West 
Bank? 14 
Nevertheless, it was of no real surprise that an ardent Jewish settler, a supporter 
of the extreme right and member of the outlawed Kach group would consider 
anathema, the rescinding of Jewish territory to the 'Arabs' .15 Simply put, this can 
be considered as a conflict waged against non-Jewish inhabitants of Israel 
(Amulek), in this instance Palestinian Arabs, whose incorporation into a 'peace 
process' denies the potential of the redemptive process that underpins both 
Judaism and 'political' Zionism. This, however, is a hotly contested Jewish 
theological dogma, causing much debate between the different yeshivas and their 
associated Rabbis. The Jewish extremists however, consider that Israel must be 
Arabrein, (Arab free) in order to facilitate the restoration of the 'New Jerusalem'. 
9 See article in New York Times of June 1981. In Firestone, David, 'Seed planted in Brooklyn 
blooms as violence', New York Times, February 26, 1994. 
10 Lempart, Lesley, quoted in Mitchell, Allison, 'A killers path of militancy: from Brooklyn to 
West Bank', New York Times, February 26, 1994. 
11 Hundley, Tom, 'West Bank bloodbath at holy site: Jewish settler guns down ten', Chicago 
Tribune, February 25, 1994. 
12 Jones, Clive, 'Ideotheology: Discourse and Dissonance in the State of Israel'. In Karsh, Efraim, 
Op-cit, p. 39. 
13 Said, Edward, W. Op-cit, p. 54. 
14 Atlas, Terry, 'wire-services', Chicago Times, February 26, 1994. And: Gwin, Ifil, 'Ciinton 
calls peace talks from Cairo to Washington.' New York Times, February 26, 1994. 
15 Lerner, Michael, 'Disarm the West Bank settlers', New York Times, February 26, 1994. And: 
Smith, Charles, D. Palestine and the Arab Israeli Conflict, p. 319. 
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The supporting logic of this concept runs thus: Israel ultimately belongs to God. 
It is on a semi-permanent loan to the Jews as their reward for being God's chosen 
people. What is to be done? The Oslo 'peace process' and any territorial 
compromise with the Arabs is ungodly, (as stated in Talmudic law), and 
ultimately prevents the installation of the 'New Jerusalem'. Therefore, a solution 
to the problem must be derived through the termination of the 'peace process'. 
It is suggested that a continuation of this logic (albeit with slight variations and 
modifications) would raise itself several times, in various forms throughout the 
meandering 'peace process' within elements of both parties in the conflict, ever 
threatening to completely destroy, or retard the peace. Indeed, this religio-
political concept is often referred to as the 'unholy alliance' where extremists on 
both sides attempt to nullify the peace. 16 Indeed, there is some evidence to 
suggest that at times there has been active collusion between the activists of 
Hamas, and the settlers. It is ironic, that the Hamas 'maximalists' i.e., those that 
reject any reconciliation with Israel, and the extreme settlers representing Israel's 
far right, are united in their political ambitions viz. cessation of a 'peace process', 
and their selected methodology, namely, through bloodshed. 
Other factors however, came in to play on that fateful day in Hebron. Although 
Dr. Goldstein was eventually overcome by the Muslim congregation and was 
battered to death, the question remains as to how he managed to kill twenty-nine 
Muslim worshippers? The answer can be attributed to very slack security and 
Israeli law. It is suggested that Dr. Goldstein knew the layout of the security 
cameras overseeing the Tomb and could gain easy access to the killing field. It is 
also hinted that the Israeli guards were asleep and in some cases even absent 
from their tour of duty. But what is of major significance, and has the greatest 
responsibility within the dynamics of the massacre, is that it is against Israeli law 
to engage in live-fire with another Jew. If the guards were present, then they 
were technically powerless to do anything about it. 17 Further suggesting that the 
16 King, John, Handshake in Washington, The Beginning of Middle East Peace? p. 45. 
17 Borger, Julian, 'US struggles to keep talks together', Guardian, October 3, 2000. 
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'Hebron Massacre' was a tragedy that was 'just waiting to happen', and in 
reality, there is nothing to prevent such a catastrophe from occurring again. 
It is argued that the suicide of Dr. Goldstein failed to destroy the 'peace process'. 
Indeed, contrary to this, the massacre acted in a way to further encourage the 
negotiators of the accords to find away through the deadlock. Unfortunately 
however, it did initiate a set of events that would in time, irreparably cripple the 
fragile peace. This is to suggest that Dr. Goldstein's suicide was inspirational to 
some. Indeed, many had made him a martyr worthy of highest honour as they 
had done with Rabbi Meir Kahane. 18 Furthermore, the underpinning logic of his 
action would be taken one natural step further at the next fateful juncture in the 
ill fated 'peace process' .19 
Selection was made of this 'media frame' for several reasons. Firstly, and 
regrettably, a massacre such as this cannot fail to generate a vast amount of 
reportage, and debate. Secondly, Dr. Goldstein hailed from Brooklyn, and his 
action must have had some impact on the large Jewish population there, as they 
distanced themselves from such a disreputable event. Indeed, many American 
Jewish groups were appalled by the callousness and implications of the act.20 
Thirdly, it would be interesting to see how the U.S. mainstream media would 
actually report such an obviously condemnable action. For after all, traditionally 
it had been the Palestinians who were the hotheads that enforced their grudges 
through the medium of murder. Jewish settlers were brave, just and noble, not 
cowards, whom empty their machineguns into the backs of defenceless 
worshippers. An American perception and an Israeli generated myth had been 
overturned, and it would not be the last to be disestablished throughout the 
period of Oslo. 
The main argument proposed is that there was no tangibly explicit pro-Israeli 
bias evident within the channels of the mainstream media. In a counter to this, 
18 Greenberg, Joel, 'Sounds of chanting and shooting echo in a town awash with blood', New 
York Times, February 26, 1994. 
19 See: Chapter 3, 'Goodbye Friend'. 
20 Greenberg, Joel, 'Sounds of chanting echo in a town awash with blood', New York Times, 
February 26, 1994. 
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however, there appeared to be no pro-Palestinian bias either. The time frame 
under specific analysis runs from February 25, 1994, (the date of the 'massacre' 
itself), until February 28, 1994, when the nature of the media's discourse focused 
upon the ensuing violence that the catastrophe provoked. To some this violence 
was reminiscent of the violence witnessed during the 1987-1993 Intifada. 21Prior, 
to this, the U.S. mainstream media's reportage focused primarily upon the facts 
relating to the massacre, and also offered psychological profiles into the mind of 
the killer.22 
It is argued that the reason that there was no explicitly tangible pro-Israeli bias 
evident in the channels of the U.S. mainstream media during this particular 
'media frame' was due to several factors. Firstly, it is suggested that the 'media 
complex' was genuinely shocked by what had happened at Hebron. Secondly, if 
there had been any overtly explicit pro-Israeli bias evident within the 'media 
complex', this would have given rise to loud protestations from the Arab League, 
the Arab Lobbyists, and from voices within the international community. And, 
although these organisations possess very little clout in the shaping of media 
discourse, it was however, a criticism that the U.S. 'media complex' could ill 
afford, particularly when the Administration desired so much to restart the stalled 
'peace process'. 
Nevertheless it is argued, that although the nature of the reportage was not pro-
Israeli, or pro-Palestinian, it was, in fact neither, sorrowful or apologetic. It was, 
as is always the case, an unsympathetic machine that churned out its stories, 
comments and analyses, in a relentless fashion. Furthermore, it appears that U.S. 
mainstream media discourse is far more gratuitous in its usage of vocabulary and 
imagery, conveying the true horror of an event in glorious Technicolor far more 
21 It is possible to consider using the term Intifada to describe this kind of popular revolt. But it is 
argued that to constitute an Intifada proper, an uprising must have a) political goals and 
aspirations, and b) some form of leadership and direction. It is all to often read that an uprising 
might represent a mini, or lesser Intifada, however, if this habit persists the definition of an 
organised struggle will become blurred. Consider, for example the post September 28, 2000 
'Uprising', this 'Uprising' does represent an Intifada, as at least there is some explicit 
organisation viz. the Tanzim, and one clearly articulated political objective viz. overthrow, no 
matter how disorganised this organisation is, or umealisable its stated objective. 
22 Mitchell, Allison, 'A killers path of militancy: From Brooklyn to West Bank', New York Times, 
February 26, 1994. 
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than its British counterpart. Indeed, its approach in covering the catastrophe was 
by treating it as something of a military operation that the Doctor had 
undertaken. To support this consideration every miniscule piece of information 
emphasizing the logistics of the massacre was supplied. 
There were maps that charted the route that the 'crazed gunman', (note: not 
fanatic, or terrorist) took to the scene of the 'killing field' .23 There were inserts 
depicting the design and specifications of the Galil Assault Rifle, (based on the 
AK47). This weapon can incidentally fire 10.8 rounds per second, and carries 35 
bullets to a clip. 24 Implying that if 111 shells were collected from the scene of the 
carnage, then the Doctor reloaded three times, if we assume that there was a clip 
already loaded.25 This calculation fits with the stated time span of three to four 
minutes given as the length of the incident, which to the victims felt more like a 
very long 'fifteen' .26 Concerning the gratuitous and perhaps unnecessary graphic 
accounts offered of the slaughter consider these two accounts. 27 
'When I heard the shots. I felt the bullet [sic] The man next to me his 
brain out of his skull. He raised his finger, to show when one feels 
death coming- and I felt like I wanted to die.' 
Sharif Zahdi. 
'The people who were shot fell back on the others. Most of the 
people were bloody.' 
Shaban Ishwaiki. 
Furthermore, there were computer-generated images depicting the Mosque, and 
also images of the killing field showing the 'cauldron of death' in all of its 
bloodied glory.28 The argument posited then, is that the nature of the U.S. 
23 Sulzberger, Arthur, Ochs, Jnr, 'Comment', New York Times, February 26, 1994. And: Youssef, 
Ibrahim, M. 'Two Palestinian rivals warn of storm to come.' New York Times, February 27, 1994. 
24 Hedges, Chris, & Greenberg, Joel, 'Before killing, final prayer, and final taunt'. New York 
Times, February 26, 1994. 
25 Accounts differ however, the New York Times reported 111 shells discovered. This calculation 
was reached utilising the New York Times, as it is the more prestigious paper, furthermore, the 
Chicago Tribune is apt at receiving a lot of its factual information courtesy of 'wire services' and 
subsequently reported 118 rounds fired. See: Hedges, Chris, & Greenberg, Joel, 'Before killing, 
final prayer, and final taunt'. New York Times, February 26, 1994. And: Hundley, Tom, Israel 
acts against settlers: some arrests sought, arms a problem.' Chicago Tribune, February 28, 1994. 
26 The Washington Post, February 27, 1994. 
27 Ibid. These two citations were, however, not part of the discourse per se. They were used as 
interspersing comments of a display of various images. 
28 Hoffman, David, '20 Arab worshippers slain in West Bank.' The Washington Post, February 
25, 1994. 
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mainstream media's discourse concemmg this atrocity was primarily 
sensationalist, and fuelled a certain bloodlust that is evident within the audience 
of the U.S. mainstream media. This is not an outright criticism per se, as blood 
thirsty media audiences abound everywhere. By making out that the attack, 
however, was some kind of military operation (which in many ways it was, but 
one without any legitimacy, except perhaps to Dr. Goldstein's Kahanist inspired 
logic), it was as if the U.S. mainstream media was attempting to legitimise the 
nefarious action of the Doctor. Indeed, there is some evidence to support this 
view. 
The very fact that the atrocity was pre-meditated was, in the main, simply 
whitewashed over, and a view was postulated that the Doctor had acted on 
grounds of diminished responsibility.29 Although, this latter view may possess a 
certain element of truth, it overrides the evidence that implies the massacre was 
pre-meditated. It also ignores the fact that the doctor had made very strong 
overtures concerning his intentions to carry out a massacre.30 Moreover, he was 
known to the authorities for previously causing upset at the shared place of 
worship. Furthermore, he had clearly stated on numerous occasions what should 
happen to the Arabs inhabiting Israel. If these factors were not proof enough of 
his real mental state, then consideration has to be made of the day he selected to 
carry out his perceived messianic mission, for the eve of Purim is a sacred day to 
Judaism, where celebration is made to the ending of the persecution of the Jews, 
at the hands of a Persian tyrant by Queen Esther in the sixth century BC. 31 
Several citations were used to imply that the morally good Doctor had simply 
snapped.32 Furthermore, reference was made to the fact that that the racially 
prejudiced homesteader of Kiryat Arba was depressed, and had been for several 
29 Greenberg, Joel, 'Sounds of chanting and shooting echo in a town awash with blood.' New 
York Times, February 25, 1994. 
30 Mitchell, Allison, 'A killers path of militancy: From Brooklyn to West Banlc' New York 
Times, February 26, 1994. 
31 Hoffman, David, '20 Arab worshippers slain in the West Bank'. The Washington Post, 
February 25, 1994. 
32 Lerner, Michael, 'Disarm the West bank settlers'. New York Times, February 26, 1994. 
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weeks, over the recent murder of two friends earlier in January.33 Moreover: 
Rabbi Meir Kahane was himself assassinated in New York in 1990 by an 
Egyptian born assassin, and Goldstein had sworn to avenge the loss of this 
particularly close friend and mentor.34 
Furthermore, it was postulated by some, that the Doctor treated both Palestinian, 
and Israeli victims alike.35 Inasmuch as this may be true, it does not exonerate the 
Doctor from guilt. For there have been many instances where ethically sound 
medical doctors ignore their true ideological leanings whilst pursuing the 
profession. Indeed, it is a pre-requisite in the field of medical practice to treat 
patients regardless of colour and creed. Nevertheless, it was suggested in the 
mainstream media that all these factors i.e., emotional stress, grief, length of 
service, etc., bore down upon the Doctor, and clouded his judgement. 
To bolster this v1ew, the emotive language of the 'Vietnam Experience' was 
employed to conjure up both empathy with, and sympathy for the murderer. The 
Doctor had simply 'been in the shit too long', and had developed the 'five mile 
stare' .36 Indeed, his neighbour Mr Ramati, a former pioneering scout in the U.S. 
Marines whilst serving in Vietnam, testified that in essence Baruch had been a 
good, and kind man, but had merely seen too much. Furthering this, he implied 
that, every now and then, a man is justified for cutting loose. 37 This sentiment 
suggests much regarding the psychology of the Israeli settler. 
The 'Vietnam Experience' is culturally deeply entrenched within the U.S., and it 
is argued, the psychological damage it inflicted upon American society on the 
whole was enormous. It has in many ways its analogy with the Jewish Holocaust 
33 Hundley, Tom, Assassin discussed hatred of Arabs long before spree'. Chicago Tribune, 
February 26, 1994. 
34 Ibid. And: MacAskill, Ewan, 'West Bank fears new reprisals'. Guardian, January I, 2001. 
35 Hoffman, David, 'Doctor to victims turns violent'. The Washington Post, February 27, 1994. 
36 With regards to the 'Vietnam Experience' reference is being made to the complete dynamic 
i.e., the war itself, its cultural legacy, and impact on American society and its subsequent 
ramifications for Israel. For examples of such emotive language specifically evoking the 
'Vietnam Experience' see: Francis Ford Coppola's Apocalypse Now (1979), and Stanley 
Kubrick's Full Metal Jacket (1987), etc. 
37 Hundley, Tom, 'Assassin discussed hatred of Arabs long before spree'. Chicago Tribune, 
February 26, 1994. 
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(which incidentally, Dr Goldstein referred to with continued frequency in the 
build up to the 'massacre')38 inasmuch as it evokes a sentiment of 'never again' 
or 'lest we forget'. (See: introduction p. 20.) Once, it is argued, it was allowable 
to be openly against American involvement in the Far East (Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam), this, however, is now no longer the case.39 Respect for, and empathy 
with, the whole 'Vietnam Experience' is now perceived to be the 'true' 
American way, particularly now that the humiliation of defeat in that particular 
imbroglio was washed over after the Gulf War (1991).40 
This phenomenon has a negative antithesis in Israel, however, realising huge 
implications for the Palestinians. For all the time that the pioneering adventurism 
exemplifying the 'Vietnam Experience' continues to be eulogised in the United 
Sates, and while this is perceived as a legitimate export for Israel, finally filtering 
out into the Occupied Territories, the result will be a continued 
'Rambowitzisation' of settler society, and will subsequently realise an escalation 
of more orchestrated extremist violence.41 Indeed, in sum, a grim omen for the 
future of Palestinian and settler relations, particularly within the Occupied 
Territories. 
38 Lerner, Michael, 'Disarm the West Bank settlers'. New York Times, February 26, 1994. 
39 See: http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/0141300vietnam-overview.html. 
40 See: http :I Jwww. nytimes. corn/library I world/ asia/vietnam-war-index. html. 
41 Rambowitz was a term coined by Paul Breines in 'Tough Jews' as cited in Said, Edward, W. 
Peace and its Discontents, p. 56. And: King, John, Handshake in Washington: The Beginning of 
Middle East Peace, p. IX. 
CHAPTER3 
'Goodbye Friend' 
'To everything there is a season, 
And a time to every purpose under heaven: 
A time to be born, and a time to die; 
A time to kill, and a time to heal; 
A time to weep, and a time to laugh; 
A time to love, and a time to hate; 
A time of war; and a time of peace:' 
'The time for peace has come.' 1 
(Ecclesiastes Ill, v., 1-8/ 
'Of course its possible to kill him. The point is that the chances of 
escape would not be too high. A fanatic prepared to die himself in 
the attempt is the most certain method of eliminating a dictator who 
exposes himself to the public. I notice, 'he added with a touch of 
malice,' that despite your idealism you have not been able to produce 
such a man.' 
(The Day of The Jackall 
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On November 4, 1995, calamity was to strike the 'peace process' once again, as 
the former Israeli warlord now turned peacemaker was assassinated after making 
a speech of peace at a Labour-Meretz and Peace Now eo-sponsored peace rally in 
Tel Aviv's main Kikar Yisrael square.4 Yigal Amir, a twenty-seven year old 
Jewish law student, had reached the only logical conclusion that belief in such 
religious extremism could allow him to make, being connected with a religious 
extremist group called the A YIN, 5 an offshoot of Kach. That 'the Rabin 'dove' is 
1 Al-Koholeth from the Torah, as quoted by the late Yitzhak Rabin during the 'Declaration of 
Principles' speech, September 13, 1993, Washington. Brown, Derek, 'Israel's darkest hour: 
Future of peace process in doubt'. Guardian, November 6, 1995. 
2 Ecclesiastes Ill, v., 1-8. Holy Bible. 
3 Forsyth, Frederick, The Day of the Jackal, p. 51. 
4 Champion, Daryl, Religious Fundamentalism - A Threat to the State of Israel. In White & 
Logan [Eds.], Remaking the Middle East. p. 313. And: Weil, Martin, 'A horrible tragedy'. The 
Washington Post, November 5, 1995. 
5 Wallach, Janet, & Wallach, John, Arafat: In the Eyes of the Beholder, p. 466. 
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ultimately rescinding God's territory to the Arab infidels, and therefore, he must 
die!' 6 
For surely it states in Talmudic literature, and is a notion propounded in classical 
Jewish thinking, that it is the responsibility of religious leaders (and political 
ones), to hold an opinion concerning Jewish settlements, the status of the Gerim 
(non Jews inhabiting Eretz Yisrael who are only to be accorded favour not 
more)/ and the circumstances in which territory can be rescinded.8 Indeed, it is a 
continuation of this classical thinking that allows for, and legitimises, political 
assassination of anyone who attempts to rescind the Jews earthly covenant Once 
again however, the logic concerning God's sovereignty over territory is not 
peculiar to extreme Judaism, it has its reflection in Islam, and was partially 
attributable to the assassination of King Abdullah of Jordan by a disgruntled 
Palestinian for perceived collusion with the Israelis (1951),9 and furthermore, for 
the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, by four soldiers linked to 
the Islamic fundamentalist groups of Al-Talifir wa al-Hijra, and Munazzamat al-
Jihad in the October of 1981. 10 
Yigal Amir, has, it is argued, acted upon the inspiration of Dr. Goldstein. 
(Indeed, a book eulogising Goldstein as a hero was found in his possessions, as 
also was Frederick Forsyth's influential The Day of the Jackal.) 11 Only Amir had 
reached a more logical conclusion than the Doctor, for he had detected that the 
'Hebron Massacre' although seriously disruptive and threatening to the 'peace 
process', had, as its focus of attention, the wrong target group. The cold-blooded 
murder of Palestinians would not destroy the 'peace process' per se. Only the 
6 Ayin: the Avenging Jewish Organisation. See: Greenberg Joel, 'Suspect says he tried to kill 
Rabin before'. New York Times, November 5, 1995. 
7 Sprinzak, Ehud, The Iceberg Model of Political Extremism. In Newman, David, [Ed.], The 
Impact of the Gush Emunim, p.32. 
8 Battersby, John, 'Israel struggles to understand loss of a Hero'. Christian Science Monitor, 
November 6, 1995. 
9 Seale, Patrick, Abu Nidal: the world's most notorious terrorist, pp. 63-64. And: Parker, 
Thomas, The Road to Camp David: U.S. Negotiating Strategy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
p. 4. 
10 Hiro, Dilop, Islamic Fundamentalism, pp. 78-79. See: Hoagland, Jim, 'Rabin perished during 
brutal war'. The Washington Post, November 5, 1995. 
11 Greenberg, Joel, 'Investigators describes a determined killer whose target was Peres as well as 
Rabin'. New York Times, November 6, 1995. 
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complete removal of its architects might do this. In this thinking though, Yigal 
Amir was also wrong, and perhaps a little nai"ve. Moreover, he had 
fundamentally miscalculated, for the supposed true architect of Oslo was Shimon 
Peres (one of the proposed targets of the assassin). 12 The assassination of Yitzhak 
Rabin, it is argued, did not derail the 'peace process', but ironically restored 
momentum behind it, as the U.S. and the international community. equally 
mourned the loss of their 'friend'. 13 
There was no need for Rabin to have lost his life, or even to have lost 'the brave 
gamble for peace'. If Yigal Amir had been a little more patient, rather than 
undertaking his own perceived messianic mission i.e., his dream of deliverance 
from out of the hands of the peacemakers, it is argued, would have eventually 
been realised. Instead, however, he now serves a life-sentence in an Israeli jail, 
because the assassination was not considered to be a crime against humanity. 
What the assassination did do though was this, it dispelled yet another American 
perception, and Israeli generated myth. For it was the Arab states of the emergent 
'modem' Middle East that had traditionally been blighted by political 
assassinations. 14 Indeed, it was an Islamic legacy that the removal of the Sultan 
was generally carried out in a bloody and brutal way. 15 Moreover, the word 
assassin is derived from the Arabic term hashaashin. 16 Meaning 'smokers of 
cannabis' and is associated with the Nizari branch of Ismaili Shi'ism who 
inhabited various parts of the Middle East during the 11th and 12th centuries, and 
is not necessarily a term associated with respectable citizens of 'modem' 
12 Shimon Peres is very often erroneously attributed with being the 'architect' of Oslo, however, 
Yossi Beilin and Johan Jergan Host can equally be considered as worthy of this title. See: King, 
John, Handshake in Washington: The Beginning of Middle East Process, pp. 106- 107. 
13 See, Saffire, William, 'Rabin earned the admiration of sceptics'. International Herald Tribune, 
November 7, 1995. Guardia, Anton L. 'The legacy of Rabin must be preserved'. The Daily 
Telegraph, November 7, 1995. And: Schmemann, Serge, 'Surge for Peres and peace, till 
elections'. New York Times, November 5, 1995. 
14 Hundley, Tom, 'Among Israelis, armed civilians commonplace: weapons often a fact of life for 
self-defence'. Chicago Tribune, November 5, 1995. And: Comment: Christian Science Monitor, 
November 6, 1995. 
15 Turner, Brian, S. Weber and Islam: A Critical Study, pp. 82-92. 
16 Wehr, Hans, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 179. See: Editorial, 'Wedded to death 
in a blaze of glory' The Times, March 9, 1996. 
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Western styled democracies.17 Moreover, it is generally considered in the West 
that political assassination is not the done thing. 
Politically, the assassination was not wholly unsuccessful, but not in ways that 
Yigal Amir could have possibly envisaged them. Shimon Peres had to stand in 
for the fallen war hero against a backdrop of heightening unrest within Israel. 
The Likud leader, Benyamin Netanyahu, was blamed for inciting the Israeli right 
(i.e., members of Shas, Kuk, and Kahane Chai, etc.), to oppose Labour's 
implementation of a 'peace process'. Within a few months, however, the 'peace 
process' would receive yet another seriously crippling blow with the coming to 
power of Netanyahu (May 1996). Nevertheless, prior to this setback, events were 
to take on a rather dramatic aspect. The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin unleashed 
a hive of activity that represented the most turbulent period in the entire 'peace 
process', where much long term, and arguably in many ways, irreparable damage 
was done. 
Selection was made of the unfortunate assassination of Yitzhak Rabin again for 
several reasons. The first is that obviously an assassination of any titular head of 
state cannot fail to generate a large corpus of reportage and debate. Secondly, 
although the assassination was an unprecedented event in Israel's colourful 
history, 18 the fact that it was committed, in essence, by 'one of their own' was 
shocking to the Israelis, and many sympathetic Americans. 19 For the act fell 
outside of their traditional perceived conventions of what Israel is, and what it 
represents viz. 'a land of the brave, and a land of the free'. Thirdly, the U.S. 
mainstream media had never before reported on an assassination of an Israeli 
head of state, how would it convey the sad news?20 
17 Brill, E, J. [Ed.], First Encyclopedia of Islam 1913-36, pp. 491-492. 
18 Schmemann, Serge, 'Rabin slain after peace rally in Tel Aviv'. New York Times, November 5, 
1995. 
19 Battersby, John, 'Israel struggles to understand loss of a Hero'. Christian Science Monitor, 
November 6, 1995. And: Schmemann, Serge, Ibid. And: Goldberg, Carey, 'As the Sabbath 
wanes, word spreads, bringing sadness and tears'. New York Times, November 5, 1995. 
2° Karsh, Efraim, [Ed.], From Rabin to Netanyahu: Israel's troubled Agenda, p. I 
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The main argument posited in this chapter is that there was no anti-Palestinian 
reportage evident within the various channels of the mainstream media. Indeed, 
nor should there have been any, as the event did not concern the Palestinians 
directly. There was a concern amongst the Palestinians themselves, however, 
regarding the future of the 'peace process' now that one of its chief 'architects' 
had been rather abruptly removed.21 This concern was reflected in the West 
generally, and in particular in the U.S., which led Clinton to personally intervene 
in efforts to get the faltering process back 'on track', as he had after the earlier 
catastrophe at Hebron. 22 
Furthermore, it is argued that although there was no anti-Arab or Palestinian 
reportage evident in the channels of the U.S. mainstream media, there was an 
enormous amount of pro-Israeli reportage, and this took several forms. Firstly, 
there was a large corpus of coverage concerning the dynamics and logistics 
underpinning the assassination itself. (Again, like the Massacre of Hebron, the 
media approached its subject as if it were reporting a military operation offering 
every consumable fact gleaned.) This style of reportage did give rise to a 
criticism concerning both tragedies, for it is strongly suggested that the 
journalists on the whole failed to blame Israel's tendency towards societal 
militarism per se, which undoubtedly was a contributing factor. 
Secondly, there were, as would be expected from a political assassination of such 
a prominent, and to the West 'well liked' character, 23 obituaries and eulogies 
dedicated to the 'warrior turned peacemaker' .Z4 These obituaries were, however, 
as to be expected of an obituary pressed during a time of national mourning, for 
they were both praised Rabin's personal achievements and focused upon 
21 Jehl, Douglas, 'A moment of disbelief and uncertainty' New York Times, November 6, 1995. 
And: Goldberg, Carey, 'As the Sabbath wanes, word spreads, bringing sadness and tears'. New 
York Times, November 5, 1995. 
22 Rosenbaum, David, E. 'A shaken Clinton mourns Rabin'. New York Times, November 5, 1995. 
23 Sciolini, Elaine, 'American officials warmly remember Rabin as a friend they came to trust' 
New York Times, November 6, 1995. 
24 Schmemann, Serge, 'A stunned Israel morns and honours its fallen leader', New York Times, 
November 6, 1995. 
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elements of his good character.25 Indeed, it is generally perceived that it is wrong 
to write or speak ill of the dead.26 This medium of the press, however, gave rise 
to a further criticism, in that it rapidly glossed over Rabin's evident culpability in 
the events of Ramla, and Lydda etc., in April 1948, whilst focusing upon him in 
the light of a military 'hero' .27 Indeed, they credited him, erroneously, with the 
responsibility of personally creating the army that destroyed the Arabs in 1967. 
Indeed, a military victory that ultimately underscores the myths that surround 
Israel's existence. 
Thirdly, there was a detectable strand of reportage that followed the details of the 
killer, his incarceration, and impending trial. Fourthly, there were copious 
amounts of reportage concerning the effects of the assassination upon the large 
Jewish communities of New York, Washington DC, Chicago, and Los Angeles 
etc. A collective Jewish community, which it is argued, was emotionally 
distraught, and grieved openly for the loss of their great leader. In this process of 
mourning, it is suggested that many non-Jewish Americans lamented equally for 
the loss of the Israeli leader. For it is understood that there existed both an 
empathy for, and sympathy with, the Israeli's general sense of anguish, having 
suffered the same psychological trauma through the assassination of J. F. 
Kennedy in November 1963.28 
Finally, after a short period, as the 'media event' cooled and as Israel and the 
international community came to terms with its unified grief, there emerged a 
strand of reportage that inevitably hinted that there was a conspiracy 
underpinning the assassination. This involved active collusion between the 
settlers, and some elements in the army. (No one was brave enough to suggest, 
however, that the political right i.e., Netanyahu's Likud, Shas, et al had any 
responsibility whatsoever in the assassination itself, except by being guilty of 
25 Berger, Marilyn, 'Yitzhak Rabin, 73, a soldier turned peacemaker'. New York Times, 
November 5, 1995. 
26 Gove, Michael, 'Assad's bid for peace was a thin disguise'. The Times, June 13,2000. 
27 Haberman, Clyde, 'Recalling a peacemaker, hard crust and all'. New York Times, November 6, 
1995. For, Lydda, Lod, and Ramla, see Guyatt, Nicholas, Op-cit, p. 52. 
28 Cowell, Alan, 'Arafat absence from funeral underscores a fragile peace'. New York Times, 
November 6, 1995. And: Hoagland, Jim, 'Rabin perished in brutal war: one for peace'. The 
Washington Post, November 5, 1995. And: Hersh, Seymour, M. The Samson Option, p. 126. 
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incitement.) Moreover, and unexpectedly, the Palestinian hawks were not 
implicated. It seemed that the assassination was a purely an Israeli generated 
phenomena. This predictably emergent conspiracy theory, however, did give rise 
to the media's obligatory use of the negatively loaded rhetorical question mark, 
which made its expected reappearance, after a brief absence. 29 
Furthermore, it is also argued that like the 'Massacre of Hebron' (that harbinger 
of impending catastrophe; in the sense that it offered to Israel, and the World, an 
example of how vulnerable the Oslo 'peace process' was to the unsolicited 
attentions of the Israeli extremist right), the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin was 
largely misreported in the various media channels. These focused primarily on 
the political implications of the assassination, rather than its obvious theological 
underpinnings. Moreover, it is suggested that there was very little in depth 
analysis proffered upon the ideological connection that existed between the two 
murders, as although they were slight variants of each other, they clearly 
stemmed initially from an extension of Kahanist inspired anti-Arabism, and only 
very loosely found legitimisation in Talmudic law. Nevertheless, certain Rabbis 
in Israel and America (Abraham Hecht of New York was blamed in particular,) 
were correctly chastised for offering a theological legitimacy to logic 
promulgated by Amir, which he could act upon without compromising his own 
ideological leanings. 30 
Indeed, it seems that there exists another similarity within the dynamics of the 
two catastrophes, in the sense that Israel is a receptacle for imported ideologies, 
and conversely, America is the recipient of accusations of complicity in the 
shaping of Israel's socio-cultural environment.31 The U.S. mainstream 
'prestigious press' (as did the Israeli press), blamed the assassination upon 
someone representing the 'lunatic fringe' of Israeli society. 32 Inasmuch as this 
29 See: Newsweek, 'Will peace survive?' Vol., 126, No 20, November 13, 1995. 
30 Battersby, John, 'Settlers regret Rabin killing: but stand their ground'. Christian Science 
Monitor, November 10, 1995. 
31 Cowell, Alan, 'Arafat absence from funeral underscores a fragile peace.' New York Times, 
November 6, 1995. 
32 Sander, Mendelson, H: In Weil, Martin, 'A horrible tragedy'. The Washington Post, November 
5, 1995. And, Wallach, Janet, & Wallach, John, Op-cit, p. 467. 
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may be true, the lunatic fringe is in essence the wrong entity label for this group 
of disparate peace wreckers. For, as the media correctly reported the assassin was 
'surreally calm' in manner, and extremely articulate in defence of his actions.33 
Moreover, there are vast number of Israelis that support the views, and to some 
extents, the actions of both Goldstein and Amir, which warrants consideration of 
them as something more than just a 'fringe' group?4 
Indeed, if it takes just two ideologically misguided members of an Israeli fringe 
to wreak so much havoc on the 'peace process', then the omen for the future is 
not a good one. This is to suggest that Shin Bet, Mossad, and others, failed to 
understand the ramifications of the 'Massacre of Hebron'. And moreover, failed 
to interpret the signs (which in hindsight were apparent, as warnings were given 
by several right wing Rabbi's pronouncements earlier in July),35 that the dark 
spectre of political assassination would be cast upon Yitzhak Rabin, (at a peace 
rally of all ironies). Indeed, there was always the threat that someone would take 
the law into their own hands after attaching some theological legitimacy to their 
intentions and placing the blame upon God's divine will. Furthermore, it is 
argued that this implicit threat is nigh impossible to defend against, and, in 
reality, any ensuing peace process is at threat through being just that, a 'peace 
process'. 
It is, perhaps, a little more than ironic, that arguably the time of the most 
peaceable conditions in Israel, during the entirety of the Arab/Israeli conflict, 
was between the cessation of the Intifada, and the official signing of the 
'Declaration of Principles' in September 1993. After this, when Oslo was 
becoming a de facto reality, opposition to the 'principles of peace' from both 
sides had cause to balk at the responsibilities imposed upon them. Perhaps, there 
33 Gellman, Barton, 'Israeli Prime-minister Rabin is killed: Jewish gunman says he acted alone'. 
The Washington Post, November 5, 1995. 
34 King, John, Handshake in Washington: The Beginning of Middle East Peace? p. VI. 
35 Battersby, John, 'Israel struggles to understand loss of a hero.' Christian Science Monitor, 
November 6, 1995. As much as this incitement is true, another contributing factor to the 
assassination can be attributed to the recent ratification of the Oslo II Agreement. (September 28, 
1995.) See: Giacaman, George, In the Throes of Oslo: Palestinian Society, Civil Society and the 
Future, in Giacaman, George, & Lonning, Dag, J. [Eds.), After Oslo: New Realities, Old 
Problems, p. 4. 
31 
is a lesson from this consideration to be learned for any future implemented 
'peace process'. 
CHAPTER4 
'Sunday Bloody Sundays' 
'I was stepping on flesh, on legs, on hands. People were screaming, 
burning, I was taking people out of there. They were yelling to me, 
burning up. It was literally hell ... ' A headless body still sat on a seat. 
A severed leg poked out from a blanket. Pieces of flesh littered the 
road, and were carefully collected by recovery teams.' 1 
Do not regard those that have died for the sanctification of the holy 
name as deceased, for they will live on, and shall receive their 
reward from Allah in heaven.2 
Thank God I am headed where I have always wanted to go.' 3 
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The period dated from February 25, 1996, until March 4, 1996, represents a very 
sorrowful and depressing chapter within the Oslo 'peace process'. Indeed, one 
wonders if this period really warrants inclusion as part of an analysis of the 
'peace process', so barbarous was its character.4 The chain of events that had 
been unleashed with the 'Massacre of Hebron' by a reportedly deranged doctor, 
and compounded upon by the efforts of a misguided Israeli law student, had 
drastically increased the tensions between the two parties. The Palestinian 
extremist groups of Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad had sworn to avenge Dr. 
Goldstein's callous action at Hebron.5 They eventually achieved this with 
devastating effect, when The Jewish Brigade, the armed wing of Islamic Jihad 
struck with a suicide bus-bomb at Beilid, near Netanya killing twenty-one 
soldiers on January 22, 1995.6 Throughout the remainder of the year Hamas 
1 Statement of A vi Revivo cited in Greenberg, Joel, 'For rescuers it was 'entering gates of hell'. 
New York Times, February 26, 1996. 
2 Famous verse from the Qur'an: as cited in Schiff, Ze'ev, & Ya'ari, lntifada: The Palestinian 
Uprising-Israel's Third Front, p. 73. 
3 Suicide note of Hamas bomber Nabil al-Areer, In: Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Suicide cyclist spurs 
Palestinian militants', Guardian, October 28, 2000. 
4 The time frame for this case study was determined from the first in a series of Hamas terrorist 
attacks that commenced on February 25, 1996 and culminated with the Dizengoff 'shopping mall' 
attack on the eve of March 4, 1996. 
5 Greenberg, Joel, 'Sounds of chanting and shooting in a town awash with blood'. New York 
Times, February 26, 1994. And: Shlaim, A vi, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, p. 525. 
6 Horowitz, David, [Ed.], Yitzhak Rabin: Soldier of Peace, p. 194. 
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activities were to cause Israel much discomfort as a psychological war raged 
between the extremists and Shin-Bet, Israel's internal security division.7 As a 
result, Israeli security was tightened, and there was a crackdown on the perceived 
militant elements that were associated with the radical groups of the Gaza Strip, 
West Bank, Beirut, and Damascus. 
And so it was, in early January of 19968 when the Hamas 'Engineer', the group's 
'master bomb-maker', had his head 'atomised' by fifty grams of plastic explosive 
concealed in a booby-trapped mobile telephone, planted in his car by a 'turned' 
Hamas insider, Usama Hamad.9 The successful 'scalping' of Yahya Ayyash was 
considered a great moral victory for Shin-Bet who had suffered some severe 
criticism for their failure regarding Yitzhak Rabin's security. 10 Indeed, it had 
even seen the resignation of its then head, 'K' a considered 'expert' of the 
extreme Jewish 'right' organisations! 11 
The funeral that took place of Yahya Ayyash in the Gaza Strip was attended by 
approximately 100,000 mourners, such was the notoriety and dubious respect 
that the Iranian trained bomb maker commanded for standing up to the Israeli 
occupation. 12 Indeed, in a chilling reminder of how deep rooted the Palestinian 
discomfiture is with continued Israeli domination, Sheikh Nafiz Azzam 
addressed the large crowd in attendance, and declared that 'millions of Yahya 
Ayyash's will be born' to which the gathered throng retorted Yes to I:aidin al-
Q . H , d . 13 asslm, amas arme wmg. 
7 For a list of attacks see: Weil, Martin, 'A horrible tragedy'. The Washington Post, November 5, 
1995. 
8 January 5th, See: Wallach, Janet, & Wallach, John, Op-cit, p. 468. 
9 Walker, Christopher, 'Booby-trap phone kills top Palestinian bomber'. The Times, January 6, 
1996. 
10 Goldberg, Andy, 'Israel seals Gaza as Hamas vows to avenge its dead hero', The Sunday 
Times, January 7, 1996. 
11 Walker, Christopher, 'Calls for vengeance as hero of Hamas is buried'. The Times, January 8, 
1996. 
12 Walker, Christopher, 'Booby trap phone kills top Palestinian bomber'. The Times, January 6, 
1996. 
13 Walker, Christopher, 'Calls for vengeance as hero of Hamas is buried'. The Times, January 8, 
1996. 
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Any analysis of this turbulent period however, cannot be undertaken without 
consideration of another important factor, namely, the Palestinian elections. 14 For 
the January elections were to be just another impacting dynamic that would lead 
to the Hamas orchestrated massacres. On election day, popular feeling would 
show that although Arafat had overwhelming support, and al-Fatah featured 
predominantly: Hamas had only very limited support. 15 If it was Hamas' 
intention to derail the 'peace process', and even change the popular mood into 
one of a more hard line militancy in opposition to the 'principles' of Oslo, they 
had failed. This single factor had a large responsibility for the upsurge of Hamas 
activity as the bombers struck at Israel not only to avenge their 'Engineer' but 
more out of frustration than anything else. Moreover, Hamas had become a 
splintered organisation, again in part due to the elections as some of its leaders 
wished to 'come in from the cold' and participate in the political process, whilst 
others felt it more beneficial to remain on the 'fringe' and continue their largely 
ineffectual destabilising tactics. 
In many ways, however, the Israelis had been too thorough in their tightening of 
security, and had made a serious tactical error in choosing to liquidate Yahya 
Ayyash at that time. The way of things within the Arab/Israeli conflict seems to 
be that timing is of the essence very often it is the difference between a massive 
political coup or a miserable abject failure. Furthermore, and as was suggested, 
Israeli preventative measures viz. assassination, seriously fractured the already 
splintered, and internally divided Hamas organisation, into an entity comprising 
many small, and vengeful cells, both difficult to monitor by Shin Bet, and 
subsequently eradicate. 16 
This was the political backdrop that underpinned Hamas' first emotional, and 
aggressive response to the loss of their 'Engineer', i.e., two suicide bus 
bombings. The first devastated a number eighteen bus near the busy bus station 
14 Walker, Christopher, 'Hamas gunmen killed as election tension mounts'. The Times, January 
20, 1996. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Brown, Derek, 'Martyr leaves perilous legacy', Guardian, March 4, 1996. 
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on the Jaffa Rd. in the early morning rush hour. 17 The second at Ashkelon some 
fifty minutes later would kill two more on a fateful Sunday, February 25, 1996.18 
Hamas declared that the two 'heroes' who had perpetrated the attacks were 
avenging the martyr Yahya Ayyash, and the massacre of twenty-nine Muslim 
worshippers, in an obvious reference to the 'Hebron Massacre' .19 
The following day, Ahmad Abdul Hamidah (incidentally a Lebanese American), 
killed two more Israelis before being shot to death by petrified and confused 
onlookers when his car skidded out of control near a bus stop. There was, 
however, some debate generated by this incident within Israel because it was not 
immediately evident whether his car possessed a mechanical fault, or whether he 
was a pre-programmed suicidal terrorist. Later, Israeli officials claimed that, after 
an inspection of his car no mechanical fault could be detected, and furthermore, 
that there was a cache of extremist literature pertaining to the Islamic Jihad 
within his automobile. 20 To substantiate this claim, the officials suggested that he 
had told friends that: 'Tonight you'll see me on television' .21 
This is interesting, because it would seem evident that if the Israelis had opened 
fire on an innocent man whilst fearing a suicide attack, then their actions would 
have been perceived as hysterical, perhaps warranting a review of Israel's gun 
laws (an Israeli was shot in the leg in the confusion [or rush] to execute the 
Arab).22 1t is argued then, that it was politically expedient to portray this man as a 
suicidal attacker rather than face the potential of a political storm, regardless of 
the man's true identity or motivations. 
At this juncture, confusion seems to have arisen within the Hamas organisation 
as separate elements supposedly representing the leadership made alternative 
gestures to the Israelis. One group, based in the West Bank offered a ceasefire, 
17 Dunn, Ross, 'Double suicide bomb attack on Israel kills 25', The Times, February 26, 1996. 
18 Brown, Derek, 'Martyr leaves perilous legacy', Guardian, March 4, 1996, 
19 Dunn, Ross, 'Double suicide bomb attack on Israel kills 25'. The Times, February 26, 1996. 
20 Rowley, Storer, H. 'Israelis to Arafat: crackdown'. Chicago Tribune, February 28, 1996. 
21 Walker, Christopher, 'Driver dies after fearful Jews fire on skidding car'. The Times, February 
27, 1996. 
22 For an interesting article concerning Israel's 'gun laws' see: Whitaker, Brian, 'Israelis gear up 
for armed struggle'. Guardian, October 26, 2000. 
36 
whilst the other (based in Damascus) rejected the notion that the offer was even 
legitimate. Regardless of this internal dispute the Israelis refused to accept any 
ceasefire, instead castigating Arafat and urging him to reign in the militants. 
Meanwhile, the clock was ticking inexorably away, until the spectre of carnage 
descended upon Jerusalem once again.23 
At 6:25am on March 3 (once again a Sunday), on the same stretch of the Jaffa 
Road an Egged bus was rather abruptly brought to a halt by a powerful 
explosion, in which eighteen more Israelis lost their lives.24 The psychological 
effect of this attack upon the Israeli population was massive. The previous 
week's terrorist activities had already strained Israeli nerves, and the perception 
of vulnerability was extreme.25 The disillusionment with the Israeli leadership 
was already high, as the majority felt that their security was being jeopardised.26 
This explosion was for many the last straw as they vented their anger in abusing 
the Labour leader. Voices along the Jaffa Road that day, were heard to shout 
'Next time its you Peres'. 
Confusion and panic had gripped Israel. The Labour party had set out to grant the 
Palestinians their own state by ceding territory to them (territory that had been 
notoriously difficult to control, and was a liability for Israel in the long term 
anyway). And what were the Israelis receiving in return? Nothing, except their 
wholesale slaughter at the hands of the crazed and 'religiously fanatical suicidal 
killers.' 
Then to top it all, on the eve of Purim, (note the date), Salah Ahmad Rahim 
wandered off in the direction of the Dizengoff shopping mall (Tel Aviv) 
apparently armed with two containers of Benzine, and some old Egyptian 
23 Dunn, Ross, Terrorists put PLO on the spot'. The Times, March 5, 1996. 
24 Associated Press, 'Bomb demolishes bus in Jerusalem'. New York Times, March 3, 1996. And: 
Walker, Christopher, 'Israeli's demand revenge for second 'bloody' [my emphasis] Sunday'. The 
Times, March 4, 1996. Note: the title for this chapter was partially inspired by the title of this 
particular article. 
25 Walker, Chritopher, 'Israelis declare war on bombers'. The Times, March 4, 1996. 
26 Schmemann, Serge, 'Peres promises a war on Hamas'. New York Times, February 27, 1996. 
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landmines.27 He was turned away by suspicious security at the mall however, so 
instead he chose a crowded spot near a cash machine, and successfully 
detonated: killing himself, and twelve more Israelis.28 In the ensuing eight days 
of violence, a grim total of sixty people were to die in related attacks carried out 
by Izzidin al-Qassim. 29 
Concerning these Hamas activities they should naturally be condemned as 
unconscionable. Recognition is made however, to the fact that Palestinian 
terrorism is first and foremost a reaction to Israeli occupation, and the ills this 
has wrought upon the Palestinian population i.e., the squalor of the camps, the 
lack of 'hope' of a prospect of change in their status, and the negation of their 
right to front any valid opposition to a de facto Israeli fait accompli. In short, it is 
violent resistance to the victory of Israel. 30 
It is argued that, politically, Hamas' activities failed to derail the 'peace process', 
however they did seriously hamper its credibility and worthiness. Furthermore, 
as was suggested, the pressure placed upon Yasser Arafat to bring in the fugitives 
and outlaws, and bring them to book was severe from Israel, the U.S., and from 
elements within the international community?1 Yet, if the Palestinian leader were 
to do this, he would incur the wrath of all Palestinians for perceived collusion 
with the Israelis viz. a further immediate threat to his own welfare. Nevertheless, 
the Palestinian Preventative Service did rein in approximately three hundred and 
fifty supporters of Hamas at Arafat's behest, but such collusive efforts by the 
Israeli and Palestinian security apparatus were not effectual, as at least two of the 
bombers came from Hebron in the West Bank. 32 
27 Marie, Colvin, & Goldberg, Andy, 'Israel on alert for wave of sleeper bombers' Chicago 
Tribune March 10, 1996. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Walker, Christopher, 'Driver dies after fearful Jews fire on skidding car'. The Times, February 
27, 1996. 
30 Seale, Patrick, Abu Nidal: The World's Most Notorious Terrorist, p. 62. 
31 Walker, Martin, 'US tries to heel wounded peace', Guardian, March 5, 1996. 
32 Schmemann, Serge, 'Arafat's police hunt bombers, pushed hard by the Israelis'. New York 
Times, February 28, 1996. 
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An important factor in understanding why Hamas' activities are ineffective in 
derailing the 'peace process' per se is to be found in the fact that Hamas is a 
separate maximalist Palestinian entity that is outside of, and in direct opposition 
with, Arafat's Al-Fatah. Therefore, the Israelis need to maintain a common 
dialogue with the Palestinian leader as it is perceived that he alone can really 
communicate through the complex channels of popular resistance that permeate 
the Gaza Strip and West Bank via a process of mediation with other PLO 
representatives.33 Today, however, Arafat no longer holds as much authority as 
he once enjoyed. The likes of Saeb Erakat (a leading Al-Fatah negotiator), and 
Marwan Barghouti (head of the Tanzim 'Apparatus' organisation), are the real 
power holders in the Occupied Territories.34 
In relation to this, Israeli methods of eradicating dangerous terrorist elements 
within the Occupied Territories, although very often successful through the 
utilisation of the Duvdevan (The Cherry Brigade), they are also politically 
dangerous, and threaten to curtail any dialogue between the two parties?5 
Nevertheless, this elite brigade was eventually sent in to round up the militants 
on March 4, 1996, due to domestic pressure placed upon the Israeli leadership, 
and Shimon Peres' personal attempt at damage limitation.36 
This damage limitation was implemented not only for the sake of the Israeli 
citizenship, but to arrest the further slide of his slim majority over Likud. Prior to 
the February blasts (Jerusalem and Ashkelon), this margin had stood at 20 
points?7 By the time of the third bomb attack however, on another number 
eighteen bus, this lead had dwindled to just a few points. By March 4th, the 
Dizengoff shopping mall attack had finally killed off any Labour lead.38 Indeed, 
as one cynical Likud supporter put it: 'The irony is that as much as I hate them, 
33 Freedman, Lawrence, 'Israel depends on Arafat'. The Times, March 5, 1996. 
34 Newsweek, 'Firestorm in the Mideast', Vol., 136, No, 17, October 23, 2000. And: Dempsey, 
Jude, 'Leader of the insurrection'. The Financial Times, October 14, 2000. 
35 Mahnaimi, Uzi, 'Barak's commandos risk all to go undercover among Gaza militants'. 
The Times. October 22, 2000. See Peretz, Don, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising, p. 62. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Editorial: 'Bomb law'. The Times, February 26, 1996. 
38 Editorial: 'Vision of Death' The Times, March 5, 1996. 
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the beasts from Hamas could win us this election.' 39 Moreover, Likud were 
enraged when Muhammad Abu-Wardah the alleged Hamas bombing convener, 
stated that he was working on behalf of Likud in order to defeat Labour, and 
sabotage the 'peace process'. 40 
This begs the cynical question; could any such conspiracy from the Israeli right 
and Islamic 'militants' actually exist? For it has been suggested that Israeli 
settlers have supplied Hamas with explosives to carry out their attacks.41 
Additionally Hamas, although headed by Shaikh Yassin and seemingly 
vehemently opposed to any peace deal with Israel has intimated that it would like 
inclusion in the political process.42 Indeed, this very organisation was initially an 
outgrowth of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood),43 which Israel had 
purposefully allowed to gamer support within the Occupied Territories during 
the mid 1980's in order to destabilise Al-Fatah the largest faction of the PLO by 
offering a more controllable altemative.44 If there is no collusion anywhere 
between Hamas, Mossad, or Shin Bet, (which there must be, or how otherwise 
would have they [Shin Bet]'gotten to' Yahya Ayyash?), then it would seem that 
the Israeli intention to create such a controllable opposition failed, resulting in 
terrible and quite literally grave consequences for the Israeli populace. 
It is argued that Hamas' activities, although both destructive and disruptive to the 
peace process, they are largely ineffectual for several reasons. Firstly, as Hamas 
is outside of the umbrella of the PLO, their activities are largely ignored 
politically, because they lack any modicum of legitimacy. This is why Hamas 
has made overtures that it wants in on the political process.45 Furthermore, it is 
argued that their methodology is so base and cruel, that even the Palestinian 
39 Mothi Cohen cited in Walker, Christopher, 'Peace process is terrorists target' The Times, 
February 26, 1996. 
40 Walker, Christopher, 'Israel sends tanks to seal off border with West Bank' The Times, March 
8, 1996. 
41 Storer, Rowley, H. 'Israeli anger threatens peace process' Chicago Tribune, February 27, 1996. 
And: Bashar, Richard, 'Breakthrough? Arafat says Israel, Hamas are holding talks.' Chicago 
Tribune, May 26, 1996. 
42 Schmemann, Serge, 'Israeli rage rises as bomb kills 19, imperilling peace'. New York Times, 
March 4, 1996. 
43 Hiro, Dilop, A Dictionary of the Middle East, pp. 105-106. 
44 Kimmerling, Baruch, & Migdal, Joel, S. The Palestinians: The Making of a People, p. 272. 
45 Ibid. 
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political mainstream i.e., the Palestinian Authority cannot consider openly 
supporting them. (Although Arafat often receives snide insinuations from Israel 
that he holds some form of executive power over the organisation.) 
Secondly, Hamas' terrorism attracts condemnation from most key governments 
throughout the globe who fear the threat that such terrorism could blight their 
own cities.46 This factor, it is argued, establishes an almost universally shared 
resolve to stand by the principles of peace.47 Owing to this, Hamas closes the 
window of opportunity upon itself, as the 'peace process' is actually thrown 
forward, after being merely temporarily jilted. And moreover, their terrorist 
activities serve only to fuel the Israeli right i.e., Likud, Shas, et al, and the 
extreme settlers. Thirdly, suicide attacks although having a disturbing 
psychological effect upon the populace and the politicians whose careers depend 
upon domestic support (a theme picked up later) their long-term effects are 
limited outside of the periphery of their immediate victims. 
Selection was made of this 'media frame', however, again for several reasons. 
Firstly, condemnable suicide attacks perpetrated by the bombers are, and perhaps 
rightly so, portrayed in a fashion that instantly draws out sympathy for the 
mainly innocent Israeli victims, i.e., images of dismembered and grizzled 
corpses, melted flesh, chunks of raw meat, blood soaked and stunned survivors, 
and other associated carnage abound.48 Furthermore, there is a moral and 
religious image that is frequently evoked by the depiction of the black-cloaked 
Hasidim (Respect for the Dead) who scavenge the mangled wreckages, and 
46 Rowley, Storer, H. 'Peres unswayed in peace process as bombs kill 25'. Chicago Tribune, 
February 26, 1996. And Rhodes, Tom, 'Cl in ton takes lead in Middle East anti-terror drive'. The 
Times, March 9, 1996. 
47 Schmemann, Serge, '2 suicide bombings in Israel kill 25 and wound 77, highest such total, 
New York Times, February 26, 1996. 
48 Greenberg, Joel, 'For rescuers it was 'entering gates of hell', New York Times, February 26, 
1996. To further compound this fact consider this sickening account offered by George Will in 
the USA Today of a very recent 'suicide' bombing. "The blast. .. sent flesh flying onto second 
storey balconies a block away. Three men were blown 30 feet: their heads, separated from their 
bodies by the blast, rolled down the glass-strewn street. .. One woman had at least six nails 
embedded in her neck. Another had a nail in her left eye. Two men, one with a six-inch piece of 
glass in his right temple ... tried to walk away ... A man groaned ... his legs were blown off. Blood 
poured from his torso ... A three-year-old girl, her face covered with glass, walked among the 
bodies calling her mother's name ... " See Sullivan, Andrew, 'America loses faith in the Israeli 
peace.' The Sunday Times August 26, 2001. 
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immediately surrounding areas for body parts to be sent to the morgue for corpse 
reassembly (the sacred duty of mitzvah).49 
These images are utilised, it is argued, in conjunction with imagery of hooded 
Hamas activists to impact upon the anonymity of their acts of terror, specifically 
to cause a psychological effect that further perpetuates fear of such acts of 
terrorism.50 Thus, legitimising the liquidation of perceived dangerous elements 
by whatever methods (shooting, explosive devices in mobile telephones and car 
seat headrests, and by even administering poison through the ear). 51 
Secondly, it is argued, that the U.S. mainstream media portrayals have once 
again regressed into a 'traditional denigration' of the Arabs, and particularly 
Palestinians, that evoke sentiments of savages, murderers, cold-blooded killers, 
devils incarnate, beasts, dogs, etc. Although some U.S. mainstream media 
channels utilised such emotive language in print: in Israel, such condemnation 
and name-calling was much more explicit and open. 52 
Within the framework of this media denigration, however, it shall be argued that 
any progress that Arab and Palestinian portrayals may have initially received 
during the early days of the 'peace process' suffered a severe setback and 
retardation. As the Arabs and Palestinians became clumped together, once again, 
as one perceived homogenous entity that exists only to harm the interests of 
Israel, and the U.S. For example, all Palestinian occupants of the Occupied 
Territories are collectively punished when the Israeli security forces encloses 
them, and enforces a siege. Furthermore, the Palestinian terrorists are not content 
with residing in just the Occupied Territories. In the eyes of the 'media complex' 
they naturally hang out in Beirut, Damascus, and as far away as Baghdad, and 
49 See: Jacobson, Philip, 'Saving souls'. The Times, Saturday March 9, 1996. And: Peretz, Don, 
Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising, p. 62. 
50 Rowley, Store, H. 'Land of Holy Terror: in a region choked by hatred, can peace survive?' 
Chicago Tribune, 'Perspective', March 3, 1996. 
51 See: Said, Edward, W. The End of the Peace Process, p. 200. 
52 Jerusalem shopkeeper, 'We have to do something about these bastards' cited in Walker, 
Christopher, 'Arafat arrests 140 suspects as Israel braces itself for further attacks'. The Times, 
February 28, 1996. 
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Teheran as well. (In fact they [the Arab terrorists], are everywhere, right through 
the 'Arc of Crisis' i.e. sweeping from Moscow around to Marrakech.) 53 
Furthermore, it is suggested that this representation of the far-flung roots of 
Palestinian terrorism is purposeful, and is actively encouraged, serving to 
legitimise Israel's conflict with all the Arabs, who are accused of being, all 
terrorists alike. This feeling is summed up with the oft quoted they, the Arabs, 
just desire to cast us into the sea. There are historical reasons that can explain and 
legitimise this argument that culminate in only one rather grim conclusion for 
both Israel and the U.S. 
The Arab/Israeli conflict, has from its inception, witnessed its fair share of 
terrorist activity. Indeed, the terrorism conducted by elements of the Irgun Zvei 
Leumi, (The Stem Gang), the Haganah, and Palmach brigades helped to 
formalise the nascent Israeli state.54 Such Zionist terrorism included methods of 
assassination e.g., that of Lord Moyne in November 1944, and Count Bemadotte 
in September 1948: 55 bombing e.g., that of The King David Hotel: July 1946.56 
Subversion and sabotage e.g., raids on Arab villages, and strategic sites, such as 
the Allenby Bridge in June 1946, 57 Cold-blooded murder e.g., at Deir Yassin, 
Lydda, and Ramla in April 1948,58 and psychological intimidation after May 
1948, to enforce an Arab Exodus. 59 
53 The 'Arc of Crisis' is an adaptation of President Jimmy Carter's Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brezinski's 'Arc of Crisis'. Which incorporated Afghanistan, Iran, Yemen, and Eritrea. Here, 
however, the definition of the 'Arc of Crisis' is an expanded one, ranging from Moscow around 
to Marrakech. See: Halliday, Fred, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, pp. 11-12. And: Laffin, 
John, The Dagger of Islam, pp. 4-5. 'Grozny', here reference is being made to the 'outlawed' 
Arab 'rebel' leader AI-Khattib in Chechnya. See: Lagnado, Alice, 'Chechen warlord who 
beheaded Britons is killed.' The Times, June 26, 2001. 
54 Seale Patrick, Op-cit., pp. 59-61. 
55 Concerning Lord Moyne, see: Smith, Charles, D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict p. 
115, and Count Bemadotte, see: Pappe, Ilan, The Making of the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951, 
p. 163. 
56 Smith, Charles, D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 132-133. And: King, John, Op-
cit, p. 34. 
57 Allon, Yigal, The Making of Israel's Army, pp. 157-161. 
58 Pappe, Ilan, Op-cit, p. 85. 
59 Said, Edward, W. The Question of Palestine, p. 34 
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Within this tradition of terrorism the Palestinians and Arabs have had an equal 
responsibility, and several examples have already been cited. But, if ·we were to 
consider specifically Arab/Palestinian (a purposeful homogenisation) acts of 
terrorism, then a good starting point, and one that denotes a change, i.e., an 
'upsurge in terrorism' would be the 1968 hijacking of an El Al flight that 
culminated in the Palestinians first post-1967 victory against the Israelis.60 Such 
a 'victory' set a precedent for a spate of hijackings throughout the early 1970's. 
The most famous being the multiple hijacking, and subsequent 'Dawson Field' 
saga, and the El Al flight that created notoriety for Layla Khalid in September 
1970.61 Another important event was the Palestinian orchestrated hostage taking 
of nine Israeli athletes, at the Munich Olympics in September 1972, and their 
subsequent murder. 62 
The period from 1970 onwards until 1973, represented the emergence of the 
'Black September' terrorist organisations, which heralded the beginning of the 
'War of the Spooks' that would continue throughout the 1970's and '80's across 
Europe, Central Asia, and North Africa. This covert warfare didn't really 
dissipate until the historical November 1988 (Algiers) Palestinian recognition of 
Israel.63 Recognition is made though to the loss of flight Pan Am 103 with 259 
passengers over Lockerbie (Scotland), in the December of 1988. A terrorist 
attack for which the PFLP General Command (Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine) based in Syria was initially blamed, and then later ruled out.64 
From this short inventory of nefarious terrorist activities, the U.S. as a victim, 
had usually been, in the main, excluded. True, several U.S. targets had been 
singled out in the Middle East; for example, consider the bombing of the U.S. 
barracks in Beirut in 1983, which killed 241 marines, or the attack upon USS 
60 Wilkinson, Paul, 'Blood is spilling over the map'. Observer, September 1, 1996. 
61 Hasla, Malu, 'My cousin the hijacker'. Guardian Weekend, January 11, 1997. And in Cabinet 
Papers 1970- 'Leila Khaled freed after U.S. pressure'. Guardian, January 1, 2001. And: 
Nicholson, Michael, Back to the Front: Israel, A Granada Production for ITV. Broadcasted: 
August 12. 
62 Seale, Patrick, Op-cit, p. 47. 
63 Ibid. p. 41 
64 See: Lockerbie on Trial, Radio 4, Broadcast, February 20, 2001. 
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Stark, (May 1987.)65 But this was the price to be paid for an enforced U.S. 
hegemonic domination over the Arabs. The bombing of the World Trade Centre 
(New York) in February 1993, was however, to change how the U.S. populace 
would consider the threat of terrorism, for it literally brought home to them how 
vulnerable they were to the backlash of Arab/Palestinian frustration and anger 
towards perceived U.S. imperialism.66 This American perception of vulnerability, 
it is argued was further impacted upon by the Oklahoma Bombing, (April 
1995).67 A bombing that 'Arab' terrorists were once again initially charged with 
culpability for, and then later reprieved, but not apologised too. And the 
'Islamists' were once again blamed for the loss of flight TW A 800 in July 1996 
where after intensive analysis it would seem that a rogue US Navy missile 
downed the ill fated aircraft. 68 
Furthermore, President Ronald Reagan's obsession with the threat of 'global 
terrorism' (throughout the 1980's directed in the main against Colonel Gadhaffi 
in Libya.) was being 'rung true' in the minds of the U.S. populace, and in the 
channels of the U.S. mainstream media.69 It is argued that this had several 
effects. Firstly, it turned the phantom spectre of terrorism into a real phenomena 
and it also helped to propel the U.S. nascent paranoia of subterfuge into a 
national obsession. An aspect that is very much evident in the media channels of 
the U.S. today. Recognition is made, however, to the fact that this paranoia is not 
aimed at Arabs per se, but also at all potential threats (domestic and 
international), to U.S. vital interests. 
As Arabs are perceived through their use of terrorism, however, to represent such 
a threat to the U.S., it has assisted in legitimising Israel's own security measures 
against considered terrorist elements either within, or peripheral to Israel. In 
65 Lancaster, John, 'Israel steps up Lebanese attacks'. The Washington Post, April13, 1996. 
66 Wilkinson, Paul, 'Blood is spilling over the map'. Observer, July 21, 1996. 
67 As reported by Jeremy Bowen see lslamaphobia, BBC2, August 18, 2001. 
68 The media's use of 'Islamists' as an entity term, it is argued, is deliberate as it allows for, and 
to some extents legitimises this aforementioned process of homogenisation of the Palestinians 
and Arabs. Moreover, it circumvents the problem of characterizing whom you are addressing: An 
opportunity then, for a bit of mild racism. See: Vulliamy, Ed, & Black, Ian, 'FBI follows twists in 
Islamist terror trail' Observer, July 21, 1996. 
69 Wilkinson, Paul, 'Blood is spilling over the map: ignore the rhetoric global terrorism is 
growing'. The Observer, July 21, 1996. 
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other words, it has legitimated the liquidation of all perceived emergent human 
threats (soft targets), as well as military ones (hard targets), at the grass roots 
level.70 Therefore, justifying the terminations carried out during the 'War of the 
Spooks' for example, or the Israeli bombing of Osiraq, the Iraqi nuclear reactor 
in June 1981, and of course, the liquidation of Yahya Ayyash.71 
Nevertheless, regarding Arab and Palestinian acts of terrorism: such terrorist 
activity although conducted in the pursuance of undermining the Israeli's and the 
U.S.'s hegemonic control over them. It actually serves only to tighten their 
[Israel's and the U .S.' s] grips on the region, as they feel justified in increasing 
their security, and conducting pre-emptive operations that have in the past (and 
continue to do so) cost the Palestinian leadership dearly.72 
Israel needs to take the threat from Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and other radical 
movements seriously, however, for several reasons: Palestinian disaffection with 
the 'peace process' and Arafat' s handling, or mishandling of their interests, may 
further encourage support for the organisations, leading to a suffocation of any 
future 'peace process', and subsequently more violence. This factor, however, 
has not come into fruition yet. If Arafat dies however, without having established 
an alternative leadership, it could result in a free for all power-struggle in the 
Occupied Territories that might lead to a civil war between the Palestinian hawks 
and doves.73 And given the propensity of terrorist violence advocated by the 
former, a rather ill omen for the future of the Palestinian cause. Concerning 
Israel, and the U.S., the grim portent is this; that their continued hegemonic 
domination over the Middle Eastern region will ultimately result in an 
exponential rise in terrorist activity conducted against them.74 To some, this 
70 This is what is recognized as the 'Begin Doctrine'. See: Levran, A, Israeli Strategy After 
Desert Storm, pp. 264-265. 
71 Osiraq. See: Catadul, H. Israel's Nuclear Weaponry, p. 126. 
72 Kimmerling, Baruch, & Migdal, Joel, S. The Palestinians: The Making of a People, p. 265. 
And: Said, Edward, W. The Question of Palestine, p. xxxii. 
73 Walker, Christopher, 'Arafat arrests 140 suspects as Israel braces for attacks', The Times, 
February 28, 1996. 
74 Zakariah, Farid, Newsweek, October 23, 2000. And: Fisk, Robert, 'Forget the peace process: 
this is a murderous civil war.' The Independent, December 29, 2000. And: Said, Edward, W. The 
Question of Palestine, p. 195. And: Guyatt, Nicholas, Op-cit, p. 79. 
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could be interpreted as 'the wages of sin'. Indeed, even as a form of Divine 
retribution.75 
75 Thedoulou, Michael, & Binyon, Michael, 'Iranian voters told to defy West's pressure.' The 
Times, March 9, 1996. And: Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'The street was covered with blood and 
bodies: the dead and the dying, Guardian, August 10, 2001. 
CHAPTERS 
'Operation Grapes of Wrath' and the 'Massacre of Qana' 
... 'If you don't beat an Arab into obedience, he'll always be on top 
of you.' Said Yifrah Albert who said he knew the Arab mentality 
because he emigrated from Morocco when he was young.' 1 
47 
After the Hamas orchestrated attack at the Dizengoff shopping mall on the 4th of 
March 1996, terrorist activities against Israel temporarily ceased. It is argued that 
there were several reasons for this. Firstly, the Israeli Defence Force had sealed 
off the Occupied Territories, seriously restricting movement, either into, or out 
of, the stricken enclaves.2 Secondly, Israel's internal security service Shin Bet, 
with the collusion of the PPS, rounded up all known supporters and activists, of 
Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad. 3 Thirdly, the relatives of the suicide bombers were 
evicted, and their homes were demolished.4 (An Israeli method of prevention 
assimilated from the British, and designed to put off would be martyrs.)5 
Fourthly, Hamas had called a moratorium on its destabilising tactics, as it had, 
for the time being at least, completed its agenda. 
Prior to the first Hamas attack of February 25th however, Labour's lead over 
Likud had stood at 20 points, but by the 4th of March this lead had all but 
vanished.6 Shimon Peres, it is argued, was in grave political trouble. The Israeli 
right i.e., Likud, Shas, et at was gaining favour amongst the Israeli mainstream, 
by claiming that it would put Israel's security, over and above, any further 
negotiation with the Palestinians. And if Likud were elected, a time out of the 
1 Gellman, Barton, 'If it's lights out for Israeli synagogue, Beirut must go dark too.' The 
Washington Post, April16, 1996. 
2 Walker, Christopher, 'Israel puts West Bank under military siege'. The Times, March 6, 1996. 
3 Schmemann, Serge, 'Arafat' s police hunt bombers, pushed hard by Israelis'. New York Times, 
February 27, 1996. 
4 Greenberg, Joel, 'Bombing suspects neighbours fear'. New York Times, February 28, 1996. 
5 Smith, Charles, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 294. And: Schiff, Ze'ev. & Ya'ari, 
Ehud, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising- Israel's Third Front, p. 145. 
6 Walker, Christopher, 'Israel rejects offer of Hamas ceasefire'. The Times, March 2, 1996. 
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misnamed 'peace process' would be declared. It was ironic indeed, that in effect, 
Hamas had electioneered on behalf of the Israeli right. 
And so it was, that on April 11th Israel commenced upon 'Operation Grapes of 
Wrath' .7 A military operation, with the primary stated objective of driving 
Hizbollah (the party of God) guerrillas out of their positions in southern 
Lebanon, where they constituted a threat to northern Israel.8 Strategically 
speaking the missions stated objective was firstly to cause a stampede (note the 
'plains culture' language) of the southern Lebanese to the north of the country, in 
order to then carpet bomb the outlaws positions.9 Indeed, the Israeli pretext for 
starting the engagement with Hizbollah was a claim that two Katyusha rockets 
were fired on Israel's most northern settlement of Kiryat Shmona. 10 
The main argument proposed in this chapter, is that the U.S. mainstream media's 
reportage of this selected 'media event' took two forms. Prior, to the 'Massacre 
of Qana', there was a definite pro-Israeli bias evident in the U.S. mainstream 
media channels. 11 Indeed, one article ironically suggested that it was acceptable 
to attack Hizbollah positions as long as the force utilised was commensurate to 
the task. Furthermore, it stated that it was reasonable to do so because no 
civilians would be injured, as the Israeli's use precision-guided munitions. 12 It is 
commonly accepted though, particularly after analysis of the damage inflicted 
upon Iraq during the Gulf War, that this form of technology is not infallible. 
Nevertheless, this pro-Israeli bias, it is suggested, had been generated out of 
sympathy shown towards Israel because of the suffering she had endured at the 
7 Reuters. 'Israel hits Lebanon targets after two guerrilla attacks.' The Washington Post, April 11, 
1996. And: Greenberg, Joel, 'An attack on Israel brings woe to Peres'. New York Times, April11, 
1996. 
8 Schmemann, Serge, 'A debate for Israel'. New York Times, April 22, 1996. 
9 Said, Edward, W. End of The Peace Process, p. 50. 
10 Reuters, 'Israel hits Lebanon targets after two guerrillas attacks, The Washington Post, April 
11, 1996 
11 Gellman, Barton, 'Israel finds challenge impossible to ignore.' The Washington Post, April 12, 
1996. And: Lancaster, John, 'Israel steps up Lebanese attacks.' The Washington Post, April 13, 
1996. 
12 
••• 'Retaliating for terrorist attacks is justified as long as the response is carefully targeted, as 
these raids appear to have been.' See: Editorial: 'Israel's answer to terror' New York Times, April 
12, 1996. 
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hands of Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad terrorists. After the massacre, which 
Israel declared was 'an accident' the U.S. mainstream media was not so blatant 
in its praise and support, for Israel's punitive action(s) in southern Lebanon. 13 
The U.S. mainstream media did not, however, directly condemn Israel's 
excessive use of force, and neither did the Administration in Washington. It was 
seven days after the operation commenced before Clinton merely urged the 
Israeli's to show restraint, and use commensurate force. 14 The reason for this 
delay was because the Administration was highly suspicious of Netanyahu, and 
what might happen to the U.S. led Middle Eastern peace initiative if the Likud 
party came to power. 15 They clearly wanted Peres, a man of peace, to win the 
coming May election, for he was someone that the Administration felt that they 
could do business with.16 Furthermore, Netanyahu, although not an entirely 
unknown quantity, was perceived as a potential maverick, and was also a known 
committed believer in Eretz Yisrael. Nevertheless, even after the tragedy at Qana 
the Administration categorically placed the blame for the Israeli error on the 
Hizbollah guerrillas who they claimed had triggered of the violence by attacking 
Kiryat Shmona. 17 Moreover, they claimed [rightly], that Israel had the right to 
defend herself against attack upon its sovereign territory, and furthermore, 
defend itself against perceived acts of terrorism. 18 
Several factors had coalesced, however, that led to the Israeli operation against 
Hizbollah, and the ensuing catastrophe at Qana. Firstly, it is argued that the 
Hamas attacks had sufficiently destabilised the 'peace process' and that any 
operation carried out against the Hizbollah, or indirectly against Syria, could not 
13 Schmemann, Serge, 'A debate for Israel'. New York Times, April22, 1996. 
14 Newsweek, 'Go up to Lebanon and cry': April 29, 1996. And: Lippman, Thomas, W. 
'Christopher contacts Mideast leaders as U.S. refrain from criticism of Israeli air-strikes'. The 
Washington Post, April 16, 1996. And: Schmemann, Serge, 'Israel and militants trade blows as 
fighting spreads in Lebanon: Syrian troops drawn into affray'. New York Times, Aprill3, 1996. 
15 Schmemann, Serge, 'Voicing regret, Israeli leader offers a ceasefire'. New York Times, April 
19, 1996. 
16 Sciolini, Elaine, 'In the face of horror diplomacy stays muted.' New York Times, April 19, 
1996. 
17 
••• 'Sen. Bob Dole said that it was 'a terrible thing' but blamed the fighters in Lebanon for 
starting the violence' See: Sciolini, Elaine, 'In the face of horror diplomacy stays muted'. New 
York Times, April 19, 1996. 
18 Editorial: 'A deadly day in Lebanon'. New York Times, April19, 1996. 
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damage the process any further. It is suggested that Peres sensed that there was a 
window of opportunity to rid Israel of a long suffered irritant. (It is important to 
note that since the time of the first Hamas attack on February 25th talks had been 
suspended with Syria, which permitted Israel to act in southern Lebanon, without 
having to worry about any serious repercussions.) 19 
This Syrian factor is important, because since 1991, it is Syria who holds real 
political power in the Lebanon.20 Indeed, Syria has to be considered if there is to 
be any diplomatic solution to a crisis there. Furthermore, Syria has 35,000 troops 
stationed in Lebanon, whom Israel believes could do more to rein in Hizbollah. It 
would seem that these days, however, the Syrian army is to pre-occupied with 
assisting in drug trafficking, and bolstering the Syrian economy, than to be 
bothered to rein in a group that is not actually a threat to Syria, and apparently 
conducts an active anti-Israeli policy on her behalf.21 This collusion between, 
Syria and Hizbollah, is an argument that raises itself repeatedly within the 
dynamics of the Arab/Israeli conflict, and has done since Hizbollah was formed 
in 1982.22 Indeed, the former Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad was often openly 
charged with actively encouraging Hizbollah to strike at Israe1.23 
Indeed, concerning 'Operation Grapes of Wrath' it is strongly suggested that an 
article was published in the New York Times on April 5th that was firstly, highly 
propagandist, and portrayed Syria specifically in a poor light; namely, by 
referring to the suspension of the talks in relation to Damascus' support of a 
Hamas faction. Furthermore, it referred to Ahmad Jibril' s PFLP (Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine), as using Syrian radio to taunt Israelis, before 
going on to suggest that the PFLP is one of ten groups (including Hamas and the 
19 Jehl, Douglas, 'In Mideast, a hard line gets harder.' New York Times, April5, 1996. 
20 Sciolini, Elaine, 'in the face of horror diplomacy stays muted.' New York Times, April 19, 
1996. And: Smith, Charles, D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 283. 
21 Comadi, Peter, 'Troops reap rich harvest from Lebanese drugs trade' The Sunday Times, June 
18,2000. 
22 Jehl, Douglas, 'Lebanon fighters gain stature but for how long?' New York Times, April 21, 
1996. And: Smith, Charles, D. Op-cit, p. 285. 
23 Erlanger, Steven, 'Christopher sees Syria chief in a bid on Lebanon truce.' New York Times, 
April 21, 1996. 
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Islamic Jihad), that warrants Syria's inclusion on the 'State Sponsors of 
Terrorism List' i.e., the U.S.'s created list of perceived rogue or pariah states. 24 
Secondly, it is suggested that this article, perhaps not intentionally, is to some 
extents and purposes, a 'consensus manufacturing' article.25 This, it is argued, is 
because what the article is actually saying is that Syria aids terrorism, almost 
conclusively. And furthermore, Syria supports, and offers a home to Israel's 
greatest perceived foes i.e., Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad. Therefore, it is 
legitimate for Israel to act chauvinistically towards both Syria, and the Lebanon, 
whilst in hot pursuit of her enemies. 
Furthermore, by reference to the PFLP, memories of the 'Tragedy of Maalot' 
were evoked (May 1974)?6 In other words, the article strongly suggested that all 
'Arabs' are 'terrorists', and are a legitimate target for Israeli punitive operations. 
It is, as has already been suggested a purposeful homogenisation of the Arabs, 
and furthermore, it is the point where this process actively begins. Within the 
channels of the U.S. mainstream media, (particularly the 'prestigious press') 
numerous articles containing this specific process of homogenisation exist.27 We 
could just supplant Syria with Iran, Iraq, or Afghanistan, etc. and the result 
would be much the same, viz. legitimisation for the hegemonic practices of the 
neo-imperialists. Indeed, one seemingly confused official at Washington stated 
on separate occasions that the Syrian president himself had personally ordered 
the Hizbollah attack on Kiryat Schmona, before going on to state that it was Iran 
who had ordered the attack in order to affect the outcome of the May 29 Israeli 
24 Jehl, Douglas, 'In Mideast, a hard line gets harder.' New York Times, April 5, 1996. See: 
Zunes, Stephen, 'The Function of Rogue States in U.S. Middle East Policy'. Orientalia, The 
CMEIS Student Magazine of Durham University, November 27, 1998. Reprinted with 
germission from the Middle East Policy Quarterly, Washington, D.C., Vol., V., No 11 May 1997. 
5 Manufacturing Consent was a term was coined by Waiter Lippman in the 1920's. See: 
Chomsky, Noam, & Herman, Edward, S. Maufacturing Consent p. XL 
26 Nayif Hawatmeh is the present head of the PFLP. He is perceived to be personally responsible 
for the 'Tragedy ofMaalot' in 1974, an atrocity where twenty-four Israeli children were killed by 
Palestinian gunmen. See; Schmemann, Serge, 'U.S. helps to start negotiations to end fighting in 
Lebanon.' New York Times, April 16, 1996. And: Said, Edward, The Question of Palestine, 
p.l72. 
27 Consider the opening quote. For examples, see: Gellman, Barton, 'If its lights out for Israeli 
synagogue, Beirut must go dark to.' The Washington Post, April 16, 1996. 
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Elections. 28 It would appear then that the logic is, suggest enough potential 
culprits, then you'll name the right one, eventually. 
With regards to Iran, she suffers constant rebuke from both Israel, and the U.S. 
'media-complex' .29 For instance, much is made of her role as the chief exporter 
of the global Islamic revolution, and her unquestionable hatred of Israel and the 
West. Therefore, it is suggested that the U.S. mainstream media is guilty of 
peddling several myths concerning Iran's role in the Middle East, that have 
severe repercussions for both the Lebanon, and the Occupied Territories. 
Firstly, it is true that Iran does bankroll Shaikh Nasrullah's Hizbollah, as rightly 
or wrongly, it is championing the cause of resistance to Israel.3° Furthermore, 
Hizbollah is a Shi'ite organisation, so there is naturally a strong spiritual 
association with lran. 31 Hizbollah no longer wishes however, for the 
establishment of an Islamic state, or wishes to destroy Israel outright. Rather, it 
has made overtures that it would like to see eventual stability in the Lebanon and 
then enter the political process.32 Ironically, the more Israel tries to punish 
Hizbollah, the more its support grows amongst the Lebanese as it resists the 
Zionist's hegemonic practices. Furthermore, the mainly impoverished, and much 
maligned southern Lebanese peasants have largely benefited from the groups 
presence in their region. Hizbollah have developed a social infrastructure 
including schools and hospitals, a factor not often stated in the U.S. mainstream 
media?3 This situation, however, is a veritable Catch 22 for Israel, who cannot 
allow Hizbollah to establish strong connections in southern Lebanon because of 
her own perceptions of vulnerability to attack. 
28 See: Erlanger, Steven, 'Christopher sees Syria chief in a bid on Lebanon truce.' New York 
Times, April 21, 1996. And: ironically, Erlanger, Steven, 'Syria and Iran are still balking over a 
ceasefire' New York Times, April 22, 1996. 
29 Associated Press, 'Israel says Iran sent arms to attack Jews' New York Times, April 8, 1996. 
30 Walker, Christopher, US supports war on Hamas', The Times, March 7, 1996. 
31 Kifner, John, 'The peacekeepers with no peace to keep'. New York Times, April18, 1996. 
32 Thedelou, Mike, 'Their future hazy, Lebanon's guerrillas try tourism, Christian Science 
Monitor, May 21, 1996. 
33 Jehl, Douglas, 'Lebanese under fire, direct fury at U.S.' New York Times, April20, 1996. 
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Moreover, Iran naturally finances Hamas as it is standing up to the victory of 
Israel.34 Inasmuch as this is true, it does not take into account that both these 
groups are not solely financed by Iran?5 Indeed, it is argued that both groups 
would survive without Iran's support, as, ironically, much of its financing comes 
from the United States.36 Furthermore, Iran's support for Hamas plays on U.S. 
perceptions of the dangerous implications of any 'Islamic Revolution' or 'Global 
Jihad' ?7 
Nevertheless, the Iranian Revolution occurred a little over two decades ago, and 
subsequently, many social and political transformations have occurred within 
Iran. The Islamic state has been in a condition of 'flux and reflux' since the death 
of the 'charismatic' Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. 38 And as a result, those 
reforms carried out by President Khatami, have been consistently opposed by 
Ayatollah Khamenai. 39 Moreover, it also fails to take into account that Iran is 
otherwise pre-occupied with maintaining vigilance upon a belligerent and often 
bellicose Iraq, as well as on the condition and status of the Shia communities in 
Afghanistan, who have suffered since 1996 under the oppressive Taliban 
regime.40 This is to suggest that although Iran may well have ill feeling towards 
Israel and the West, she is, however, rather pre-engaged. Moreover, in addition 
to these factors, it is further suggested that Iran's general orientation i.e., her 
foreign policy is more closely tied up with Central Asia and Russia than the 
Middle East at this present time.41 
This aforementioned consensus manufacturing can be taken further, however, for 
it is argued that your average home grown American mainstream media reader, 
34 Seale, Patrick, Op-cit. p. 62. Indeed, ironically a great deal of funding for both Hamas and 
Hizbollah comes from both America and Britain respectively. See: Schiff, Ze'ev, & Ya'ari, Ehud, 
Op-cit, pp. 223-224. 
35 Walker, Christopher, 'Britain attacked over Hamas cash'. The Times, March 1, 1996. And: 
Walker, Christopher, & Dunn, Ross, 'Major pledges to sever Hamas charity lifeline'. The Times, 
March 14, 1996. 
36 Natta, Van, D. 'Judge orders Hamas leader extradited to Israel'. New York Times, May 9, 1996. 
37 Halliday, Fred, Op-cit, pp. 70-71. 
38 
'Iran: Testing the Waters of Reform'. National Geographic, Vol. 196, No.1, July 1999. 
39 Halliday, Fred, Op-cit, p. 67. 
40 Evans, Michael, 'Iran and Russia in Pact on Saddam'. The Times, April19, 2001. 
41 Gordan, Michael, R. 'As West shuns Iran, Russia pulls closer.' New York Times, April 12, 
1997. Lagnado, Alice, 'Moscow defies U.S. with Iran deal'. The Times, March 11,2001. 
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(a layman), could not state what the difference is between Hamas and the Islamic 
Jihad both movements having their origins in the Ikhwan al-Muslimin,42 or 
between Lebanon's Hizbollah and Amal: or the Syrian based DFLP of Ahmad 
Jibril: or the PFLP of George Habash, and nor, perhaps, should they be expected 
to. They might, however, be more able, if they were supplied with clearer 
definitions and a more in depth analysis. 
Thirdly, it is suggested that this article can be understood to be a 'Notice of 
Intention'. For it is argued that Israel would probably like to eradicate its enemies 
in Syria, but can't risk the dangerous implications of a direct confrontation with 
her, and this is why the Lebanon serves as Israel's 'chessboard' .43 The buffer 
zone that was established in 1985, and is now home for some 4, 500 members of 
the UN (UNIFIL),44 as well as the southern Lebanese population and at various 
times to some guerrillas of Hizbollah; serves several purposes. 
Firstly, it can always be used as a scapegoat, (which in this instance it most 
certainly was).45 Peres, was in serious political strife, desperately needing to raise 
some polling points.46 The best way to achieve this was to act in the interests of 
Israel's security (that most ancient of Israel's bugbears), and to be seen as being 
tough on crime (terrorist is often juxtaposed with criminal within U.S. 
mainstream media reportage) i.e., as the hard man of Israeli politics.47 'You have 
removed the threat however, posited by Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad, so you 
have to pursue more terrorists outside of Israel. You can't 'go as far as 
Damascus' or Teheran, because of U.S. pressure, and the risk of global 
condemnation.48 Therefore, the only logical place to cause a diversion is the 
42 Hiro, Dilop, A Dictionary of the Middle East, pp. 105-106 and p. 136. 
43 Gellman, Barton, 'Israel finds challenge impossible to ignore'. The Washington Post, April 12, 
1996. 
44 UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force for Lebanon. 
45 Guyatt, Nicholas, The Absence of Peace, p. 39. 
46 Schmemann, Serge, 'Israel and militants trade blows as fighting spreads in Lebanon: Syrian 
troops drawn into fray.' New York Times, Aprill3, 1996. 
47 Greenberg, Joel, Peres vows to submit final pact with Palestinians to Israeli vote.' New York 
Times, April2, 1996. And: Shlaim, Avi, Op-cit, p. 560. 
48 Freedman, Lawrence, Open Editorial, 'Lebanon's Aftermath'. New York Times, May 15, 1996. 
This phrase is readily adapted from David Lean's 'Lawrence of Arabia' (1962). For further 
interest consider: Kedourie, Elie, 'The Capture of Damascus' in, The Chatham House Version, 
pp. 33-47. 
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Lebanon, where, as long as the sketchy rules of engagement are adhered to, i.e., 
'no engagement with civilians' as outlined, but unwritten by Warren Christopher 
in 1993,49 you will not receive condemnation from the U.S., because their greater 
interest is being pursued, i.e., the eradication of perceived global terrorists, and 
avenging the sponsors of the bombers of the U.S. marine barracks of Beirut 
(1983). Regrettably, for the southern Lebanese victims, these rules were either 
flagrantly ignored, or mistakenly forgotten, and furthermore, this fatal omission, 
in part, cost Peres his leadership. 
Secondly, it is argued that if Israel occasionally carries out punitive operations in 
southern Lebanon, i.e., against Hizbollah positions, or buzzes Beirut with her 
American supplied F16's, or Apache AH64 attack helicopters (the modem 
battlefield 'peacemaker') she sends a powerful message to Syria.50 Inasmuch as 
she indicates to Syria, that her [Israel's], old military policies are still in effect 
e.g., the 'transference of war into the enemy's territory', and the 'pre-emptive 
strike theory'. It also shows that Syria is not all that important to Israel, and any 
ensuing 'peace process' with the Palestinians. 
This can be taken further however, for it is arguable that if the Occupied 
Territories are internally disorganised, the Lebanon is an absolute 'mess'. 51 
Syria in effect runs Beirut, and northern Lebanon. Israel, formerly with the 
assistance of the SLA (a Druze and Phalangist based Christian militia), and 
UNIFIL, controls the nine-mile border. 52 Hizbollah, and Amal vie for control of 
southern Lebanon,53 and an element of the Syrian army controls the Bekka 
Valley, therefore, it is little wonder that like the hashish, in between them, 
terrorist cells grow and flourish. 
49 Sciolini, Elaine, 'In the face of horror diplomacy stays muted'. New York Times, April 19, 
1996. And: Wallach, Janet, & Wallach, John, Op-cit, p. 470. 
50 Schmemann, Serge, 'Israeli aircraft strike guerrillas in Beirut suburbs.' New York Times, April 
12, 1996. 
51 See: Kifner, John, 'The peace keepers with no peace to keep'. New York Times, April 18, 1996. 
52 Schmemann, Serge, 'Israeli aircraft strike guerrillas in Beirut suburbs'. New York Times, April 
12, 1996. 
53 Smith, Charles, D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 284. 
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It is argued that this state of chaos suits Israel and is actively encouraged. The 
constant instability and fractious nature of the Lebanon exacerbated by Syria's 
constant intervention and meddling, allows Israel to act with a free hand and 
pursue her rarely clearly stated objectives. (In the sense they are purposefully 
unclear to allow for strategic flexibility). Indeed, if the Occupied Territories are 
perceived by some to represent Palestinian 'Reservations' then it is argued, that 
the Lebanon is unfortunately, Israel's true Wild West. 
CHAPTER6 
'The 'Stinker' Comes to Power' • 
Corrections and clarifications: 
In her op-ed page column of April 26, [1996], Georgie Anne Geyer 
wrote that Syrian President Hafiz Assad 'was born to the despised 
Alawite tribe and was so poor that his name means pig.' In fact, the 
Alawite are not a tribe but a religious group and Assad's name does 
not mean pig. 
The Tribune regrets the errors. 1 
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On May the 29th 1996, the Likud leader Benyamin Netanyahu won the Israeli 
General Election by the slimmest of electoral margins over his oftentimes 
politically unfortunate Labour rival, Shimon Peres.2 Nevertheless, it is argued 
that Netanyahu's rise to the political fore, and his assuming the role of Israel's 
Prime Minister was to affect the future course and eventual outcome of the Oslo 
'peace process' in perhaps a more tangible and explicit way than any other single 
event or factor that affected this incipient 'peace process'. Indeed, as one 
editorial succinctly put it: 'Netanyahu and [Ariel] Sharon are to a peace process 
what a fox is to a chicken coop' in a beautifully expressed sentiment reflecting 
• The title of this chapter is derived from the unfortunate Arabic translation of Benyamin 
Netanyahu's surname. Meaning literally: 'He who stinks' (Natan, yahu) See: Bhatia, Shyam, 
'Leader who lost friends'. Guardian, April 18, 1997. And: The Concise Oxford-English Arabic 
Dictionary of Current Usage, p. 383. Wehr, Hans, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 
942. 
1 An apology proffered in the Chicago Tribune, May 14, 1996. 
2 1,501,023 votes were registered for Likud, against 1,471,566 for Labour, a majority of some 29, 
457 votes of the votes polled. See: Dunn, Ross, & Walker, Christopher, 'Peace process in 
jeopardy as Likud snatches victory'. The Times, June 1, 1996. Schemann, Serge, 'Election for 
prime minister of Israel is dead heat'. New York Times, May 30, 1996. In terms of percentage 
points: these were reported as follows 50.2% Likud to 49.7% Labour of 72.3% of ballots counted. 
See: Rowley, John, 'Israeli vote is a cliff-hanger'. Christian Science Monitor, May 30, 1996. 
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the Semitic language's propensity for the use of similitude.3 Nevertheless, this 
insightful sentiment shall be borne out in the analysis of the subsequent 'media 
frames' that comprise the remainder of this study. 
Furthermore, it shall be argued that there was very little (but regrettably some) 
overt and explicit anti-Palestinian viz. anti-Arab discourse evident within the 
majority of the U.S. mainstream media channels, and that this was due to specific 
emphasis placed on the significance of Israel's General Election to both the 
Israelis, and in this particular instance, American Jewry. Yet two or three clear 
examples of a rare, but explicit anti-Arabism, did emerge during this 'media 
frame'. (It is doubtful that any better examples of the overt castigation of the 
homogenised 'Arabs' could be found elsewhere within the mainstream media 
channels of the U.S., throughout the entire Oslo 'peace process' period.) 
Firstly, consider this particular half-page advertisement that the Washington Post 
circulated on May the 191h 1996, entitled Remember Saddam? Meet Syria's 
Assad: Blood Brothers penned by Daniel Pipes. This advertisement it is argued, 
was purposefully and very explicitly anti-Syrian, and moreover, was typically 
anti-Saddam viz. anti-Iraqi in content. (Inasmuch as the West, led by the U.S. 
'media complex' has been waging a rather vicious and protracted smear 
campaign against the Iraqi leader ever since the Gulf War.)4 Neverth~less, after 
supplying an exhaustive list of all Syria's perceived major faults i.e., the 
sponsoring and encouragement of Hizbollah: overt support for the Abu Nidal 
Organisation, the DFLP, the PFLP, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad etc., the article 
went on to refer to Syria's violent suppression of the Syrian branch of the 
3 Editorial, 'The Price of Failure', Guardian, October 3, 2000. For such use of similitude, 
consider Farid al-Din Attar's The Conference of the Birds, trans. Dick Davies. For examples of 
the use of similitude in a derogatory anti-Palestinian manner by the Israelis, consider these two 
examples: 'Trying to kill the mosquito' i.e., the Palestinian 'terrorists' and 'drain the swamps' 
viz. the Occupied Territories. And: Rafael Eitan speaking in 1983 said that after Israel's invasion 
of Lebanon, the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories would be like 'drugged cockroaches in a 
bottle'. See: Khalidi, Muhammad, A. 'Israeli discourse still reflects hatred'. New York Times, 
May 24, 1996. And: Smith, Charles, D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 328. 
4 Thedelou, Michael, 'Saddam's sex pest son blamed for woman's suicide'. The Times July 5 
1996. Cockburn, Patrick, 'Portrait of Saddam: the man setting the world agenda', Independent, 
February 20, 1998. Norton-Taylor, Richard, 'Britain intensifies propaganda war against Saddam'. 
Guardian, October 24,2000. Colvin, Marie, 'Saddam builds new atom bomb, The Sunday Times, 
December 24, 2000, Beeston, Richard, 'Saddam may hold the key to West's prosperity', The 
Times, January 18, 2001. Etc. 
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Muslim Brotherhood at Hama in 1983, where reportedly as many as 15, 000 
Syrians died, many allegedly gassed to death. This catastrophe was contrasted 
with a direct comparison of Saddam's gassing of the Iraqi Kurds at Halabja in 
March of 1988.5 
Here though, common sense it is argued should prevail. Because the author of 
this obviously govemmentally sponsored piece of anti-Arab propaganda has got 
his historical facts jumbled.6 For if the facts are interpreted correctly, then the 
title of the article would better and more correctly read: Remember Assad? Meet 
Iraq's Saddam: Blood Brothers. Indeed, closer examination of the facts shall 
establish that it was President Nasser that set the trend for gassing undesirables in 
the 'modem' Middle East during Egypt's involvement (1963-67) in the Yemeni 
Civil War (1962-1970).7 To some, this confusion might represent a moot point, 
or indeed, an argument concerning the selective manipulation of historical facts. 
Such distortions no matter how slight, it is argued, when occurring in the 
channels of the mainstream media have a detrimental effect upon the audience, 
and its subsequent understanding, and evaluation of the truth. In this particular 
instance, the methodology of the gassing of one's own citizens is portrayed as 
being the special preserve of scary Middle Eastern potentates, which might be 
true in relation to the gassing of one's own citizens. Nevertheless, the method of 
gassing is a well 'tried and tested' formula that has had currency on several 
inauspicious occasions within twentieth century Europe. 8 
Moreover, and once agam, it is argued that the process of a purposeful 
homogenisation of the Arabs has occurred, initially at a personal level, and then 
5 Conason, J, 'The Iraq Lobby: Kissinger, The Business Forum & Co', in Sifry, M, & Cerf, C, 
The Gulf War Reader, p. 80. And: Miller, Judith, & Mylroie, Laurie, Saddam Hussein and the 
Gulf Crisis, p.l4. 
6 Pipes, Daniel, Committee for Democracy and Peace in the Middle East: PO Box 123, Berkeley, 
CA 94701. 
7 Mostyn, Trevor, & Hourani, Albert, [Eds.], The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle East, p. 
455. 
8 Consider the use of mustard 'yellow' gas in the trenches of France and Belgium during the latter 
half of The Great War, and of course, the evil use of Zyklon B by the Nazi Regime during the 
Jewish Holocaust of World War Il. Moreover, it is even rumoured that the Israelis themselves 
have had recourse to the use of gas as a form of torture. See Nicholas V on Hoffman's report, as 
cited in Said, Edward, W. The Question of Palestine, p. 43. And See: Peretz, Don, Intifada: The 
Palestinian Uprising, p. 67 for confirmation of the IDF' s misuse of tear gas. 
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at a national one. In essence, the U.S. mainstream media on behalf of a U.S. 
governmental think tank is implying that Saddam Hussain and Hafiz al-Assad are 
one and the same. Indeed, just mere reflections of the other. Moreover, Syria can 
be juxtaposed with Iraq effortlessly. Furthermore, this explicit homogenisation is 
also reflective in the advertisement's title, and subsequent use of the term 'Blood 
Brothers' (mildly reminiscent of the language of the 'Plain's Culture'). Such a 
validated usage of this terminology, however, is an absurdity that defies rational 
logic. For Syria and Iraq have been at loggerheads at different extremes since the 
early 1950's. For example, the Syrian and Iraqi Ba 'ath (Renaissance) parties 
have waged an on and off ideological battle for regional hegemony.9 (That 
reached its peak during the years between 1958-61, i.e., the years of the AUR.) 
Moreover, the two leaders have themselves waged a 'cold war' for the title of 
supreme leader of the Arab Middle East (Note: not Judith Miller's of the New 
York Times 'Godfather' analogy, which, it is argued, is an affront to Islam.) 10 
Nevertheless, after this advertisements explicit reference to the Syrian leader's 
use of poison gas at Hama, it went on to suggest that Syria is a major arms 
manufacturer and supplier, and furthermore, is a prolific drugs producer, 
possessing links with the Colombian drug cartels and the Sicilian Mafia. (In 
other words, Syria is a major contributor to many of America's perceived ills.) 
There is no direct refutation of this argument, however it seems that Syria is the 
target of an American dirty tricks campaign, inasmuch as these are rather heavy 
and largely unsubstantiated accusations levelled against her.ll Finally, the 
advertisement portrays al-Assad as the devil incarnate, for example consider, the 
final bullet pointed statement: 
9 Adams, Michael, [Ed.], The Middle East: A Handbook, p. 205, and pp. 300-301. 
10 Judith Miller and Laurie Myroie make an analogy of Saddam Hussein with Don Corleone, i.e., 
Mario Puzo's 'Godfather' (1972), however, the point being made is that such an analogy is 
insensitive to Islam: as the Shuhada i.e., the 'Testimony of Faith' states: La Allah ila Allah, Wa 
Muhammadu Rasul Allah, (There is no God except God: and Muhammad is his Prophet.) Indeed, 
a better analogy, and one that is not such an open affront to Islam would be with Martin 
Bregman's 'Scarface' (1983), as portrayed by AI Pacino, this it is argued would remove the 
religious implications of the former choice of character. See: Miller, Judith, & Laurie, Myroie, 
The Rise of Saddam Hussain, in Sifry, Micah, L. & Cerf, Christopher, The Gulf War Reader, pp. 
66-68. 
11 Zunes, Stephen, 'The Function of Rogue States in U.S. Middle East Policy'. Orientalia, The 
CMEIS Student Magazine, University of Durham, November 27, 1998. Reprinted with 
permission from the Middle East Policy Quarterly, Washington, D.C., Vol., V. No. 11, May 
1997. 
'As sad is as ruthless a tyrant as Saddam, but much more cunning: his 
promises of peace are as worthless as Saddam's broken peace with 
Iran and Kuwait. The U.S. paid dearly for ignoring Saddam's 
character and true intentions. Let's not repeat that mistake with 
Syria's dictator.' 
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How was the former Syrian leader more cunning than Saddam? Alas the 
advertisement does not tell us that; although, we can premise that it has 
something to do with his failure to kow-tow to a U.S. dictated Middle Eastern 
peace initiative. 12 But, if we were to read and believe much of the explicit anti-
Saddam propaganda that is evident in most of the Western mainstream media 
channels, then no one could possibly be more cunning, or slier than the Iraqi 
leader. 13 Indeed, what promises has al-Assad reneged upon? Again, such 
information is unfortunately omitted. But this is probably an allusion to the 
Syrian's leader's political ability to wrong foot the majority of his opponents, 
and to stand up to a U.S. and Israeli enforced regional hegemony, particularly, in 
this instance, with regards to his demands over the restoration to Syria of the 
Golan Heights. 14 
Finally, did not the Kuwaitis, Saudis, immigrant workers in Kuwait, Coalition 
Forces, Israelis, Palestinians, and latterly, the Iraqis themselves, also pay dearly 
for Saddam's 'character and true intentions'? 15 What the advertisement does not 
tell you, however, is that the U.S. led Coalition paid dearly for Saddam's 
belligerency, not because it ignored the 'character and true intentions' of Iraq's 
leader, but primarily because it failed to understand his 'character and true 
intentions' .16 Moreover, and arguably, Saddam was not allowed to escape the 
military might of the Coalition, even if he had wished to do so. 17 For there is a 
specious argument that exists, which alleges that all the diplomatic channels that 
12 Obituary, 'President Assad of Syria', The Times, June 12, 2000. 
13 Sweeney, John, 'Arms and Saddam', Observer, February 4, 1996. 
14 Obituary, 'President Assad of Syria', The Times, June 12,2000. And: Faour, Muhammad, 
Op- cit. p. 117. And: Smith, Charles, D. Op-cit, p. 311 
15 Faour, Muhammad, Op-cit. p.lOO and p. 114. 
16 Miller, Judith, & Mylroie, Laurie, Saddam Hussein and the Gulf Crisis, p. 8. 
17 Forsyth, Frederick, The Fist of God, p. 354, pp. 358-61, and p. 383. 
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might have allowed the Iraqi leader to climb down and escape the wrath of the 
U.S. led Coalition with his military machine intact, were, in effect closed down. 18 
This is not to suggest that al-Assad as a leader was without fault. Indeed, brutal 
suppression of political dissidents was clearly something that he certainly did 
have in common with his Iraqi neighbour. 19 But many distortions and 
contradictions still abound within this rather unnecessarily pernicious 
advertisement. Furthermore, it is argued, that the advertisement serves two 
functions. Firstly, it is obviously and rather candidly, consensus manufacturing, 
and moreover allows for the direct solicitation of public support for the U.S. 
'media complex's' propaganda war that is being conducted against the Arab 
World per se. This fact is substantiated by the use of the first person plural i.e., 
'Let's [Let us], not make that mistake with Syria's dictator'. Indeed, this is to 
suggest that the U.S. 'media complex' believe that the Syrian leader's 
antagonism towards the West, and his refusal to submit to a U.S. and Israeli 
dictated regional hegemony is a shared responsibility of the U.S. mainstream 
media audience, which, surely cannot be reasonably plausible. Secondly, it is 
suggested that the advertisement is also silently urging for further support of 
Israel amongst its target audience, and in particular advocates a harsh stance 
against Syria. (Coincidentally a support for Israel, that ties in nicely with 
Netanyahu's election campaign, and his espoused desire at this time to 'get tough 
with the Arabs' .)20 
Nevertheless, casting this explicitly racist and xenophobic anti-Arabism aside, 
consider another advertisement published in the New York Times upon the lOth of 
May entitled: March for Israel's Future. This advertisement, it is argued, was 
both myth impacting and fallacious. For it read: 
'There should be some place on earth where we have a Jewish 
majority ... as a minority we have quite a history' (Golda Meir). 
18 Ibid. And; Smith, Charles, D. Op-cit, p. 309. 
19 AI-Khalidi, Samir, Republic of Fear, pp. 3-146. 
20 Storer, Rowley, H. 'Majority of Israelis Arabs to vote for Peres.' Chicago Tribune, May 18, 
1996. 
'There is such a place, and it's called Israel.' [Indeed, consider the 
oblique reference to Jewish persecution in Europe, and the whole 
settler colonialist experiment being lauded as something of a 
justifiable triumph and moral victory.] 'Join us, and thousands of 
other proud New Yorkers this Sunday May 12th at noon, for the 31 51 
annual Salute to Israel Parade.' [This sentence, it is argued, is a 
subtle indication as to the longevity of the U.S.!Israel 'special 
relationship'.] 'We will march up Fifth A venue, from 57th to 79th 
Street. Celebrate modern Israel's 48th birthday.' [No doubt an equally 
enjoyable birthday celebration for the disenfranchised 
Palestinians.] ... 'In solidarity with our Israeli brethren, some 300 
New Yorkers are leaving today for Israel to commemorate 
Jerusalem's tri-millennium.' [Recognition is made to the fact that 
these three hundred New Y orkers were not described as potential 
settlers. If they were, however, then undoubtedly more good news 
for the already much harangued Palestinians of the Occupied 
Territories. 300 potential Baruch Goldstein's on their doorsteps.] 
'Israel is a fulfilment of a once impossible dream. We salute her 
people and all those who cherish Jewish unity and sovereignty.' 21 
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Once again, casting this negativity aside, it is strongly suggested that this 
advertisement is rather an explicit and self-explanatory attempt at mitigating 
popular support for Israel within New York proper. Indeed, the explicit nature of 
the advertisement, and the way in which the New York Times has unabashedly 
printed it, gives true definition to the overt character, and highly obtrusive nature, 
of the 'special relationship' as personified by the 'media complex' and 'Jewish 
Lobby' per se. Moreover, and quite simply, it is an obvious Zionist foray into the 
realm of U.S. public relations. Yet the real mythical and fallacious nature of the 
article is to be discovered in the advertisement's last lines viz. 'Israel is a 
fulfilment of a once impossible dream. We salute her people and all those who 
cherish Jewish unity and sovereignty.' 
Firstly, Israel was never really 'a once impossible dream' .22 Only the realization 
of the establishment of the Jewish national home in the heart of the Arab World 
upon former Palestine caused a protracted problem for the advocates of 
'political' Zionism. Indeed, this factor might have led some to consider the 
21 See; 'March For Israel's Future' an advertisement lodged in the New York Times, May 10, 
1996 sponsored by the Israel Tribute Committee in cooperation with the Jewish Community 
Relations Council. 
22 Indeed, consider the language, you can either have a dream, or not have a dream, but not really 
'an impossible dream'. More correctly speaking 'an unrealisable dream' conveys a truer sense. 
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establishment of Israel as a practical impossibility; however it was not. A 
Ugandan, or even an Argentine based Israel was once quite a feasible alternative, 
particularly in the early days of 'political' Zionism i.e., (c.1887-1903). 23 
To take this argument further, however, it is proposed that if there had been any 
serious doubt as to the possibility of the creation of the state of Israel, this doubt 
was cast aside by several factors. Firstly, by the pronouncement of the now 
infamous Balfour Declaration (November 1917), and secondly, by the British 
handing the Mandate over to UNSCOP in 1947, 2\due largely in part to Jewish 
agitation of the colonialist overseer by the likes of the Hagganah, the Irgun Zvei 
Leumi, and the 'Stem Gang' 'terrorist' organisations), and finally due to a 
sensitive U.S. president, Harry Truman, overruling the Peel Commission's report 
(1937)25 and the subsequent British 'White Paper' (1939), and his granting of 
150,000 immigration visas for Israel to the Jews of the 'Displaced Persons' 
camps of Europe immediately after World War Two.26 Indeed, and 
understandably so in the light of the Shoah, (a more respectful term for the 
Holocaust), Israel's permanence was guaranteed at the conclusion of World War 
Two, it was merely made an article of 'fact and faith' with the subsequent 
forging of the 'special relationship' with the U.S., which commenced with the 
philanthropic Harry Truman, and reached its zenith with the most overtly pro-
Israeli, American president to date Bill Clinton.27 
Finally, it is suggested that openly encouraging the saluting of a people who 
'cherish unity and sovereignty' is an exhortation to commit an act based quite 
frankly upon a mild but explicit distortion of the truth. Because, as has already 
been discussed, Jewish society particularly within Israel is much divided.28 And 
moreover, Jewish sovereignty over Israel is in itself, (given the circumstances of 
23 Laquer, Waiter, A History of Zionism. pp. 126-130. And, Said, Edward, W. The Question of 
Palestine, p. 23. 
24 UNSCOP: United Special Committee on Palestine. 
25 Black, Ian, 'Double tragedy rolls back years of progress.' Guardian, October 13, 2000. 
26 Kimmerling, Baruch, & Migdal, Joel, S. The Palestinians: The Making of a People, p. 298. 
27 Schmemann, Serge, 'Sharon keeps claws very sharp'. New York Times, May 25, 1996. And: 
Hirst, David, 'Private view: slow-motion conquest, Guardian, March 8, 1997. And: Smith, 
Charles, D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 322. 
28 Gellman, Barton, 'Israelis are edgy as election nears'. The Washington Post, May 16, 1996. 
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how it was achieved i.e., the blatant dispossession of the host peoples), a rather 
questionable concept. Furthermore, Israel has had a poor record of achievement 
when it comes to respecting the principles of a state's sovereign rights. Consider, 
for example, her audacious raid upon Entebbe airport in June 1976 29 Mossad's 
abduction of the Israeli 'whistle blower' Mordechai Vanunu, from the suburbs of 
Rome in October 1986,30 or even the commando raid upon the PLO headquarters 
in Tunis and the subsequent assassination of PLO deputy Abu Jihad in April 
1988, etc. 31 All of these operations were carried out in direct breach of another 
state's sovereign rights, and many more other occasions could be cited. 
Nevertheless, these two very different, yet, very similar advertisements it is 
argued show explicitly how the U.S. mainstream media works upon the process 
of manufacturing a consensus amongst its target audience. For example, the first 
advertisement, which is unquestionably extremely anti-Arab in the nature of its 
discourse, directs the readership towards a very negative interpretation of Arabs 
and Arab culture per se. Whilst, the second advertisement is working in direct 
apposition to this racist propaganda, conjuring a perception that Israel is 
something of a miracle in terms of 'modem' state building, and that the Israelis 
as a result are also something of a miraculous peoples. 32 Furthermore, it is argued 
that the advertisements when considered individually are clearly damaging 
distortions of the truth. The first, is both cynically and gratuitously condemning 
of Arabism, whilst the other is unnecessarily overly laudatory of a people who 
are both tenacious and tendentious, not, however, miraculous. 
Yet if the advertisements are considered in conjunction, they serve only to 
doubly impact upon this distortion of truth. And moreover, they serve only to 
further embed the 'David and Goliath' viz. the 'good vs. evil' dictum deeper into 
the subconscious minds of the U.S. mainstream media's audience (See: 
29 Shott, Ian, World Famous SAS and Elite Forces, p. 36. 
30 Said, Edward, W. The End ofthe Peace Process, p. 200. And: Cohen, Yael, The VanunuAffair. 
p. 135. And: Hersh, Seymour, M. The Sampson Option. pp. 197-198. 
31 Seale, Patrick, Abu Nidal: Gun for Hire, pp. 219-220. And: Smith, Charles, D. Op-cit, p. 289. 
And: Bregman, Ahron, &El-Tahri, The Fifty Years War: Israel and Arabs, p. 193. 
32 
'Israel has always presented its history as a spectacular experiment in nation-building under the 
most harsh conditions.' Guyatt, Nicholas, Op-cit, p. 89. 
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introduction, p.16.) Here though, recognition IS made to the fact that the 
advertisements were published by two different papers, and upon two separate 
dates. Yet it is argued, that the mainstream media operates as a complex whole. 
Indeed, it is this aspect of the media and its modus operandi that warrants its 
consideration as part of a larger 'media complex'. Therefore, in light of this, it is 
felt that it is quite legitimate to analyse these two advertisements in juxtaposition, 
and indeed, even loosely consider them as part of the U.S. mainstream media's 
discourse upon the Arab/Israeli conflict per se. 
Nevertheless, having considered these two rather explicit, but not necessarily 
typical pieces of propaganda i.e., a U.S. government sponsored piece of anti-
Arabism, and a pro-Israeli advert lodged by the American 'Israeli Lobby', it is 
now necessary to return specifically to an analysis of the U.S. mainstream 
media's reportage of the run up to the Israeli General Elections of May 29th 1996. 
Therefore, the principle argument posited is that the nature of the U.S. 
mainstream media's reportage during this particular 'media frame' was, firstly, 
very evidently pro-Israeli, and secondly, mildly racially deprecating with regards 
towards the Palestinians and Arabs. (Carping on in particular about the 
Palestinian and Arab propensity towards terrorism.)33 It is argued, however, that 
although the U.S. mainstream media channels were explicitly pro-Israeli in their 
bias, they were, nevertheless, divided into two broad but discernable camps. 34 
Firstly, there existed a tangible element within the 'media complex' that 
supported the principles of peace as espoused by Yitzhak Rabin et al, and who 
considered that Shimon Peres was the most suitable man for the presidency, 
despite his previous failings with regards to Israel's overall security and the 
unfortunate blunder that resulted in the 'Massacre of Qana'. This camp 
predictably and explicitly placed the blame upon the Palestinian maximalists i.e., 
Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and elements within Al-Fatah etc., for the breakdown 
in the 'peace process'. 
33 Gellman, Barton, 'Israelis are edgy as election nears.' The Washington Post, May 16, 1996. 
34 Schmemann, Serge, 'Israel's parties open the election campaign with slick ads and a focus on 
security.' New York Times, May 9, 1996. 
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Secondly, the Arab outlaws i.e., Hizbollah were categorically condemned for 
antagonising Israel,35 despite Israel's (and to a lesser degree the United States) 
obvious complicity within the events that led to the regrettable catastrophe at 
Qana.36 This consistent condemnation of the Hizbollah guerrillas it is argued 
helped Peres legitimise his hard-line stance shown towards these perceived 
outlaws and fugitives right up to polling day. Indeed, most Israelis were not 
overtly vocal in their condemnation of Peres' foolhardy misadventure into 
southern Lebanon. Quite contrary, many perceived it as a necessity, and the 
subsequent tragedy (i.e., the loss of ninety lives), little more than unfortunate; 
indeed nothing more than a small price to be paid for the maintenance of Israel's 
territorial integrity and the protection of her citizenry. It was this particular camp 
that was supported by the U.S. Administration; and Bill Clinton in particular 
threw himself wholeheartedly into Shimon Peres' election campaign?7 Indeed, 
Clinton's electioneering fervour, undertaken on behalf of his Israeli buddy led 
him ironically and perhaps a little foolishly (in light of Peres' impending failure), 
to state that the two men were, metaphorically speaking, nothing less than 
'cousins'. 38 
This support for Peres from a particular camp (led in the main by the New York 
Times with the exception of A.M. Rosenthal who praised the 55% that supported 
Netanyahu),39 within the U.S. 'media complex' clearly headed by Clinton, and 
backed by Henry Kissinger (The sharpest tooth and committed forger of the U.S. 
Israeli 'special relationship' particularly during Israel's troublesome years' l.e., 
35 Jehl, Douglas, 'After fighting flares again in Lebanon, Israel shells villages'. New York Times, 
May 20, 1996. 
36 The point being made here is twofold. Firstly, the U.S. Administration's failure to rebuke Israel 
for its cynical incursion into southern Lebanon acted as a further 'green light' to the IDF, leading 
inexorably to the 'Massacre of Qana'. And, the catastrophe would not have been possible if the 
Israelis were not using American supplied technology i.e., a sophisticated tracking and targeting 
device and drone vehicle. 
37 Erlanger, Steven, 'Clinton and Peres find mutual admiration.' New York Times, May 1, 1996. 
And: Schmemann, Serge, 'Eyes of the World upon Israeli election'. New York Times, May 28, 
1996. 
38 Schmemann, Serge, 'Eyes of the world upon Israel election.' New York Times, May 28, 1996. 
And: Krauthammer, Charles, Opinion, 'The case for Netanyahu'. The Washington Post, May 17, 
1996. And: Time Magazine, 'Which way to peace.' Vol. 147. Issue, 21, May 20. 
39 Rosenthal, A, M. 'That fifty five percent of Jews.' New York Times, June 5, 1996. As cited in 
Guyatt, Nicholas, Ref: No., 13, Op-cit, p. 84. 
68 
from 1973-79) amongst others, was principally predicated upon two motivating 
factors. 4° Firstly, Peres was perceived as something of a dove (albeit, a 
perception that was somewhat compromised by Israel's ever present security 
considerations.) Secondly, because Peres was also generally regarded, although 
largely erroneously, as the main instigator behind the Oslo 'peace process' it was 
felt by the U.S. Administration that he could, circumstances allowing, restart the 
stalled negotiations with the Palestinian Authority when given the opportunity to 
take a pragmatic approach to the problems evident within the often considered 
fraudulent process. 41 
Peres, like his unfortunate predecessor Rabin, earnestly believed that Israel's 
security could be guaranteed in exchange for territory, viz. that Israel's security 
was inextricably linked with the exchange of illegally occupied territory. (In 
itself a rather rational and quite logical deduction.) Moreover, Rabin and Peres 
were perceived as the 'Guardians' of a Middle Eastern 'peace programme'. 
Rabin had met his unfortunate demise however, and Peres had, by default, 
inherited both his legacy and his dream. 42 
Conversely to this camp that openly supported Peres however, was a camp 
(headed in the main by The Washington Post) that also openly supported the 
young and well groomed Benyamin Netanyahu.43 This camp within the U.S. 
'media complex' considered that Netanyahu was probably 'the best man for the 
job' in the light of his even more intended hard line approach towards the 
Palestinians,44 and his declaration to impose a moratorium (a declared permanent 
cessation, before being revised to a temporary halt, in the face of stiff U.S. 
pressure)45 upon the peace process if he were successful in his election bid. 
Furthermore, Netanyahu was not unknown to this particular camp, because his 
40 Rowley, Storer H. 'Day of decision for Israel's voters.' Chicago Tribune, May 29, 1996. 
41 Ajami, Fouad, The Dream Palace of the Arabs, p. 276. 
42 Schemann, Serge, Israel's parties open the election campaign with slick ads and a focus on 
security.' New York Times, May 9, 1996. And: Storer, Rowley, H. 'Israel's stark choice: next 
weeks election marks a watershed as voters decide between 2 visions of the future'. Chicago 
Tribune, May 22, 1996. And: Wallach, Janet, & Wallach, John, Op-cit, p. 472. 
43 Krauthammer, Charles, 'The case for Netanyahu.' The Washington Post, May 17, 1996. 
44 Guyatt, Nicholas, The Absence of Peace, p. 39. 
45 Battersby, John, 'Israeli vote may pivot on immigrants.' Christian Science Monitor, May 17, 
1996. And: Guyatt, Nicholas, Ibid. 
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years as serving Israeli Ambassador to the U.N had enabled him to create a good 
working relationship within the U.S. mainstream media channels through his 
regular appearances on CNN and NBC, and by his regular interviews conducted 
with many of the U.S. newsmagazines.46 
It is also suggested that this strong working relationship that Netanyahu had with 
the mainstream media in particular was also further enhanced through his careful 
cultivation of many friends within the U.S. 'industrial complex' who as in 
previous electioneering campaigns, certainly helped in footing the bill of this 
costly campaign. Moreover, Netanyahu's links to the 'media and industrial 
complexes' were further supported through his strong ties to the American 
branches of the Jewish Lobby within the United States, in sum then, a very 
powerful and persuasive candidate, who effectively used his supporting camp to 
promote himself as the man for the job. Indeed, media portrayals of Netanyahu 
showed the 'sound bite cowboy' ,47 in a positively good light, focusing upon 
several different aspects of his character, all of them favourable, if not based 
upon mild distortions of truth. 
For example, much was made of Netanyahu's successful military career (1967-
1972),48 and the fact that he was a Sabran i.e., someone born in Israel after the 
establishment of the state, in contrast to his apparent lack of religiosity, and his 
confirmed adulterous nature. These positive aspects i.e., his strong working 
knowledge of the U.S. mainstream media, and his perceived heroism, were 
starkly contrasted to Peres lack of military experience and rather wooden 
demeanour, and lack of electoral appeal for the Israeli public. 
In sum, the Israeli General Election of May 29, 1996, was probably the single 
most important election in Israel's relatively short history. For in essence, it was 
a referendum (and was billed as one) over the future of the Oslo 'peace 
46 Newsweek 'Beautiful Bibi.' Vol. 127, No. 22, May 27, 1996. And: Schmemann, Serge, Eyes of 
the world upon Israeli election.' New York Times, May 28, 1996. 
47 Newsweek, 'Beautifuil Bibi.' Vol. 127, No. 22, May 27, 1996. 
48 Hiro, Dilop, A Dictionary of the Middle East, p. 225 
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process' .49 It was high time that the Israeli electorate decided whether peace with 
the Palestinians was desirable for the price of an enormous concession, and 
recognition that peace could only be achieved through an active and ongoing 
dialogue with their once bitterest foe. The outcome of the election (decided by 
approximately half a percentage point),50 would spell disaster for the aspirations 
of the Oslo 'peace process'. It was a very sad day indeed, for those on both sides, 
who still cherished the dream of creating a lasting peace, and offering future 
generations of Palestinians and Israelis the chance to live in hope and security. 51 
49 Rowley, Starer, H. 'Israel's stark choice: next week's election marks watershed as voters 
decide between two visions of the future, Chicago Tribune, May 22, 1996. Rowley, Storer, H. 
'Israeli vote is a cliff hanger.' Chicago Tribune, May 30, 1996. 
50 Schmemann, Serge, 'Election for Prime Minister of Israel is dead heat.' New York Times, May 
30, 1996. 
51 Guyatt, Nicholas, Op-cit, p. 56. 
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CHAPTER 7 
'The Hashmonean Tunnel Opening' 
On September 26, 1996, one hundred days to the day, 1 smce Benyamin 
Netanyahu was sworn in as Israel's new Prime Minister,2 the already stalled 
'peace process' was once again thrown violently further 'off track'. 3 Ehud 
Olmert's (The Mayor of Jerusalem's) decision to open the northern entrance of 
the ancient Hashmonean Tunnel that runs 400 metres alongside the length of the 
Al-Haram al-Sharif' s (Temple Mount) western perimeter wall, whilst being 
backed by the tacit approval of the Israeli premier, gave legitimisation to an 
already nascent violent Palestinian protest.4 (Skirmishes had broken out a week 
before, over the IDF's forced closure of an Arab market in Hebron.)5 
The violence that ensued after this particular ominous event was to some analysts 
highly reminiscent of the violence witnessed during the troublesome and deadly 
days (for both protagonists) of the Intifada.6 Indeed many Western media 
sources, European and American alike, wrongly claimed that the violence 
represented a new, a lesser, or even a mini Intifada.7 Arguably however, the 
ensuing violence was both serious and disruptive enough to the already fractured 
1 Shlaim, A vi, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, p. 563. 
2 Schmemann, Serge, Netanyahu and Arafat, the political burdens of their stubbornness'. New 
York Times, September 27, 1996. 
3 Bhatia, Shyam, 'Arabs heap scorn on Israeli 'stinker', Guardian, September 26, 1996. And: 
Walker, Christopher, 'Israel on brink of war as 55 die in 'new intifada'. The Times, September 
27, 1996. 
4 Guyatt, Nicholas, The Absence of Peace, p. 39 and p. 133. 
5 Prusher, Llena, R. 'A look but don't act mandate in West bank'. Christian Science Monitor, 
September 25, 1996. 
6 Schmemann Serge, 'Arab/Israeli clashes leave five dead in West Bank'. New York Times, 
September 26, 1996. And: Said, Edward, W. The End of the Peace Process, p. 111. 
7 Dempsey, Judy, 'The start of a new intifada; businesses close as Palestinians come to take away 
the dead'. The Financial Times, September 27, 1996. And: Shahin, Mariam, 'The road to ruin'. 
The Middle East, Issue 267, May 1997. 
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peace, but it clearly lacked the articulated objectives that would characterise an 
Intifada proper. 8 
Nevertheless, Intifada or not, there was one very tangible difference in the nature 
of the violence that arose from the inception of the 'interim stage' of Oslo. The 
Palestinians through the assistance of the PPS, 9 and other Palestinian security 
organisations (It is estimated that there may be as many as nine of them, perhaps 
more.), 10 now had recourse to their own assault rifles.ll Therefore offering an 
opportunity to even things up a bit with the IDF. 12 Indeed, many of these 
estimated 30, 000 PPS security men13 were described as battle hardened Ex-
Fedayeen, i.e., the Israeli's perceived criminals, outlaws, and 'arch terrorists' 
who had served as guerrillas in the Lebanon. 14 It was little wonder then, that the 
international community, and in particular the U.S. 'media complex', watched 
the unfolding events with growing alarm and constemation. 15 For the American 
imposed 'peace process' appeared to be in grave trouble; the outburst of violence 
was at the worst the Occupied Territories had experienced since its conception. 16 
Indeed, the IDF found itself in the unenviable position of discovering that the 
boundaries of their Indian country i.e., the Lebanon had now shifted, and 
moreover, their natives were now extremely restless. 17 Furthermore, some of 
8 Schmemann, Serge, '50 are killed as clashes widen from West Bank to Gaza', New York Times, 
September 27, 1996. 
9 Schmemann, Serge, 'Arab/Israeli clashes leave five dead in West Bank'. New York Times, 
September 26, 1996. 
10 Said, Edward, The End of the Peace Process, p. 35. 
11 Farquhar, Neil, 'For Jews a split over peace effort widens'. New York Times, September 27, 
1996. For a 'Byzantine Tree' See: Time Magazine, October 23, 2000. 
12 Schmemann, Serge, 'Arab/Israeli clashes leave five dead in West Bank'. New York Times, 
September 26, 1996. 
13 Wallach, Janet, & Wallach, John, Op-cit, p. 477. 
14 Greenberg, Joel, 'PPS- The breakdown and the gunfight'. New York Times, September 27, 
1996. And: Bhatia, Shyam, 'Israelis stunned as Palestine rises in bloody revolt'. Guardian, 
September 27, 1996. And: Butenschon, Nils, A. 'The Oslo Agreement: From the Whitehouse to 
Jabal Abu Ghnaim' In Giacamon, George, & Lorring, Dag, J. Op-cit, p. 37. 
15 Erlanger, Steven, 'Alarm around the world, and calls for calm talks', New York Times, 
September 26, 1996. 
16 Schmemann, Serge, 'Arab/Israeli clashes leave five dead in West Bank'. New York Times, 
September 27, 1996. And: Erlanger, Steven, 'Alarm around world, and calls for calm talks'. New 
York Times, September 27, 1996. And: Silver, Eric, 'Dozens killed, hundreds shot, as Middle 
East hopes are buried in the battle of Joseph's tomb'. Independent, September 27, 1996, 
17 Peretz, Don, lntifada: The Palestinian Uprising, p. 69. 
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these natives were also alarmingly armed with more than just the traditional 
stones and slingshots. 18 
It is suggested however, that in fact the ensuing violence was tantamount to little 
more than a form of mob rule i.e., spontaneous, and lacking no credible direction 
or moral purpose whilst opposing a well tried and much tested Israeli military 
machine, 19 even though the Israelis antagonism of the Palestinians and their 
much humiliated, and to some, humiliating leader, caused him [Arafat] to declare 
his intention of rekindling the still warm embers of the Intifada earlier in the 
month.20 Therefore, on the strength of Arafat's pronouncement, perhaps the U.S. 
mainstream media felt justified in labelling what was to them, for all intents and 
purposes, a popular uprising constituting a 'shaking off' of the Israeli oppressor, 
viz. an Intifada proper. 21 Nevertheless, it is argued, that the opening of the 
ancient tunnel was utilised as little more than a justification for the Shabab to 
vent their frustrations and anger with Israel, brought about through Netanyahu's 
political backtracking, vacillation, and constant u-tuming, with regards to the 
implementation of the 'peace process', viz. the recently articulated proposal of 
further extensive settlement, in the guise of 40,000 new housing units and the 
Israeli Prime Minister's reluctance to release Palestinian political prisoners as 
agreed earlier with Arafat. This nascent Palestinian frustration was also 
particularly heightened due to Israel's very recently suspended scheduled 
withdrawal from Hebron in the West Bank. 22 
Moreover it is further argued, that the opening of the tunnel (carried out under 
the cover of darkness, amongst heavy IDF protection; indicating the Israelis 
18 Schmemann, Serge, 'Arab/Israeli clashes leave five dead in West Bank'. New York Times, 
September 27, 1996. And: Greenberg, Joel, 'Arab protest in West Bank explodes in gunfire'. New 
York Times, September 26, 1996. And: Avishai, Bemard, 'Lost Tribes of Israel' Prospect, June 
2001. 
19 Consider an image by Castelbuono, Rina, 'An Israeli army jeep made its way through 
barricades and a hail of stones towards Mary's Tomb yesterday after a mob of Palestinians tried 
to set the Jewish shrine on fire'. New York Times, September 27, 1996. 
20 Bhatia, Shyam, 'Israeli insults drive Arafat to threaten new intifada,' Observer, September 1, 
1996. 
21 Ashrawi, Hanan, This Side of Peace, p. 43. 
22 Shmemann, Serge, 'Arab/Israeli clashes leave five dead in West Bank'. New York Times, 
September 26, 1996. And: Greenberg, Joel, 'Arab protest in West Bank explodes with gunfire'. 
New York Times, September 26, 1996. 
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realisation that to do so, would be a highly contentious, and an extremely 
inflammatory move), was firstly, an unfortunate harbinger of the violence that 
was inevitably to come with the death throws of the 'peace process'. 23 Indeed, 
the purposeful violation of the sanctity of the Al-Haram al-Sharif and Al-Aqsa 
Mosque, would, undoubtedly herald the true 'Death of Oslo'. 
Therefore it is suggested that the opening of the tunnel, was not only a cynical 
act of Israeli chauvinism, (highly reminiscent of Israeli acts of chauvinism 
displayed towards the Palestinians during the 1960's and '70s), 24 but could also 
be considered as something of a dummy run. If you will, an acid test to 
deliberately ascertain how vulnerable the 'peace process' actually was. And to 
gauge precisely how the 'peace process' could once and for all be nullified if the 
Israeli Authorities so wished for it, at any given time in the future. To develop 
this argument further, it seems a reasonable consideration to postulate, that 
supporting this observation, is the contention that the Israelis do not require a de 
facto accommodation with the Palestinians, nor an extant 'peace process' to 
maintain and enforce their regional hegemony. Whilst contrary to this, the 
Palestinians certainly require an accommodation with Israel, if they wish to 
improve their unfortunate, and often considered miserable lot. 25 
This is to suggest that the erupting violence and protestations of the Palestinians 
were being closely followed and assessed by many Israeli hawks.26 Who neither 
cared for the principles of Oslo, nor, had wished for its inception.27 Indeed, it had 
appeared to them, that Rabin had sold out on the principle of Eretz Yisrael, by 
offering a supposed olive branch to the Palestinians, and trading territory for 
security, and therefore a cessation of the 'peace process' would suit them.28 
23 Schmemann, Serge, 'Netanyahu and Arafat, the political burdens of their stubbornness'. New 
York Times, September 27, 1996. 
24 Erlanger, Steven, 'U.S. urges Israel to yield and close tunnel entrance'. New York Times, 
September 27, 1996. 
25 Woolacott, Martin, 'Neither peace nor war, just endless suffering'. Guardian, October 13, 
2000. 
26 Farquhar, Neil, 'For Jews a split over peace effort widens'. New York Times, September 27, 
1996. 
27 Greenberg, Joel, 'After prayers at the Mosque, oasis of peace is shattered'. New York Times, 
September 28, 1996. And: Wallach, Janet & Wallach, John, Op-cit, p. 477. 
28 Ajami, Fouad, Op-cit, p. 286. 
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Indeed, a prevalent theory amongst the Israeli hawks was that it was better that 
this violence had emerged now, in order to show the Palestinians that the issue of 
Jerusalem was to them [the Israeli hawks] non-negotiable?9 Secondly, it could be 
argued, that many Israelis, both politicians and populace alike, were rather sick 
to death with Oslo, and the difficulties that its implementation had brought 
particularly to the Israeli domestic arena i.e., the constant threat of terrorist 
activity, or the continued unrest of the approximately one million Arab Israelis, 
who for the first real time since the Intifada of 1987-93, were beginning to show 
a compatriotism for their incarcerated Palestinian brethren. 30 
Therefore it is suggested that many Israelis were really wishing for a return to the 
'stalemate' that was pre-Oslo, and abruptly ending the dream of Palestinian 
national aspirations, perhaps, arguably for 'all' eternity.31 (Stalemate however, is 
something of a frequently used misnomer within the mainstream media's 
discourse concerning the conflict, particularly when considering that Israel has 
total control in the shaping of the Palestinian's destinies within the Occupied 
Territories. Moreover, to the Israelis, such a dominance and purposeful 
suppressiOn of Palestinian 'hope' constitutes an outright victory for Israel.) 
Indeed, given the political and social upheavals of the previous six months, and 
the uncertainties for the future, particularly now that it was clear to them, [the 
Israelis], that the strong committed leadership of Rabin was long gone, in favour 
of the more opportunistic and autocratic political style of Netanyahu, a 
moratorium of the 'peace process' might indeed be the best thing (for them).32 
Selection of this particular 'media frame' was made once agam for several 
reasons. Firstly, and as was suggested, the eruption of the violence that 
29 Olmert, Ehud, 'Jerusalem will stay ours'. The Jerusalem Post, August 1, 1993. And, 
Greenberg, Joel, 'Arab protest in West Bank explodes with gunfire'. New York Times, September 
26, 1996. 
30 Schiff, Ze'ev, & Ya'ari, Ehud, lntifada: The Palestinian Uprising-Israel's Third Front. 
p. 127. 
31 Realisation is made of two factors however; the first is that Oslo, or something very like it, 
might rise like a phoenix from out of the ashes, the second, is that there is an argument that exists 
that suggests that the implementation of the Oslo 'peace process' had to happen to facilitate a 
proper, more workable initiative. See: Halm, Sara, 'It may take a long time, but this Middle East 
violence will subside'. Independent, May 23,2001. 
32 Farquhar, Neil, 'For Jews a split over peace efforts widens'. New York Times, September 27, 
1996. 
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accompanied the tunnel opening could be considered to constitute something of a 
portent of things to come. Secondly, it is argued that U.S. mainstream media 
portrayals firstly showed the Palestinian Shabab and the guerrillas of the PPS in 
a reasonably favourable light, as they reacted to what many in the U.S. 'media 
complex' considered as a wilful and unnecessary provocation undertaken by the 
Israeli authorities.33 As the days of tension and violence mounted, and as the 
Palestinian protestations became rather predictable and habitual, the U.S. 
mainstream media's portrayals of the protesters slid back into a form of 
'traditional denigration' that the Palestinians had experienced during the Intifada 
proper. 
For example, there were scores of images that depicted large groups of the 
disaffected Palestinian youths lining up to throw volley after volley of rocks 
down onto the heads of the IDF. 34 And in apposition to these images, there were 
many that showed views looking down the length of rifle barrels into the midst 
of these apparent seething hordes from the perspective of the 'noble and brave' 
Israeli soldiers?5 To all intents and purposes, the utilisation of these images in 
the mediums of the U.S. mainstream media was in itself deliberate, for it showed 
a considerable distortion of a reality with regards to the construed nobility of the 
IDF. Furthermore, it is argued, that regrettably, these images have become the 
stock in trade of images utilised in the compilation of the visual narrative that 
accompanies this particular aspect of the conflict. 36 
Indeed, this is to argue that in both images, the Palestinians were portrayed as 
crazed, irrational, hotheads (the intransigent party) who throw rocks at the moral, 
33 Erlanger, Steven, 'Alarm around the world and calls for calm talks'. New York Times, 
September 26, 1996. And: Schmemann, Serge, '50 are killed as clashes widen from West Bank to 
Gaza'. New York Times, September 27, 1996. 
34 Consider, for a good example, the image shown on the cover of the New York Times as 
supplied by Reuters. See: New York Times, September 26, 1996. 
35 Again, consider Castelbiono, Rina, 'An Israeli soldier returns fire towards Palestinians at 
Rachel's tomb in Bethlehem'. New York Times, September 29, 1996. And: Shiff, Ze'ev, & 
Ya'ari, Ehud, Op-cit, p. 159. 
36 Consider for example these very graphic and powerful images selected from various Western 
mainstream media sources: Abadi, Sharon, 'Israeli troops prepare to fire as Palestinians stone 
them in Hebron yesterday'. Guardian, April10, 1997. Guez, Jack, 'An Israeli soldier takes aim in 
Bethlehem'. The Sunday Times October 22, 2000. Johansson, Magnus, 'The firing line: a 
Palestinian boy keeps up the pressure on Israeli troops'. The Sunday Times March 4, 2001. 
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logical, Israeli soldiers (the armed vanguards of 'modem' civilisation)?7 
Moreover, it is suggested that in a way, they, [the Palestinians], are portrayed as 
being incapable of rationalising their anger. Furthermore, they throw stones 
purely because they have nothing better to be doing with their time. 38 This 
consideration, some bigots might argue, is due to their general laziness, and lack 
of inventiveness. And moreover, has nothing whatsoever, to do with the harsh 
brutality, and the insipid nature of the Israeli occupation, and the subsequent 
despondency this instils in the noticeably disaffected Palestinian youth. 
Nevertheless, this typical depiction of an unruly mob, serves to provide a loose 
legitimisation for the IDF opening fire on the Shabab, and if any of the 
Palestinian outlaws are regrettably killed? 'Well, that's just too bad, they 
shouldn't have been out on the streets in the first place.'(At least if there is a 
curfew in force the death toll is slightly curbed.)39 Moreover, it serves to conjure 
sympathy for the young conscripts of the IDF within the audience of the U.S. 
mainstream media, inasmuch as it provokes the sentiment of: 'Oh those brave 
boys ... How difficult it must be to restrain oneself when having rocks and abuse 
hurled at you indiscriminately ... ! don't blame them for losing their patience 
every once in a while.' 
In a way, it is probably possible to empathise with this last sentiment. However, 
it says nothing for the foolhardiness, but sheer bravado of the Palestinians (man, 
woman and child alike), who stand up to an extremely well equipped modem 
army, that possesses racially prejudiced views and ideology, and who can pick 
you off at will through the use of a high powered rifle (Ml6) and a 'full metal 
jacket' deterrent, (al-malan) if and when, they wish to use it.40 (On that 
impassioned afternoon of the 25th they certainly did.) It is suggested, that to argue 
that the IDF is not racially prejudiced in its views and ideology, is to foolishly 
deny yet another reality, for it is a regrettable truism, that a 'modem' standing 
army can only operate in such conditions unless spoon-fed upon a constant diet 
37 Shiff, Ze'ev, & Ya'ari, Ehud, Op-cit, p. 145. 
38 Schmemann, Serge, '50 are killed as clashes widen from West Bank to Gaza Strip'. New York 
Times, September 27, 1996. 
39 Schiff, Ze'ev, & Ya'ari, Ehud, Op-cit, p. 115. 
40Al-malan see Peretz, Don, Intifada: the Palestinian Uprising, p. 86 
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of hateful and racist propaganda concerning the true nature of the perceived 
enemy. 41 
To consolidate these aforementioned views, there was another strong image that 
appeared quite frequently, which depicted members of the PPS standing rifle to 
shoulder, and loosing clip after clip at a predominantly unsighted target, with a 
demonstrative expression on their faces denoting anger or rage. (Indeed, effusing 
an expression close to blind fury.)42 It is argued that the express utilisation of 
such images as these was purposeful, for it depicted Arafat's hand picked men as 
Goons who are both militarily inexperienced and are also largely ineffective. 
Moreover, they are portrayed as boys with their new toys; whooping like a pack 
of over excited Indian 'braves' riding out on a raiding party, firing willy-nilly 
into the air like a gang of drunken Mexican bandits.43 
Therefore, it is suggested that the true purpose of these images is to show how 
the ex-Fedayeen and Shabab have descended into an unruliness that is largely 
predicated upon a perceived notion of a base Arab machismo. And moreover, 
that this rabble are too naive and unsophisticated to even use a rifle effectively. 
Indeed, the analogy with an American 'Plains Culture' i.e., 'Cowboys and 
Indians' is easy to facilitate with the usage of such obvious imagery. And in the 
channels of the U.S. mainstream media this is often reflected by the common and 
popular usage of such language as gunfights, revenge at high noon, (i.e., after, 
noon prayers) etc. 44 
Nevertheless, it is also argued that accompanying this shift in temporary empathy 
for the Palestinians within the U.S. mainstream media's portrayal of the 
supposed 'new' Intifada was a transition in the nature of media's discourse per 
se. For example, when the violence officially erupted in the aftermath of the 
41 Ashrawi, Hanan, This Side of Peace, p. 41. And: Said, Edward, The Question of Palestine, p. 
91. And: Peretz, Don, /ntifada: The Palestinian Uprising, p. 49, and p. 54. 
42 Hollander, Jim, (Reuters) 'A Palestinian policeman fires his AK-47 rifle at Israeli troops 
stationed on the hills surrounding the West Bank town of Ramallah'. Guardian, September 27, 
1996. And: The Times, September 27, 1996. 
43 See: Masland, Tom, Newsweek, 'Shot all to hell'. Vol. 128, No 15, October 7, 1996. 
44 Ze'ev Schiff & Ya'ari, Ehud, Op-cit, p. 121. 
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tunnel opening there was some sympathy for the Palestinians expressed in many 
of the U.S. and Western mainstream media channels. Indeed, this media 
recognised that the Israelis had been unnecessarily provocative, and had indeed 
acted in an extremely chauvinistic manner. (A manner in which their regional 
hegemony allows for.) And furthermore, that given the disappointments that the 
Palestinians had received, and the ire that had been provoked since Netanyahu 
had attained power, they were more than just a little justified in venting their 
anger and frustrations. Indeed, many analysts had wondered what had taken the 
disillusioned Palestinians incarcerated in the Occupied Territories so long to rise 
up.45 Traditionally the oppressed Palestinians had never tolerated the Israeli's 
colonial tactics of divide and rule and 'carrot and stick' quietly.46 (This last term 
construes the underlings as donkeys, and is, in itself, a derogatory phrase, 
connoting both stubbornness and foolishness). 
By September 27, 1996, however, there appeared a tangible shift in the nature of 
the mainstream media's discourse as the Palestinians vowed to gather after noon 
prayers at the Al-Haram al-Sharif and Al-Aqsa Mosque complex, and conduct a 
'day of rage' in direct protest at the Israeli inspired violation of the Holy Site.47 
Indeed, whereas the Palestinians had evoked sympathy within the U.S. 
mainstream media channels on the strength of the flagrant injustice conducted 
against them, this mildly more favourable empathy shown toward them, would 
descend into an antipathy and a more recognisable 'traditional denigration'. 
Many writers, journalists and analysts, now perceived that the Palestinian youths 
were, in the main, largely overreacting, and embarking upon a dangerous 
escalation with the ranks of the ID F. Furthermore, it was claimed that the Shabab 
were being incited to revolt against the Israeli occupancy specifically by Arafat 
himself, and whilst doing so were being shielded by the armed policemen of the 
PPS. 48 
45 Friedman, Thomas, L. 'Bibi's moment of truth: partnership or fantasy'. New York Times, 
September 28, 1996 
46 
'Carrot and Stick' see Kimmerling, Baruch & Migdal, Joel, S. The Palestinians: The Making of 
a People, p. 241. And Schiff, Ze'ev & Ya'ari, Ehud, Op-cit, p. 117. 
47 Schmemann, Serge, 'Netanyahu and Arafat, the political burden of their stubbornness'. New 
York Times, September 27, 1996. 
48 Schmemann, Serge, '50 are killed as clashes widen from West Bank to Gaza Strip'. New York 
Times, September 27, 1996. 
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Inasmuch as this maybe true, it is argued that another mild distortion often 
occurs within the U.S. mainstream media concerning the Palestinian Chairman's 
utilisation of the disaffected Palestinian youth. For although Arafat may openly 
encourage keen spirited young men to make it as difficult as possible for the IDF 
to impose their rule over the Occupied Territories, it does not take into account 
that these youths are fiercely independent and vehemently politicised, or that 
they have little or no future in the current status of the Israeli occupation, and are 
therefore more than prepared to become potential martyrs for the sake of 
Palestinian national aspirations and perceived liberty. 49 
Recognition is also made to the fact, however, that a lot of the false bravado 
evident in the foolhardy, but arguably brave Shabab (not insane, i.e., Majanin), is 
fuelled by both peer pressure, and by what some have questionably identified as 
a supposedly specific Arab inclination to a male machismo. This sentiment is a 
mildly racist allusion in itself, as young Arab men are no more inclined to a 
specific male machismo than any other group of young men venting their 
frustrations in impassioned acts of defiance, or in this case, legitimate resistance 
to an Israeli fait accompli. 
It is also argued that the Palestinians did little to halt this transition of a more 
balanced media portrayal into a traditional form of media denigration, and this 
was brought about through several factors. Firstly, as the violent protest to the 
Israeli injustice became more habitual, its original justification was lost. Indeed 
too many observers and analysts, the protestations were now perceived as 
violence perpetuated just for the sake of it. And furthermore, the Palestinians 
were now just simply overreacting, for after all, this was an ancient tunnel, the 
opening of which, was not directly harmful to the Arabs. Moreover, it did not 
directly impinge upon the sanctity of the Muslim's revered Holy Site, for it only 
passed alongside the Al-Haram al-Sharif, albeit, below ground. The Palestinians 
fears and anger however, were to some extents valid, i.e., that with the opening 
of the tunnel, the potential for terrorists from Israel's far right, if they so wished, 
49 Ibid. 
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could tunnel further under the revered site, and perhaps attempt to destroy the 
golden domed eight century Mosque of Omar by an act of wanton terrorism.) 
This suspicion however, was not totally groundless for some extreme settlers had 
indeed articulated their plans to carry out such a reprehensible scheme on several 
previous occasions.50 
It is argued however, that this violation of the Al-Haram al-Sharif was in its 
sheer audacity, even more inflaming by dint of its supposed justifiability and 
questionable legitimacy. Secondly, and very harmfully for the Palestinians as far 
as more temperate media portrayals were concerned, the violence that erupted 
soliciting Israel's extremely firm response i.e., that of no tolerance (iron fisti 1 
inevitably brought out onto the streets both the rabidly fervent nationalists of Al-
Fatah and the ephemeral appearance of the hooded would-be martyrs of Hamas 
and the Islamic Jihad. 
As soon as their presence was detected however, and then reported by the U.S. 
mainstream media, any last sympathy for the Palestinian's sense of injustice 
vanished. For it is argued that the injustice of opening an ancient tunnel for the 
officially stated purpose of easing the difficulties and burdens of Jewish 
veneration at the Wailing Wall, (Kotel Maaravii 2 when compared to the threat 
and injustice of being blown to bits upon an Egged bus, does not equate within 
the minds of the readership of the U.S. mainstream media. 
An analysis of the U.S. mainstream media throughout this turbulent 'media 
frame' did give rise to a serious criticism, however, namely that on the whole the 
journalists and analysts failed to pick up upon the religious implications that 
instigated the escalation of violence. Instead, it is argued, that not for the first 
time throughout the period of the Oslo 'peace process', the 'media complex' 
50 Smith, Charles, D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 295. Sprinzak, Ehud, The Iceberg 
Model of Extremism. In Newman, David [Ed.], The Impact of Gush Emunim, pp. 42-43. Indeed, 
an underground Jewish organisation calling itself the Fist of Defence attempted to destroy a 
mosque in Hebron in May 1983, and there was also another subsequent attack upon the Al-
Haram al-Sharifand Masjid al-Aqsa in January 1984. See Peretz, Don, Intifada: The Palestinian 
Uprising, p. 21. 
51 Schiff, Ze'ev, & Ya'ari, Ehud, Op-cit, p. 261. 
52 Syrkin, Marie [Ed.], Golda Meir Speaks Out, p. 158. 
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once again showed grave concern for the continuation of the 'peace process' and 
concentrated upon the political ramifications of the Israeli's controversial 
decision. Indeed, this was reflected in the way that Bill Clinton promised to 
personally intervene to find a way through the deadlock and perhaps whilst only 
showing the Palestinians and their leadership mere lip service, did castigate 
Netanyahu for deliberately pushing the Palestinians too far. 
It is suggested that since the inception of Oslo (perhaps with the exception of the 
'Massacre of Hebron'), the violence that ensued after the harmful opening of the 
ancient Herodian tunnel was extremely reminiscent of the violence that 
hallmrkad the lntifada proper. Nevertheless, such violent outbursts after this 
extremely provocative action would characterise the remaining days of the Oslo 
'peace process' until the regrettable outbreak of Intifada ll, which denoted the 
true 'Death of Oslo'. It seems fair to suggest, that all the while that Israel acts in 
such an overtly chauvinistic manner towards the Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, 
she [Israel] and the international community i.e., the U.S. in this instance, can 
expect, little more than violent and retrogressive behaviour conducted against 
them. Therefore, in light of these factors, it is strongly argued that an Israeli 
imposed moratorium of the 'peace process' would not be equal to a moratorium 
of purposeful inflammatory Israeli orchestrated acts of blatant chauvinism, upon 
any true path to peace. 
CHAPTERS 
'Har Homa: An 'Ongoing' Project' 
'By God, this is the worst situation in the 'peace process' since 1977 
[Camp David] ... You have [Netanyahu] succeeded in frightening the 
world ... You have pushed all of us into a very difficult situation.' 1 
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This 'media frame' deals specifically with the 'ongoing' Zionist project of the 
establishment of immutable 'facts on the ground', namely the Israeli settlement 
of Arab southeast Jerusalem at the contended site of Har Homa.2 (Jabal Abu 
Ghnaim to the Palestinian Arabsl The main argument proposed in this chapter, 
is that U.S. mainstream media discourse during this lengthy period i.e., March 
15, 1997 until approximately the end of March in 1998, took distinct forms, and 
possessed several different aspects.4 Therefore, this chapter will undertake to 
discuss the nature of U.S. mainstream media discourse during this initially 
extremely turbulent, and potentially very grim and destructive period.5 
From the outset then, when the politically intransigent and personally determined 
Benyamin Netanyahu declared his own 'steadfast' intention to commence upon 
the project of Har Homa,6 despite stiff opposition from the Palestinian Authority, 
1 Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, as cited in Schemann, Serge, 'New strife leads Netanyahu 
to schedule a visit to Clinton,' New York Times, April2, 1997. 
2 Dempsey, Judy, 'Netanyahu seeks troop pull out backing: Israeli leader cuts controversial Har 
Homa settlement to win far right support'. The Financial Times, March 7 1997. And: Editorial, 
'Setting facts in concrete'. Guardian, February 28, 1997. 
3 Editorial, 'Whistling in Jerusalem.' Guardian, March 19, 1997. 
4 These dates were decided upon, firstly, because March 15, 1997 represents Netanyahu's 
confirmed commitment to embark upon the Har Homa project, and the end of March 1998 
represents the coming to office of Ehud Barak. 
5 Grim has been used here because Har Homa represented the potentially gravest threat to the 
'peace process'. See: Hirst, David, 'Arafat quandary as dream fades'. Guardian, March 29, 1997. 
And: Gellman, Barton, 'Gap widens in Mideast peace making, The Washington Post, March 25, 
1997. 
6 The use of 'steadfast' here is a purposeful connection with the Palestinian's 'steadfastness' 
(Samud) i.e., the specific language of resistance. Butenshon, Nils, A. 'The Oslo Agreement: The 
White House to Jabal al Ghnaim, In Giacaman, George, & Lonning, Dag, J. [Eds.], Op-cit, p. 25. 
The Har Homa settlement was initially the 'brainchild' of Likud's Yitzhak Rabin, and was 
'spearheaded' by Ariel Sharon. See: Editorial, 'Setting facts in concrete'. Guardian, February 28, 
1997. And: Guyatt, Nicholas, Op-cit, p. 63. 
84 
7 
and a quite unusual overt condemnation from the U.S. 'media complex} U.S. 
mainstream media portrayals were on the whole rather sympathetic to the 
Palestinians, recognising that Israel was purposefully violating the ambiguous 
good nature of the Oslo 'peace process' i.e., that of supposedly 'no more 
settlement' .9 
So when the surveyors moved up onto the 'hill' on the 181h of March, as 
scheduled, 10 and a peaceful Palestinian protest was instigated, 11 (led in the main 
by the late Faisal Hussaini a stoical Jerusalemite), 12 the U.S. mainstream media 
empathised with the plight of the powerless Palestinians, and even relatively 
surprisingly rallied to their defence, openly questioning Israeli motivations and 
their claimed moral legitimacy of such an unnecessarily pernicious move. 13 
Indeed, it was evident to most observers and analysts in the U.S. 'media 
complex' that it was now Israel, or more specifically Benyamin Netanyahu, that 
was endangering the fragile 'peace process' .14 Moreover, there were vociferous 
voices from within the U.S. 'media complex' warning of the impending violence 
that would inevitably break out if such a plan were executed.15 
7 Starer, Rowley, H. 'Israel repeats vow to build in Arab zone.' Chicago Tribune, March 15, 
1997. 
8 Bill Clinton was quite vocal in his disapproval of Netanyahu's potentially inflammatory and 
dangerous action and perhaps this was what encouraged Netanyahu to 'stick to his guns'. See: 
Waldmeir, Pat, & Dempsey, Judy, 'Clinton criticises Israel over Jerusalem homes plan'. The 
Financial Times, March 8, 1997. And: Walker, Martin, 'Clinton snubs Israeli PM in frank talks'. 
Guardian, April4, 1997. 
9 Bhatia, Shyam & Black, Ian, 'Bulldozers roll in'. Guardian, March 19, 1997. And: Hirst, 
David, 'Private view: Slow motion conquest, Guardian, March 8, 1997. Prusher, Llene, R. 
'Umavelling peace pushes Netanyahu into a corner.' Christian Science Monitor, April3, 1997. 
10 Starer, Rowley, H. 'Israeli, Arab negotiators hurry to avert violence'. Chicago Tribune, March 
18, 1997. And: Greenberg, Joel, 'Tense stand off in Jerusalem ends, but nerves are taut.' New 
York Times, March 1, 1997. 
11 Up until then, and even initially as works began, the Palestinians protest to Har Homa had been 
mainly peaceful. See: Bhatia, Shyam, & Walker, Martin, 'Netanyahu accused of secret deal on 
settlers' Guardian, February 28, 1997. And: Starer, Rowley, H. 'Israel resets peace clock.' 
Chicago Tribune, March 20, 1997. 
12 Ephron, Don, 'Ex-terrorist turned peace activist dies.' The Washington Times, June 1, 2000. 
And: Goldenberg, Suzanne, & Whitaker, Brian, 'Hussaini, the 'voice of sanity' dies.' Guardian, 
June 1, 2000. 
13 Will, George, F. 'Land for a liars promises.' The Washington Post, March 27, 1997. 
14 Geyer, Georgie, A. '2 weak leaders hope for peace in the Middle East'. Chicago Tribune, 
March 28. 1997. And: Starer, Rowley, H. 'Israel resets peace clock.' Chicago Tribune, March 20, 
1997. 
15 Farquhar, Neil, 'Arafat lobbies U.S. against Israeli's housing plan.' New York Times, March 6, 
1997. 
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Therefore, when violence erupted on the 21st, (poignantly denoted by a Hamas 
sponsored 'suicide attack' upon a cafe in Tel Aviv, which killed three), several 
days after the big lumbering bulldozers accompanied by a heavily armed IDF 
contingent rolled out onto the hill 'to break the ground' on the eighteenth, 16 
(indicating that the Israeli authority had accepted that they were acting 
chauvinistically, and immorally, once again towards the Palestinians), no one 
was really shocked, least of all the Israelis and the U.S. 'media complex' .17 The 
ensuing violence however, was not all that different from the violence that had 
erupted last fall, when the Israelis had maliciously opened the ancient tunnel. 
Indeed, so similar was both the use of imagery and the descriptive narrative of 
the violence, that it would, to some, represent once again a 'lesser' or 'micro' 
Intifada. 18 Therefore, it is felt that it is unnecessary to spend too much time in 
this present chapter conducting an intensive analysis of it. Suffice to say 
however, there was one significant difference between the violence surrounding 
the commencement of the Har Homa project, and that of the Hashmonean 
Tunnel, and this difference was reflected in the both the textual and visual 
narratives pertaining to the early and transitory period of the project. 
For instance, there were many images that showed the impressively bulky 
bulldozers, chewing up the pine trees, 19 and spitting them out like shredded and 
snapped matchsticks whilst spewing out big black diesel clouds high into the 
Mediterranean sky; meanwhile the graders and levellers flayed the rock strewn 
topsoi1.20 Moreover, there were many more images depicting the frustrated and 
16 Bhati, Shyam, 'Bulldozers roll in'. Guardian, March 19, 1997. And: Dempsey Judy & Machlis, 
Avi, 'Netanyahu sends in the bulldozers'. Financial Times, March 19, 1997. And: Storer, 
Rowley, H. 'Israeli, Arab negotiators hurry to avert violence.' Chicago Tribune, March 18, 1997. 
17 Storer, Rowley, H. 'U.S. seeking good will gestures from Israel.' Chicago Tribune, March 13, 
1997. And: Storer, Rowley, H. 'Israel resets peace clock.' Chicago Tribune, March 20, 1997. 
And: Schmemann, Serge, 'Israeli cabinet votes to build in East Jerusalem next week.' New York 
Times, March 15, 1997. 
18 Bhati, Shyam, & Black, Ian, 'Israel warned of new lntifada over settlement'. Guardian, 
February 27, 1997. And: Bhatia, Shyam, 'Tide of fury runs towards a third lntifada, Guardian, 
March 23, 1997. And: Prusher, Llene, R. 'This time, Palestinian lntifada loses punch.' Christian 
Science Monitor, April 10, 1997. 
19 Greenberg, Joel, 'Tense stand off in Jerusalem ends, but nerves are taut.' New York Times, 
March 1, 1997. 
20 AP Photo, 'Breaking ground damaging peace hopes.' Chicago Tribune, March 19, 1997. And, 
Israel breaks ground at housing site'. The Washington Post, March 19, 1997. 
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saddened protesters, powerless to stop the wilful betrayal of the principles of 
Oslo and the onslaught of the Zionist state maker i.e., the construction 
company's (and in some cases, the army's) heavy machinery.21 (This was 
colonialist pioneering made too easy; indeed, 'like taking candy from a baby'.) 
Yet this relatively pro-Palestinian discourse however, did give rise to a criticism, 
because once again, as on several previous occasions throughout the Oslo 'peace 
process', the U.S. mainstream media largely failed to indicate or reflect the 
obvious religious implications and their clear significance to the crisis that was 
triggered by the commencement of the project.22 Indeed, this is to say, that in 
fact, what was unleashed, represented the potentially gravest and most troubling 
issue relating to Oslo itself. For the Palestinians, the 'Battle of Jerusalem' had 
now begun.23 The fan of extreme violence, (as in a vortex) had regrettably been 
switched on, whipping everyone up into an angry frenzy (It was largely the 
Palestinians that were portrayed as frenzied, however.) and it would be remain to 
be seen whether or not it could be switched off again.24 
In order to clarify this contentious and debatable point, it is necessary to 
understand exactly what the Har Homa project means and represents to both 
parties of the conflict. Firstly, the Har Homa project means all that is positive 
and good for the Israelis, and 'political' Zionism. Conversely, it represents 
everything negative and nihilistic for the Palestinians, and their long held 
national dream and fanciful allusions. Indeed the Har Homa project means for 
the Israelis, the completion of two final concentric rings of Jewish settlement, 
and the closing of a 'horseshoe' .25 Moreover, this completion defines the Zionists 
total 'conquest' of the ancient city and the creation of a Greater Jerusalem, 
21 Hersh, Seymour, M. The Sampson Option. pp. 184-185. 
22 Gellman, Barton, 'gap widens in Mideast peacemaking.' The Washington Post, March 25, 
1997. 
23 Greenberg, Joel, 'Tense stand off in Jerusalem ends, but nerves are taut.' New York Times, 
March 1, 1997 .Hirst, David, 'Arafat quandary as dream fades'. Guardian, March 29, 1997. 
24 Prusher, Llene, R. 'Umavelling peace pushes Netanyahu into a corner' Christian Science 
Monitor, April3, 1997. 
25 Greenberg, Joel, ' Tense stand off in Jerusalem ends, but nerves are taut.' New York Times, 
March 1, 1997. Editorial, 'Setting facts in concrete.' Guardian, February 29, 1997. 
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emblematic of Zionism's greatest physical and spiritual achievement.26 Whilst 
conversely, for the Palestinians, it represents their total entrapment and 
cantonment, viz. the Balkanisation or Bantustanisation of Palestine. In sum, the 
Har Homa project is the 'keystone' for the resounding Israeli victory, 27 and is 
axiomatically the building block that seals Palestinian access through the land 
corridor from the West Bank to their much beloved Al-Quds. (Jerusalem) 
The fear for the Palestinians then, is that they shall appear as 'a people' (indeed, 
'a nation' purposefully to refute Golda Meir's infamous and often quoted racist 
sentiment)28 cast like 'seeds of grain upon a path', for whom without contiguity 
for their territory, they as a supposedly emancipated nation, shall for a short time 
grow and flourish, only before withering away, perhaps forever, consumed by the 
vexatious ministrations of their neo-colonialist Israeli overseer. Furthermore, this 
process of decay, would, it is argued, take years, perhaps even decades. In short, 
it would represent a slow and painful descent into a condition of deep and dark 
desperation, which in itself, is a rather morbid and nihilistic 'projection'. 
Finally, the Har Homa project is a symbol of Israel's 'modem' vibrancy and 
status as a matured and established Zionist state. Yet it sends a clear message to 
the world that the tenets of 'political' Zionism are also healthy and secure. (In the 
sense that Israeli settlement is 'ongoing' and the actualisation of Eretz Yisrael is 
gradually being realised and not 'forsaken' .)29 This factor is obviously appealing 
to the settlers and the Israeli right, i.e., Likud: Jerusalem would finally become 
the indivisible Jewish capital forever. 30 Secured quite simply with the creation of 
six thousand five hundred housing units at the Har Homa site.31 Indeed, secured 
for the price of the settling many of the Israelis supposedly much needed Russian 
26 Hirst David, 'Private view: slow motion conquest'. Guardian, March 29, 1997. 
27 Leader, 'Dangers in Jerusalem.' The Financial Times, March 3, 1997. 
28 Syrkin, Marle, [Ed.] Golda Meir Speaks Out, pp. 13-14. 
29 Aronson, Geoffrey, 'Despite confrontation Oslo still stands.' Christian Science Monitor, April 
15, 1997. And: Borger, Julian, 'Anger on streets of Hebron.' Observer, July 16, 1997. And: 
Sharrock, David, 'Jerusalem builders find Mary' s resting place.' Guardian, November 10, 1997. 
30 Rowley, Storer, H. 'U.S. seeking good will gestures from Israel.' Chicago Tribune, March 13, 
1997. 
31 Cloud, David, S 'Mubarak fears Jerusalem violence.' Chicago Tribune, March 12, 1997. 
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immigrants.32 A pnce that in the long term might be too much to pay, as 
colonialism is by nature a cyclical process, inasmuch as it has to have fuel viz. 
subjects to dominate and territory in which to develop. Therefore, in Israel we 
see marginalized and expendable Palestinians today, and perhaps 'lower grade' 
and expendable Russian Jews tomorrow. 
Politically speaking the Har Homa project was quite simply a Likud ploy to 
circumvent the 'final status talks' 33 and pre-empt the final solution to the 
'Question of Palestine' by creating permanent and immovable obstacles on the 
ground, that are not just merely housing units, but are a people, with a very 
dubious specific Jewish identity. 34 Theoretically then, no one would dare, or 
would be allowed, to ask them to move to a less contested area on the Israeli side 
of Jerusalem's 'Green Line' in order to make way for an eventually agreed 
partition. 
All these aforementioned considerations hopefully cover the major dynamics and 
socio-political ramifications of the Har Homa project. Simply put, they confirm 
Israel's conquest, whilst signifying the conclusive defeat of Palestinian designs 
upon Arab East Jerusalem. (But not the abject defeat of the Palestinian peoples 
per se.)35 Therefore, it is strongly suggested that the Har Homa project was not 
the seemingly innocuous project it first appeared, but is in reality a symbol of 
probably the single most emotive issue pertaining to the Arab/Israeli conflict, 
i.e., 'the final status' and the contested inheritance of Holy Jerusalem?6 
Yet it would seem as in previOus times of cns1s, the 'media complex' 
concentrated their efforts largely upon the political ramifications and the 
potential damage to the frail and inert 'peace process', specifically due to an 
escalation of violence. It was Washington in the form of envoy Dennis Ross 
32 A vishai, Bernard, 'Lost Tribes oflsrael', Prospect, June 2001. 
33 Bhatia, Shy am, & Black, Ian, 'Israel warned of new Intifada over settlement'. Guardian, 
February 27, 1997. And: Gellman, Barton, 'U.S., Israel fault Arafat on Hamas.' The Washington 
Post, March 24,1997. 
34 
'Arguably of Jewish identity', consider the debate within Israel concerning 'Who is a Jew?' 
See: Schiff, Ze'ev, & Ya'ari, Ehud, Op-cit, p. 307. 
35 Guyatt, Nicholas, The Absence of Peace, p. 185. 
36 Hirst, David, 'Arafat quandary as dream fades'. Guardian, March 29, 1997. 
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(sent to Israel initially on the 261h of March), who eventually managed to pull the 
plug and the halt the fan, temporarily forestalling the already nascent 'Battle of 
Jerusalem', but only after the Administration had seriously reined in the 
mischievous Netanyahu, by threatening all sorts of political and fiscal 
recriminations for Israel. 
It is strongly suggested however, that Clinton had to rummage quite extensively 
through his personal address book at this particular time of crisis. 37 It was an 
irony indeed then, that Netanyahu's belligerent attitude over the instigating of the 
Har Homa project contrastingly saved the greatest of all of the Palestinian 
national aspirations. 
The violence may have quelled as a result of direct U.S. intervention, but not 
before Arafat received some rather typical U.S. 'media complex' denigration and 
slander once again over his perceived inability to maintain his authority other his 
subjects in the Occupied Territories.38 It is doubtful however, that the violence 
ceased as a result of what was often rumoured in the 'prestigious press' i.e., that 
the Palestinian leader had struck a deal with Netanyahu over his personal use of 
Israeli airspace and also over the opening Gaza International Airport, which had 
recently been completed.39 
And all the while the two leaders were bickering over who possessed the moral 
high ground with their American friend in Washington, the erstwhile Israeli 
Building Minister, Ariel Sharon, 40 was undoubtedly watching from the wings 
and analysing the unfolding events with perhaps more political acumen than even 
his 'perceived' master, friend, and adversary, Benyamin Netanyahu. 
37 The surmise being that if it hadn't been for the tangible clash of personalities evident between 
the American and Israeli leader, (very possibly induced because they were from the same 
'charismatic' and egocentric style of political leadership mould), and Clinton's much needed 
'arbitration', Arafat's dream might well have been irredeemably broken. 
38 Tribune News Service, 'U.S. asks Arafat to reign in Arab terrorists.' Chicago Tribune, March 
25, 1997. And: Gellman, Barton, 'U.S., Israel fault Arafat on Hamas.' The Washington Post, 
March 24, 1997. 
39 Bhatia, Shyam, 'Arafat seeks airport deal with Israel'. Guardian, April 13, 1997. And: Guyatt, 
Nicholas, Op-e it, p. 67. 
40 Bhatia, Shyam, & Black, Ian, 'King Bibi besieged'. Observer, April20, 1997. 
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Nevertheless, once the extreme violence had seemingly dissipated i.e., by mid-
April, 41 (low level violence is a constant way of life in Israel), after exacting a 
substantially large amount of Palestinian casualties, and a traditionally 
disproportionately small amount of Israeli ones, the U.S. mainstream media's 
reportage of Israeli settlement, particular at Har Homa, (but also in other 
carefully selected sites) also dissipated. In fact, the continued Israeli settlement 
was only ever mentioned in passing reference in the channels of the U.S. 
mainstream media after the cessation of the seemingly Intifada like violence, and 
the cooling off of the immediate crisis. Indeed, mention of the Israeli's settlement 
policy usually only occurs when U.S. diplomatic mediation upon the 'peace 
process' falls directly onto the Washington Administration's foreign policy 
agenda.42 
As far as the lengthy period of Har Homa is concerned (determined for the sake 
of this study, as just a little more than a month in length),43 it represents a period 
of tangible stagnation, a continued moratorium of the 'peace process', inspired 
and sustained by Netanyahu's purposeful forestalling and political vacillation, 
which to a large extent, was purposefully appeasing to his 'friends' of the Israeli 
right and less than liberal American backers. 44 
Therefore, in consideration of the above factors the conclusion that is drawn 
concerning the U.S. mainstream media's reportage of the of Har Homa project, 
and indeed the phenomenon that is Israeli settling itself, is that it is not an issue 
that really generates to much direct media attention. Only when such Israeli 
activity actually mitigates an outbreak of extreme violence, or implicitly risks 
directly further damaging an already heavily beleaguered 'peace process' does 
the U.S. 'media complex' show any true concern. 
41 Greenberg, Joel, 'Israelis and Palestinians cooperate to seize four terrorist suspects.' New York 
Times, April 11, 1997. 
42 Guyatt, Nicholas, Op-cit, p. 115. 
43 Recognition is made that the Har Homa project because of its 'ongoing' nature cannot really be 
accurately placed within a 'time frame.' Netanyahu did concede however, to offer a halt of the 
project, which diffused the tension, but the development went silently on. 
44 Schmemann, Serge, 'Israel to yield 9% of West Banlc a victory for Netanyahu.' New York 
Times, March 7, 1997. And: Schmemann, Serge, '9% of a loaf.' New York Times, March 11, 
1997. 
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In truth, the reality is this, Israeli settling goes on unabated, and the U.S. 'media 
complex' has always traditionally turned a blind eye to it, considering it as a 
dynamic of the conflict that is to a large degree not worthy of direct Washington 
attention, or even direct reference within the mainstream media's narratives 
regarding the Arab/Israeli conflict.45 This seeming lack of interest is motivated in 
part from out of a latent fear of provoking an accusation of anti-Semitism from 
the Jewish Lobby, and the threat of having this umbrella organisation's support 
removed from Congress.46 In sum then, the 'media complex's' attitude to Israeli 
settlement, is that as long as it is conducted quietly, and with the minimum of 
fuss, i.e., a contained non violent and silenced Palestinian protest, then it is 
perfectly reasonable in principle, indeed, even quite acceptable, and to some, i.e., 
the avowedly staunch supporters of Israel, even morally laudable.47 This attitude 
evident in a great majority of the U.S. 'media complex' is a cynical, patronising, 
insincere, mildly racist, (and in the case of the U.S. Administration, cowardly,) 
pro-Israeli attitude, bought and paid for through active Palestinian 
disenfranchisement, humiliation, marginality, and ultimately their expendability. 
45 Guyatt, Nicholas, Op-cit, p. 82. 
46 Walker, Martin, 'Clinton hedges as Arafat appeals for support against Netanyahu'. Guardian, 
March 4, 1997. Greenberg, Joel, '3 Palestinians killed and a hundred wounded in clashes with 
settlers and troops in Hebron.' New York Times, April9, 1997. 
47 Will, George, F. 'Land for a liars promises.' The Washington Post, March 27, 1997. 
CHAPTER9 
'The Penultimate Nail in the Oslo Coffin' 
'Its like churning water to get butter, it will never work, that is what 
these negotiations are like. 1 
'Yesterday, there was trepidation among Palestinians that Arafat 
would come under intolerable pressure from Clinton and Israeli 
Prime Minister Ehud Barak to swallow compromise proposals or be 
cast as the summit wrecker.' 2 
'On the American side some suggest, President Clinton's first 
objective is to ensure that if the summit fails, someone else will get 
the blame.' 3 
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This 'media frame' exammes an extremely short, but tremendously important 
period within the Oslo 'peace process', namely the unsuccessful Camp David II 
'talks' of July 11, 2000 until July 25, 2000.4 The main argument posited 
however, is that U.S. mainstream media portrayals during this particular phase 
were not altogether unlike those that surrounded the initial 'birth or stillbirth' of 
the 'peace process', inasmuch as they were largely based upon a false 
enthusiasm, and were moreover, once again tentative, nervous, and very often 
cynical.5 In essence, the channels of the U.S. mainstream media were mildly 
schizophrenic, and at times, mildly racist towards the Palestinians.6 
1 Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Homecoming: crowds out for Arafat, daggers out for Barak.' Guardian, 
July 27,2000. 
2 Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Hope just glimmers in light of Jerusalem's golden dome.' Observer, 
July 23, 2000. 
3 Whitaker, Brian, 'Camp David's gates reopen.' Guardian, July 11, 2000. 
4 Mostyn Trevor, 'Time-Bomb under Jerusalem.' The Tablet, August 5, 2000. 
5 Perlez, Jane, 'U.S. is trying to be upbeat about the talks in Maryland.' New York Times, July 11, 
2000. And: Sontag, Deborah, 'Cautious hopes for significant agreement' New York Times, July 
12,2000. 
6 Krauthammer, Charles, 'Camp David: Finality.' The Washington Post, July 18, 2000. 
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Initially, these media channels were incorrectly optimistic and expectant,7 
portraying the leaders of both immediate parties to the Arab/Israeli conflict with 
apparent equanimity and respect. When the 'talks' inevitably collapsed in an 
abysmal failure however, the Palestinian leader was largely perceived as the 
intransigent party, and subsequently received the familiar 'traditional 
denigration' and was categorically cast as the 'summit wrecker' by the American 
'media complex'. 8 (The American President being among the most vocal in his 
open condemnation of the Palestinian leaderl This overt denigration of Arafat 
however, offered by some representatives of the U.S. Administration was quickly 
and instinctively followed by the U.S. mainstream media channels. 10 
Furthermore, in an act of consolidation of the American position, and in a bid to 
shore up his own damaged image in the aftermath of Camp David ll, the Israeli 
leader was also quick to condemn the Palestinian leader over his perceived 
intransigence and intractability. 11 
Nevertheless, the decision to hold 'highest level' talks between the Palestinian 
Chairman Y assir Arafat, and the politically stricken Ehud Barak, at the idyllic 
and historic site of Camp David, high in the Catoktin Mountains (Verdant Hills) 
of Maryland, was taken ultimately by the U.S. President (on Ehud Barak's 
insistence), for several reasons. 12 The official reason given, was that Camp David 
II was a 'last ditch attempt' to restore 'momentum' upon the path (read 
pendulum) to peace that Oslo was to have supposedly delivered. It has been 
suggested in some circles however, that Bill Clinton's real motivation for 
7 Perlez, Jane, 'Clinton voices some optimism on peace talks.' New York Times, July 17, 2000. 
And: Sontag, Deborah, 'Talk of lower expectations as Mideast deadline nears.' New York Times, 
July 18, 2000. 
8 Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Hope just glimmers in light of Jerusalem's golden dome.' Observer, 
July 23, 2000. 
9 Whitaker, Brian, 'Camp David's gate reopen.' Guardian, July 11, 2000. And: ·Freedman, 
Laurence, Any peace deal in the Middle East must include extremists on both sides, Independent, 
October 16, 2000. And: Fisk, Robert, Forget the peace process: this is a murderous civil war. 
Independent, December 29,2000. 
10 Hockstader, Lee, 'Mideast summit ends with no deal.' The Washington Post, July 26,2000. 
11 Perlez, Jane, & Sontag, Deborah, Talks are declared over but Barak and Arafat stay.' New 
York Times, July 20, 2000. And: Lancaster, John, 'Impasse over Jerusalem' The Washington 
Post, July 26, 2000. And: Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Barak rushes to blame unyielding Arafat.' 
Guardian, July 26, 2000. 
12 Sontag, Deborah, 'Cautious hopes for significant agreement.' New York Times, July 12, 2000. 
And: Delios, Hugh, 'Barak wins showdown.' Chicago Tribune, July 11, 2000. 
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inviting the two leaders to meet in such calm and tranquil surroundings, was to 
attempt to force a passage through the 'deadlock' by purposefully attaching 
significance to the successful Camp David 'talks' (framed by Dr. H. Kissinger) 
of 1978, and held between Anwar Sadat and Menachim Begin, and presided over 
by then U.S. President Jimrny Carter. 13 Moreover, if any reconciliation could be 
achieved, then Clinton could leave office with his own reputation as 'peace 
broker' and 'facilitator' intact. Indeed, it was an irony not missed by many, that 
both of the 'peace processes' that Bill Clinton had personally championed, (that 
of Northern Ireland and the Middle East), were dissolving, just like his 
presidency. 
In political terms, the Camp David ll talks aims were to ditch the 'multi-layered' 
inadmissible structure of the Oslo 'peace process' package (a long recognised 
flawed approach to 'peace initiatives'), by circumventing both the 'interim 
phase' (Oslo 11 of September 28, 1995) 14 and the 'final status talks' (initially 
timetabled for May 1999), and placing all the complicated and protracted issues 
upon the table, namely, the three main 'core issues' i.e., the 'right of return' of 
some three million Palestinian exiles,15 or their full compensation, the amount of 
illegally occupied territory to be finally rescinded back to the Palestinian 
Authority, and the highly controversial and irresolvable issue of the final 
territorial demarcation of Jerusalem. 16 
Whilst not omitting the equally important issues of Israeli settlements, and 
consequentially some 200 000 settlers, 17 water rights (Israel has a serious water 
13 Perlez, Jane, 'For Clinton the personal is political at summit.' New York Times, July 14, 2000. 
And: Lancaster, John, 'Impasse over Jerusalem' The Washington Post, July 26, 2000. September 
17, 1978 witnessed the successful culmination of a peace proposal framed by Dr. Henry 
Kissinger between Egypt and Israel, with an attached solution to the Palestinian Question. This 
historic deal was famously ratified on the North Lawn of the White House on March 26, 1979. 
Needless to say, that it fell far short of its noble intentions. 
14 See: Giacaman, George, In the Throes of Oslo: Palestinian Society, Civil Society and the 
Future, in Giacaman, George, & Lonning, Dag, J. [Eds.], After Oslo: New Realities, Old 
Problems, p. 4. 
15 Diamond John, 'Tensions mounting in Mideast summit.' Chicago Tribune, July 15,2000 
16 Perlez, Jane, 'Moment of truth on tough issues.' New York Times, July 11. 2000. See: 
Giacaman, George, 'In the Throes of Oslo: Palestinian Society, Civil Society and the Future' In 
Giacaman, George, & Lonning, Dag, J [Eds.], Op-cit, p. 9. And: Guyaratt, Nicholas, The Absence 
of Peace, pp. 33-34. 
17 Diamond, John, 'Tensions mounting in Mideast summit.' Chicago Tribune, July 15, 2000. 
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problem with regards to the location of her reservoirs and aquifers: to the point 
that possession of them, will in time become a major dynamic of the Arab/Israeli 
conflict), 18 and finally, Israel's security arrangements with both Jordan and Syria. 
Indeed, every issue that had blighted Oslo's ultimate chance of success would be 
raised, discussed, and negotiated, until a settlement could be reached in a 
comprehensive new deal that avoided the old and acrimonious sticking points. 
This definitive and final resolution to the impasse was to be reached by trading 
concessions and accepting compromise proposals, in 'closed door' sessions 
lasting a fortnight with small groups of 'negotiators' and 'facilitators' working to 
resolve the less important details concerning the final deal, 19 i.e., Israel's troop 
redeployment, the final size of the Palestinian security apparatus, Palestinian 
access to roads and highways, and of course the insurmountable problem 
concerning the final and declared permanent shape and character of the infamous 
'Green Line' viz. the pre-1967 war lines.20 (It would of course remain to be seen 
whether this would lead to a successful settlement of the Question of Palestine, 
or the further apartheid of the Palestinian people.) 21 
Meanwhile, the two leaders would meet each other after consulting these smaller 
teams and attempt to end the conflict through the most important of all 
'confidence building measures' i.e., a commonly held trust of the other via direct 
personal interaction, thus facilitating an active and ongoing dialogue. 22 If there 
wasn't any progress achieved by the scheduled termination of the talks then it 
would be left for the protagonists themselves to attempt to settle this most 
18 Sherman, Martin, The Politics of Water in the Middle East, p. ix. 
19 Hoagland, Jim, 'A peace within reach.' The Washington Post, July 9, 2000. 
20 Butenshon, Nils, A. 'The Oslo Agreement: From the Whitehouse to Jabal Abu Ghnaim' In 
Giacamon, George, & Lonning, Dag, J [Eds.], Op-cit, p. 37. 
21 In 1987, Israeli academic Uri Davis declared Israel an apartheid state with regards to her 
treatment of Israeli Arabs. If, however, Israel's Arabs can be considered to be living in a 
condition of 'petty' apartheid, then those Palestinians of the Occupied Territories are living in a 
condition of 'grand' apartheid and have been since the inception of Oslo. See: Davis, Uri, Israel: 
An Apartheid State. London: Zed Books. 1987. As cited in Guyatt, Nicholas, The Absence of 
Peace, pp. XIII-XIV, and p. 159, and p. 170. 
22 Hockstader, Lee, 'Summitspeak: A translation, The Washington Post, July 13, 2000. 
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ancient of disputes without Clinton's personally acclaimed persuasive powers of 
arbitration. 23 
Indeed the hugely egotistical Clinton suggested that when he was to leave office, 
his ideas were to go with him. Therefore, if the two leaders were wise and 
serious about their commitment to supplant a lasting peace in the region that 
would deliver their peoples from out of the 'meat-grinder' that was (is) the 
Arab/Israeli conflict in all of its vainglorious pointlessness, and give 'hope' to 
their future aspirations, then they should unhesitatingly seek to utilise this much 
vaunted 'final opportunity' ,24 to thrash out a binding settlement that would offer 
strong foundations upon which a full and comprehensive 'peace settlement' 
could be built. This exhortation, was initially received by both the pugilists with 
a sense of wanting to achieve something of substance at the 'talks', for they both 
equally recognised the enormity of the occasion, and furthermore, they both 
realised that to fail at Camp David 11, it would, in effect, consign the Oslo 'peace 
process' to a long awaited grave. 25 
This 'all or nothing' method however, being conducted at the 'last chance 
saloon' that was the Laurel Cabin of the Maryland retreat was never going to be 
without its problems. Indeed, there were many within the 'media complex' that 
intuitively knew that because of the lack of trust between the two parties, the 
chances of success were about fifty-fifty, 26 and at that time a tri-partite settlement 
that incorporated U.S. considerations, would be extremely difficult, if not nigh 
impossible to achieve.27 It was even suggested by the U.S. mainstream media, 
that the U.S. President knew that this was indeed the case.28 This suggests two 
things, the first, that his decision to stage-manage and referee a supposed 'last 
23 Hoagland, Jim, 'A peace within reach.' The Washington Post, July 9, 2000. This was not 
actually the case though, for after the outbreak of hostilities on September 28, 2000, and up until 
Clinton left office in January 2001, the outgoing U.S. President made several desperate attempts 
to resuscitate the moribund 'peace process'. See: Fisk, Robert, 'Sham summit promised little for 
the Palestinians.' Independent, December 29, 2000. And: Dunn, Ross, Brodie, Ian, 'Clinton's 
final push to sell peace to Arafat.' The Times, January 3, 2001. 
24 Perlez, Jane, 'Moment of truth on tough issues' New York Times, July 11,2000. 
25 Whitaker, Brian, 'Leaders seeking a place in history.' Guardian, July 26, 1996. 
26 Godenberg, Suzanne, 'Barak plays for highs stakes at summit.' Guardian, July 7, 2000. 
27 Kettle, Martin, & Hooper, John, 'Clinton casts around for foreign success.' Guardian, July 16, 
2000. 
28 Sontag, Deborah, 'Cautious hopes for significant agreement.' New York Times, July 12, 2000. 
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chance for peace' was primarily motivated for his own personal gain and 
prestige, and was not necessarily undertaken for altruist reasons.29 The second; 
that such a momentous decision was in itself an act of desperation undertaken on 
behalf of all three leaders, and a farcical attempt to salvage something, (a full and 
committed peace agreement) if anything, (simply, any agreement), from an 
unworkable, impractical, finally exhausted and rapidly unravelling 'peace 
process'. 30 
Nevertheless, the U.S. mainstream media speculated quite extensively upon the 
difficulties that surrounded the potential opportunity for success at Camp David 
II, and arguably, actually helped contribute towards these difficulties by applying 
immense pressure upon the leaders to succeed, or let down a much hyped and 
expectant U.S. media audience, (not to mention the 'hopeful' Palestinians and 
Israelis). When the talks began on July 11 however, there was media blackout 
imposed concerning discussion of the issues raised and placed upon the agenda at 
the summit.31 This censorship concerning the issues being raised for discussion 
at the meeting was principally motivated to prevent any unnecessary leakage of 
extremely sensitive information that might directly affect the progress of the 
summit itself. 
For it was considered by the 'facilitators' and 'conveners' that leaks might 
threaten the summit's success, and bring about its premature closure. It seemed 
to be overlooked however, by the U.S. mainstream media in this particular 
instance, that Camp David II was destined to end in an unavoidable and 
lamentable failure from its outset. Indeed, the U.S. Administration had either 
fooled the agents of the press into believing that there was some semblance of 
'hope' in holding the meeting, or they were also going along with the 
government charade by doing the Administration's bidding. There was also 
29 Naftali, Bendavidi, 'Clintons crusade comes up short.' Chicago Tribune, July 20, 2000. It 
seems the way of the Middle Eastern 'peace process' that many summits and talks (emergency, 
crisis, or otherwise), are usually billed as the 'last chance' or 'last step for peace' however, this is 
never the case, for in reality, there is always at least one more distant glimmer of hope. See: Fisk, 
Robert, 'Sham summit promised little for Palestinians, Independent, December 29, 2000. 
30 Diamond, John, 'Clinton reports some progress.' Chicago Tribune, July 17, 2000. 
31 Sontag, Deborah, 'Cautious hopes for significant agreement.' New York Times, July 12,2000. 
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another fear however, that mitigated the muzzling of the press, for it was felt that 
leaks could have severe consequences for those within the Occupied Territories 
and Israel, perhaps provoking a violent outburst from either the Palestinian 
'maximalists' and Israeli settlers, or from sympathisers of Israel's far right. 32 Yet, 
despite the blackout, many of the media's narratives were inevitably fuelled by a 
certain amount of leakage in the form of 'nods and winks' from sources close to 
the 'key players' .33 
Therefore, ironically, because of the restrictions imposed upon the media there 
was a subsequent upsurge of reportage concerning the talks, and much of it was 
highly speculative, (but not necessarily wholly inaccurate), in content.34 
Moreover, it also meant that because the U.S. mainstream media was officially 
proscribed from direct coverage of the events unfolding at the retreat, it focused 
upon less frequently reported issues of the Arab/Israeli conflict.35 Many of these 
articles were, however, couched in a language that was purposefully utilised to 
create an atmosphere that was reminiscent of the euphoria that surrounded the 
'landmark' talks twenty-two years earlier. In essence, Camp David 11 was billed 
as a sequel, and was little more than a heavily staged and carefully 
choreographed 'media event' .36 
Indeed, here was an explicit example of the U.S. mainstream media promoting 
the interests of the U.S. Administration, because it was undoubtedly a purposeful 
intention of Bill Clinton's, to attempt to force a settlement by physically and 
psychological reminding the two leaders that they were the keys to the future 
32 Sontag, Deborah, 'Cautious hopes for significant agreement.' New York Times, July 12,2000. 
33 Diamond, John, 'Signs of progress in Mideast summit.' Chicago Tribune, July 14, 2000. And: 
Sontag, Deborah, 'Camp David talks in a lull before an expected whirl of decision making.' New 
York Times, July 15, 2000. 
34 What is implied here is that there was a great deal of rumour and speculation concerning the 
nature of the 'talks', however, a majority of it was not necessarily inaccurate as the journalists 
and analysts have been following the conflict/peace process for many years, and therefore they 
are able to speculate intuitively. See: Franklin, Stephen, 'Partisan crowd in Tel Aviv sends a 
message to Barak: come home.' Chicago Tribune, July 17, 2000. And: Lancaster, John, 'Camp 
David talks going to the wire.' The Washington Post, July 19, 2000. And: Nafatali, Bendavidi, 
'Clinton's crusade comes up short.' Chicago Tribune, July 20, 2000. 
35 See: Hockstader, Lee, 'Fading hopes, fading demands.' The Washington Post, July 18, 2000. 
And: Franklin, Step hen, 'Nightmare of splintered Jerusalem.' Chicago Tribune, July 25, 2000. 
36 Diamond, John, 'Israel bows to U.S. on radar sale to China.' Chicago Tribune, July 12, 2000. 
99 
shape and destiny of the 'modern' Middle East?7 And moreover, that if they 
considered themselves to be great and respected leaders, then they too should 
follow the exemplary attitudes of Anwar Sadat and Menachim Begin and make 
the effort to forge a peace. Indeed, 'to go that extra mile for peace', (an often 
quoted 'sound-bite' cliche), 38 it was in this thinking though, that the 
fundamental flaw of Camp David II lay, and where, interestingly, another 
possible lesson for the future of the Middle Eastern peace process and its 
initiatives is to be found. 
It is argued that Bill Clinton had been somewhat foolish to think that by bringing 
the two leaders together and making them fight it out in close quarters that a 
permanent peace settlement could be achieved. The actuality was that the 
American President by forcing the issue, would inadvertently bring the 
realisation of a long held suspicion of the Palestinian people, i.e., that peace with 
Israel was unachievable, Oslo was literally 'killing them', and U.S. intervention 
and arbitration was little more than a proven one sided, pro-Israeli, 
phenomenon. 39 
The Palestinian's greatest fear concerning the Camp David II summit was not 
realised, however, for Arafat was not crushed by the enormity of the occasion, 
nor would he sell out on the 'Palestinian Dream', even in the face of extreme 
pressure applied by the U.S. President and his Israeli interlocutors. Instead, he 
would leave the 'talks' after having rejected an Israeli offer 'he couldn't refuse', 
(Barak's poisoned offer of two separated portions of East Jerusalem: certainly 
not prime pieces of real estate.) Camp David II would, however set of the timer 
37 The summit was often referred to as Camp David II, and sometimes less seriously as the ABC 
summit, after Arafat, Barak, and Clinton. See: Diamond, John, 'Leaders launch Mideast summit.' 
Chicago Tribune, July 11, 2000. 
38 Songer, Deborah, 'talk of lower expectations as Mideast deadline nears.' New York Times, July 
18, 2000. And: Lancaster, John, 'Summit extended as Clinton departs' The Washington Post, July 
20,2000. 
39 Diamond, John, & Naftali, Bendavidi, 'Time short at Mideast talks.' Chicago Tribune, july 18, 
2000. And: Sontag, Deborah, 'stalled but alive, peace talks on Mideast reach lOth day.' New York 
Times, July 21, 2000. And: Lancaster, John, 'Summit teams await talk and await Clinton.' The 
Washington Post, July 22, 2000. And: Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Talks key to Barak's failure.' 
Guardian, July 10,2000. Etc. 
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of a bomb, that once activated could not be defused.40 Indeed, now it was only a 
question of time before Oslo would perish, indeed the 'ship of peace' was 
foundering upon its own rocks (i.e., its evident flaws and insufficiencies), and 
furthermore, was now well and truly beginning to sink. Camp David II had now 
become the 'penultimate nail in the Oslo coffin' .41 
Casting all this gloom and pessimism overboard, however, it is argued that one 
image in particular, published in the U.S. mainstream media and the British 
press, showed in a purely allegorical fashion, the innate and fundamental 
differences between the two protagonists, and how close and biased the 'special 
relationship' between the U.S. and Israel evidently was, and to some extents still 
is.42 For this image published at the start of the ill fated 'talks' showed a 
characteristically broad smiling Clinton standing tall and authoritatively between 
two 'pocket sized battleships' i.e., a diminutive Barak to his right, and an equally 
short Arafat to his left, with a paternal and custodial arm about each of the 
Middle Eastern leader's shoulders. The contrast between these two would-be 
'peacemakers' was startling however, for Barak was a mirror image in every way 
of the American President, (except in his facial expression which was typically 
nervous and strained, and historically befitting of Israeli heads of state attending 
perfunctory occasions), as his shirt, belt, trousers, and most probably his shoes 
and socks as well, could have quite easily come from the same gentleman's 
outfitters. 
Conversely however, there was Arafat, dignified, thoughtful, and apparently 
good humoured, (relieved) swathed in his traditionally worn black and white 
Kaffiyah, and his dark olive green military fatigues, but noticeably this time 
without his German pistol. This image was indeed telling, for it showed 
conclusively that the Israeli leader was a man that the U.S. media audience could 
identify with, if only through a commonly shared Western oriented 'modern' 
dress code. Axiomatically however, it portrayed the Palestinian leader in a 
40 Mostyn Trevor, 'Time-Bomb under Jerusalem.' The Tablet, August 5, 2000. And: Hockstader, 
Lee, 'Mideast peace summit ends with no deal, The Washington Post, July 26, 2000. 
41 Oz, Amos, 'Even if Camp David fails, this conflict is on its last legs.' Guardian, July 25, 2000. 
42 Hosefros, Paul, New York Times, July 12, 2000. And: McNamee, Wyn (Reuters) Independent, 
October 16, 2000. 
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negative light, i.e., as a man who still has not left his militaristic leanings behind: 
as a man living in the past: as a Middle Eastern demagogue of an earlier era. In 
essence, an anachronistic dinosaur too immersed in violence and 'dodgy back 
room deals' to bring anything of real worth or substance to Camp David. This 
depiction of 'Abu Ammar' it is suggested, did nothing to improve the U.S. 
mainstream media's, the Administration's, and the audience's perception of the 
Palestinian Chairman. It is a paradox indeed that the solution to the Palestinian's 
plight may well be found through a simple re-imaging of their leader, but it is 
difficult to imagine Arafat arraigned in Armani. Designer sunglasses? Yes, 
possibly. Lounge suit? No. Never. 
Indeed, when the summit opened Arafat's dress code was very often overlooked; 
his uniform considered as one of Arafat's personal foibles and trademarks, Gust 
like his chequered kaffiyah folded in the shape of Palestine), but when the 'talks' 
collapsed, and Arafat apparently was left with no option than to state his 
intention of declaring the claim of a de facto Palestinian state on September 13, 
2000,43 the media circus seized upon the image as would-be warmonger with 
alacrity, and this interpretation was unquestionably reflected in a majority of the 
comments and analyses proffered with the U.S. 'prestigious press'. 
The lesson to be learned for the future administrators of a Middle Eastern peace 
package from the political disaster that was the failed Camp David II 'talks' is 
this: that within the dynamics of the Arab/Israeli conflict, when it comes to dark 
and desperate acts of violence and terror, history undoubtedly repeats. When 
however, it comes to positive acts (which are very rare) of peacefulness and 
security, history regrettably is not quite as fortuitous. This unfortunate truism is 
what has led to the consideration that The U.S. President was hopelessly out of 
touch when convening Camp David II. 
43 Perlez, Jane, 'Moment of truth on tough issues.' New York Times, July 11,2000. And: Sontag, 
Deborah, 'Talk of lower expectations as Mideast deadline nears.' New York Times, July 18, 2000. 
And: Delios, Hugh, 'Barak wins showdown.' The Washington Post, July 11, 2000. Concerning 
Arafat's dangerous intention to declare an independent statehood, it could be viewed like this: 
Oslo to the Palestinians was like a cracked mirror (i.e., fundamentally flawed from the outset). By 
declaring a de facto Palestine, Arafat was merely ending 'seven years bad luck' that accompanies 
the smashing of any mirror. 
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In short, twenty-two years had passed since the successful Carter brokered 
'talks'. Moreover, way back then, Egypt had a fundamentally strong bargaining 
position, viz. state sovereignty, stature, and economic independence, alongside a 
territorial bargaining chip, the Sinai.44 The simple fact of the matter is that the 
Palestinians have neither with which to trade, implying that they shall always 
find themselves cast as 'summit wreckers' and the intransigent party in 
negotiations. The Oslo 'peace process' has been replete with cliches from its 
outset, however, one phrase in particular carries great currency, namely 
'confidence building measures'. It is suggested that this phrase should be the 
cornerstone of any ongoing 'peace process' repeated, and repeated, ad infinitum. 
44 Parker, Thomas, The Road to Camp David: U.S. Negotiating Strategy Towards the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, p. 3. 
CHAPTER 10 
'The Death of Oslo' 
The dowry was in dollars. 
The diamond ring was in dollars. 
The fee for the judge was in dollars. 
The cake was a gift from America, 
and the wedding veil, the flowers, 
the candles, and the music of the marines, 
were all made in America. 
And the wedding came to an end: 
and Palestine was not to be found at the ceremony. 1 
... 'America's credibility as mediator has long been questioned by 
Palestinians, and with reason. The Palestinians always complain that 
we know the details of every proposal from the Americans before 
they do. One Israeli source told the Independent recently: 'there's a 
good reason for that we write them.' 2 
... 'I brought a message of peace. I believe Jews and Arabs can live 
together. There was no provocation. [My emphasis], Jews have the 
right to visit every place in Israel.' 3 
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In the aftermath of the failed Camp David 11 talks (July 11-25 2000)4 a general 
feeling of pessimism and anger descended upon the Palestinians within the 
Occupied Territories, shrouding the slum-like camps just like an oppressive rain 
cloud, ever swelling and threatening to break, only awaiting the right conditions. 
Arafat had returned to Gaza, politically outmanoeuvred and downtrodden, only 
1 Excerpt from Al-Muharwiluun (The Hurried Ones) by the celebrated Syrian poet Nizar Qabbani 
and translated by Fouad Ajami, as cited in Ajami, Fouad, The Dream Palace of the Arabs, p. 258. 
2 Reeves, Phi!, 'Humiliation of Palestinians triggers rush to war: dying peace process' 
Independent, October 9. 2000. 
3 Ariel Sharon's defence of his 'unwise' visit to the Haram al-Sharif, on September 28, 2000 as 
reported by Ross, Dunn, 'Muslims shot in clash at Jerusalem site'. The Times, September 30, 
2000. 
4 Mostyn, Trevor, 'Time-Bomb under Jerusalem'. The Tablet, August 5, 2000, pp. 1040-41 and 
Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Boy's death stokes up battle for Jerusalem'. Guardian, October 2, 2000. 
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to receive a hero's welcome from his loyal supporters.5 (Apparently, he hadn't 
sold out on the Palestinian dream of statehood.)6 And moreover, it was indeed 
true! Barak had laid upon the table at the unsuccessful talks the greatest 
concession to the Palestinians in the history of the conflict.7 The Israeli leader 
had been prepared to relinquish 'certain' portions of Israeli occupied East 
Jerusalem, and recognise the Palestinian and Arab claim to their legitimate right 
to protect the Al-Haram al-Sharif, at a cost perhaps of both his personal political 
career, and the inflammation of both the Israeli right and the religiously extreme 
hawks. 
At Clinton's orchestrated round of talks however, the Palestinian leader's hands 
had been tied. For it was not possible for him to accept the limited offer of 
certain portions of East Jerusalem.8 The portions in question were territorially 
separated (Abu Dis, and Azariyya),9 and furthermore, any acceptance of the 
Israeli proposed concession would have given de facto recognition of Israel's 
claim to sovereign possession of the entirety of Jerusalem, an absurdity that has 
propelled the conflict since the Israelis annexation of East Jerusalem in June 
1967. 10 
Moreover, could the question concerning Jerusalem and its final status, really 
have been determined by the Palestinian leader even if he had so wished it? 
Indeed, the Al-Haram al-Sharif was not Arafat's to negotiate. For it belongs to 
the entire Islamic community. 11 Therefore, when it came to concluding the deal 
at Camp David II, the Palestinian Chairman could not settle upon any agreements 
because essentially it was out of his remit to do so. 12 This left the U.S. 
Administration to accuse the Palestinian leader of coming to the talks without 
5 Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Homecoming: Crowds out for Arafat, daggers out for Barak.' Guardian, 
July 27,2000. 
6 Sontag, Deborah, 'Cautious hopes for significant agreement.' New York Times, July 12,2000. 
7 Sullivan, Andrew, 'America loses faith in the Israeli peace.' The Sunday Times, August 26, 
2001. 
8 McGeary, Johanna, 'The many minds of Arafat'. Time Magazine, October 23, 2000. 
9 Said, Edward, W. The End of the Peace Process. p. XV. 
10 Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'West Bank explodes in fury'. Guardian, May 16, 2000. 
11 Hockstader, Lee, 'Jerusalem the Holy, the city of Zion, the conundrum.' The Washington Post, 
July 21, 2000. 
12 Sontag, Deborah, 'Stalled but alive, peace talks on Mideast reach lOth day.' New York Times, 
July 21,2000. 
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rece1vmg a mandate from the members of the Arab League facilitating his 
potential negotiation over Jerusalem: 13 A rather unfair accusation given the fact 
that the Al-Haram al-Sharif when considered by Muslims falls under God's 
sovereignty and thus severely restricts any human intervention regarding its 
status. 14 
To many Israelis though, Arafat's refusal to accept Barak's 'perceived' generous 
offer was a sign that the Palestinian leader did not really wish for peace. 15 But 
rather, he advocated a return to the 'stalemate' that was pre-Oslo. Moreover, to 
them [the Israelis], Oslo was coming to be considered as one of the gravest 
mistakes in the history of 'modem' Israel, a sentiment that had its reflection 
amongst many Palestinians interred in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
The disaffected and disillusioned Palestinians had great justification for feeling 
that they were being betrayed by the promises of Oslo. Indeed, it seemed that all 
the warnings given by the pessimists were being realised i.e., economic 
strangulation by the Israeli surrogate, alongside incarceration in the festering and 
fetid camps etc. 16 Indeed, the reality was that many Palestinians had become 
genuinely worse off with the inception and partial implementation of the Oslo 
'peace process' and its seemingly honourable intentions. 
Nevertheless, the 'peace process' certainly wasn't intended to become the 
proverbial nemesis of both longsuffering peoples. The process had been 
constructed by leaders however, who were often considered to be out of touch 
with the realities on the ground by its recipients, and furthermore was overseen 
by both a U.S. Administration with an interest of forging further hegemonic 
13 New York Times: News Services, 'Regions leaders had made it clear, Jerusalem wasn't up for 
compromise.' Chicago Tribune, July 26, 2000. Borger, Julian, 'US reaction: Clinton 
Administration stunned and angry as its investment in Arafat fails to pay off. Guardian, October 
13, 2000. And: Freedman, Lawrence, 'Americans blame Arafat' Independent, October 16,2000. 
And: Fisk, Robert, 'Forget the peace process: this is a murderous civil war'. The Independent, 
December 29,2000. 
14 Dempsey, Judy, 'Clinton keeps low profile ahead of polls'. The Financial Times, October 5, 
2000. 
15 Reeves, Phi!, 'Blood flows as Middle East summit opens'. Independent, October 17, 2000. 
16 Goldenberg, Suzanne, '3m Palestinians trapped in prison that once was home'. Guardian, 
October 23, 2000. And: Silver, Eric, 'Barak tries economic war in bid to beat the Intifada'. 
Independent, November 7, 2000. And: Guyatt, Nicholas, The Absence of Peace. p. 158. 
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domination over the Middle East, (particularly in any ongoing 'peace' initiative 
that might have several potential serious regional consequences, i.e., shifts in 
territorial demarcations, and state alliances, etc ), as well as being directed by a 
U.S. president whose Administration very often gave indications that his primary 
motives for 'fronting' a complex peace process was for the pursuit of personal 
gain. (The 'crowning achievement' of Clinton's term in office and perhaps a 
Nobel peace prize nomination.) 17 
That the 'peace process' and all of its concessions and recriminations would be 
the trigger for the complete retardation, but, arguably, not permanent damage, in 
Palestinian/Israeli relations, was, perhaps, of no real shock. 18 For it is very often 
the way of complicated and protracted arguments held between protagonists, that 
when an arbiter offers a difficult choice for a solution, one side will invariably 
balk near the closing of the deal, paranoid of the intentions of their long term 
mistrusted enemy, and the 'hawks' that invariably 'roost' in their own camp. 19 
This factor is why Clinton called Oslo 'a brave gamble for peace' viz. Arafat's 
'peace of the brave' for perhaps they foresaw the bloodshed and disappointments 
that would emerge along the difficult route. 20 But could they have possibly 
foreseen the extent of the carnage that lay at the feet of Oslo's last hurdle? 
Namely, the reduction of Palestinian/Israeli relations once again to a 
'bloodthirsty' 1929-36, or even a 1948-49 level,21 alongside the complete 
annihilation of several thousands of man-hours spent in the pursuance of 
solutions to the conflict, no matter how temporary, and furthermore, in a worst-
17 Newsweek, 'Shot all to hell'. Vol. 128, No 15, October 7, 1996. And: Whitaker, Brian, 
'Leaders seeking a place in history.' Guardian, July 26,2000. 
18 Helm, Sarah, 'It may take a long time, but this Middle East violence will subside'. 
Independent, May 23,2001. 
19 Fried land, Jonathan, 'The enemy within.' Guardian, July 11, 2000. 
20 Tisdal, Simon, 'Symbolic gesture seals hopes to end blood and tears'. Guardian, September 14, 
1993. And: Said, Edward, W. The End of the Peace Process, p. 45. And: Goldenberg, Suzanne, 
'When they blundered into the baying mob they sealed their fate'. Guardian, October 13, 2000. 
And: Wallach, Janet, & Wallach, John, Op-cit, p. 469. And: See: Giacaman, George, In the 
Throes of Oslo: Palestinian Society, Civil Society and the Future, in Giacaman, George, & 
Lonning, Dag, J.Op-cit, p. 17. And: Guyatt, Nicholas, The Absence of Peace, p. 197. 
21 Woolacott, Martin, 'Neither peace nor war, just endless suffering'. Guardian, October 13 2000. 
And: Kiley, Sam, Israeli soldiers may be freed'. The Times, December 12, 2000. 
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case scenario, an inexorable slide into a dangerous and unnecessary war. 22 (That 
Israel might one day have to fight on three fronts, unless reconciliation or 
withdrawal can be achieved, which is impossible for very obvious reasons.) 23 
Underpinning all this negativity and pessimism however, and what was of real 
significance to the ultimate failure of Oslo; was the supposed 'generous' offer 
made by Barak, for in reality it was a 'Hobson's Choice' i.e., absolutely no 
choice whatsoever. And so it was throughout that millennia} summer; both 
protagonists were tired and deluded by the uncertainties of the Oslo 'peace 
process', and were waiting nervously like two exhausted boxers for the ever 
threatening final bell, and the referee's (America's) fateful decision.24 In the last 
days of that summer, or perhaps in the early days of the fall, an Israeli court's 
decision not to take Netanyahu to trial for corruption whilst in office was made 
due to alleged insufficient evidence.25 This would act as the catalyst that denoted 
the real beginning of the end of the Oslo aspirations, for it would reopen for the 
formerly disgraced Israeli premier a path to political power within the Likud 
party. 
This emergent threat from the once ousted Netanyahu however, could not be 
contained by the then Likud leader Ariel Sharon. Sharon was aware that 
Netanyahu possessed more electoral popularity than himself and that he 
[Netanyahu] could probably regain the leadership of the party in any internal 
power struggle. This meant that Netanyahu could be in a position to enforce a 
greater political influence in the event of any coalition needing to be formed with 
Barak's failing Labour government. Sharon was further inflamed by the then 
Prime Ministers offer to rescind Israeli claimed sovereignty over the Temple 
Mount. Sharon, it is argued, wilfully and unhesitatingly, exercised his democratic 
22 Haberman, Clyde, Israelis and Palestinians prepare for a long struggle, New York Times, 
August 18, 2001. 
23 Israel having to wage war on three fronts is determined as follows. Firstly, a war waged against 
the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories. Secondly, a bloody civil war waged against the 
Israeli Arabs whom have critically shown support for their Palestinian brethren. Thirdly, and 
although improbable, a war waged against a Coalition Arab Force or a 'preventative' war, or 
incursion conducted against a neighbouring state such as Lebanon simultaneously. 
24 Woolacott, Martin, 'Time to find an exit from this daily ritual of suffering'. Guardian, 
November 3, 2000. 
25 News in Brief, 'Netanyahu charges dropped'. The Times, September 28,2000. 
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right to freedom of movement for a Jew inhabiting Eretz Yisrael and decided to 
embark upon a purposefully provocative excursion.26 
Therefore, surrounded by a personal praetorian guard of a thousand security men 
(indicating guilt and perceived vulnerability).27 The known architect of the Sabra 
and Shatila Massacres (1982) 28 lumbered lazily and provocatively across the 
courtyard of the sublime and majestic Al-Haram al-Sharif, like John Wayne, 
before standing at 'high noon' and re-enacting a scene reminiscent from 'True 
Grit'. Sharon hadn't 'come for his boy' though, but had come to exercise his 
Divinely given 'Right to Roam'. Of course no real offence was intended. Or 
according to some Israeli accusers, taken legitimately by anyone whatsoever. The 
offended Palestinians were merely using their religious attachment to their third 
most important shrine, as a catalyst, so as to carry out their evil business namely, 
the slitting of innocent Jewish throats. 
It is now understood that Barak could, and should have forbidden the Likud 
leader from visiting the Jewish 'Temple Mount', perhaps realising that this 
action would inflame the already flaring tensions with the Palestinians.29 But, 
Barak weighed up the cost of prevention against the cost of acquiescence. The 
cost of appeasing the Jewish right for the sake of domestic stability, against the 
cost of giving the red light to the Palestinians and the subsequent legitimisation 
for the venting of their frustrations. 
Barak should have realised that any violation of the sanctity of the Al-Haram al-
Sharif would give rise to an extreme response, and it did. For it legitimated an 
already nascent Palestinian uprising. Furthermore, it also offended the Orthodox 
Jews, who considered the visit a repugnant act undertaken by an atheistic gun 
toting Americanised Jew as representing a purposeful violation of their holy site. 
Moreover, it riled those Israelis that still had intentions of making eventual peace 
with their Semitic cousin. 
26 Black, Ian. 'Double tragedy rolls back years of progress.' Guardian, October 13, 2000. 
27 Burke, Jason, 'Child martyrs line up to die'. Observer, October 8, 2000. 
28 See Keane, Fergal, 'The Accused' Panorama, BBC 1, June 17,2001. 
29 Freedland, Jonathan, 'doves must be hawks'. Guardian, October 11, 2000. 
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It has been suggested by some analysts that perhaps Sharon imagined that he 
would be turned away by Israeli security at the site.30 But why would this have 
been the case? If the order wasn't given by Barak to elements of the Israeli 
Security Services to restrain or restrict Sharon, then surely a body of young, 
bored, conscripted Israeli guards were not going to challenge a man of Sharon's 
political standing and proclaimed if some what dubious, military prestige whilst 
accompanied by a thousand hardnosed henchmen, picked no doubt from the elite 
units of the IDF. Sharon knew that he would not be turned away, therefore his 
action was without doubt premeditated and malicious, and not too dissimilar 
from other Sharon orchestrated adventures i.e., that of the murder of sixty nine at 
Qibya, in October 1953,31 and lamentably his responsibility for the massacre at 
Sabra and Shatilla in September 1982. 32 
Furthermore, it is strongly suggested that the Likud leader knew the enormity of 
his actions at the Al-Haram al-Sharif, for it is a known flashpoint, and even the 
relatively ambivalent U.S. Administration urge the Israelis to utilise caution 
when dealing with specific issues encompassing it. In fact, this factor can be 
taken further. If Jerusalem is the single most contended issue in the conflict, then 
the Al-Haram al Sharif, and the sanctity of the Al-Aqsa Mosque represent the 
most hotly contended issue relating to Jerusalem. To the Palestinians, and the 
remainder of the Dar al Islam, (literally the House of Islam, in this instance, 
however, Muslim community) Jerusalem and the Al-Haram al-Sharif are as one 
inseparable and nonnegotiable. To overlook this obvious truism is to completely 
fail in understanding the true dynamics of the conflict.33 On the surface, the 
conflict could be considered to be a struggle just conducted over territorial 
issues. If only it were that simple however, then a solution to the Arab/Israeli 
conflict, it is considered, would not be too long in coming. Indeed, the weeping 
and festering wound that ails the entire Middle Eastern arena would have been 
30 Whitaker, Brian, 'Ariel Sharon: the bloodstained past that inflames Palestinians'. Guardian, 
October 3, 2000. 
31 Benziman, Uzi, Sharon: An Israeli Caeser, pp. 51-54. 
32 Ibid. pp. 258-259. And: The Economist, 'The Road to War?' Vol. 357, No, 8191, October 7, 
2000. p. 19. And: New Internationalist, 'Message of War'. No. 333, April2001. p. 3. 
33 Prusher, Llene, R. 'Mideast tale of brothers at odds'. Christian Science Monitor, April4, 1997. 
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tamped long, long ago, and the region would have fallen from such great 
significance, in many Westerners minds. 
It is now evident that this dangerously flirtatious and flagrantly disrespectful 
action of Sharon' s was not the true trigger of the 'Uprising of the Al-Aqsa 
Mosque'. Hostilities had been brewing for some time and had erupted in several 
areas prior to September 28, 2000, but, as is the way of things within the 
dynamics of the Arab/Israeli conflict, if any violence by either combatant needs 
justification, then it is never very long before it is found. Usually following hot 
on the heels of the violence that precedes it. For nowhere is the biblical maxim 
that violence begets violence more true, than in the seething cauldron of 
irreconcilable ideologies that is the 'modem' Middle East. This last statement is 
about as liberal as can be put forward regarding both Israel's military offensive 
that commenced after the Friday noon prayers on September 30, 2000, and the 
Palestinian response, as they [the Palestinians], celebrated yet another nominated 
'day of rage' .34 
On that particular emotionally charged afternoon, however, the Israelis made the 
decision to exchange their traditionally utilised rubber coated bullets for a 'full 
metal jacket' deterrent, before deciding to embark upon a rather poor public 
relations exercise?5 It is now clearly documented that the Israeli Defence Force's 
sharpshooters were pursuing a 'shoot to kill' policy.36 Someone, somewhere, was 
advocating the breaching of rather sketchy 'rules of engagement'. It also seems 
evident that the Shabab had finally become expendable, to some. 
Is this a continuation of the thinking that: 'If there is no Oslo 'peace process' 
then there should be no Palestinians with whom to deal with?' 37 Or a 
continuation of: 'We should have finished what we started in 1967, namely, the 
34 Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'West Bank explodes in fury'. Guardian, May 16,2000. 
35 Dunn, Ross, 'Muslims shot in clash at Jerusalem site'. The Times, September 30, 2000. 
Regarding 'Days of Rage' see Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Palestinian's tell-tale wounds expose shoot 
to kill tactics'. Guardian, October 5, 2000. 
36 Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Palestinian tell-tale wounds expose shoot to kill tactics'. Guardian, 
October 5, 2000. 
37 Ashra wi, Hanan, Op-e it, p. 117. 
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liquidation of Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation, and the enforced 
transference of the residual Palestinian population to other territories?' 38 
It is not generally agreed at which point the Oslo 'peace process' actually died. 
(For many it had been stillborn anyway.) But, for the sake of this study, it is 
suggested that for the Palestinians the last hope was lost on the afternoon of 
September 30, when the Israeli 'sharpshooters' executed the unfortunately now 
famous, innocent young boy Muhammad al-Durrah, as he sought shelter in his 
father's arms at the 'Nezarim Junction'. (Now romantically, but a little naively, 
called 'Martyrs Corner' by the Shabab.) At this point, however, in contrast, the 
'peace process' (if it can be called that) was still alive for many Israelis, for after 
all they had traditionally dictated its course and implementation. 39 
For them [the Israelis], and in particular for the 'sharpshooters' of the IDF, 
opening fire upon the Palestinian Shabab, it is argued, was no more of a chore 
than taking a critically injured dog to the vet to be put to sleep, fuelled by the 
sentiment of another day, another shekel.40 As the violence initially escalated, 
and the fatalities and casualties continued to amass at a ratio of approx. 6:1 in 
Israel's favour, (of course, this ratio varies depending on the previous evening's 
bloodletting), however, events were leading inexorably to the final death knell of 
the U.S. and Israeli manipulated Oslo 'peace process' .41 
On the 1ih of October 2000, two Israeli reservists (possibly Duvdevan agents 
i.e., The Cherry Brigade) happened to get lost in the West Bank, and were 
arrested by representatives of the PPS and escorted to a Palestinian police station 
for their own protection. Word got round however, that Israeli security men had 
been discovered in a highly emotionally charged Palestinian area, and a baying 
38 See: Smith, Charles, D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 291. Grant, Linda, 'Them 
and Us'. Guardian, G2, October 24, 2000. And: Peretz, Don, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising, 
p. 31. 
39 Reeves, Phi!, 'Humiliation of Palestinians triggers rush to war: dying peace process.' 
Independent, October 9, 2000. 
40 Reeves, Phi!, 'bus driver brings carnage to Tel aviv in worst Palestinian attack in four years.' 
Independent, February 15, 2001. 
41 Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Fresh gunfire shatters Israeli truce'. Guardian, October 4, 2000. 
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mob of approximately one thousand stormed the courtyard of the police station.42 
The subsequent lynching of the unfortunate Israelis that occurred is well 
documented, having been recorded by a morally questionable Italian camera 
crew.
43 Nevertheless, brutal events such as these are not new in the dynamics of 
the conflict.44 What was new, however, and for the sake of this study, represents 
the true 'Death of Oslo' was the damage that occurred through the transmission 
of these horrific killings upon Israeli TV.45 The military reprisal i.e., calculated 
rocket attacks upon the police station where the atrocity occurred were arguably 
commensurate with the crime. Militarily speaking, Israel can always enforce its 
need for recompense. But, the psychological damage done by showing this 
violent episode of primeval bloodlust encapsulated by the image of Thabit Abbas 
Aasi, or Aziz Tsalha raising his bloodstained palms in victory at the window of 
the police station was irreparable concerning the Oslo 'peace process' .46 
Any real consideration of Oslo as a 'peace process' after this event it can be 
argued is worthless. In essence, the peace was at this point, like a victim of an 
automobile accident, wasting away in a coma, unconscious, starved of life, and 
clinically dead.47 If, and for the time being it is a small if, any 'peace process' 
can be reconstituted from the ashes of this unworkable and impractical stillborn 
peace, then it should have a new name, new schedulers, and new conveners, and 
moreover, be driven by new innovators: Perhaps it is the time for a European, a 
42 Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'When they blundered into the baying mob they sealed their fate'. 
Guardian, October 13,2000, 
43 Silver, Eric, 'Israeli agents seize suspected lynch mob leaders'.lndependent, October 19,2000. 
44 Such examples of brutal violence are to numerous to cite. For an example however, of a 
specific incident of lynching consider, Shiff, Ze'ev, & Ya'ari, Ehud, lntifada: The Palestinian 
Uprising -Israel's Third Front, pp. 147-148. 
45 Black, Ian, 'Double tragedy rolls back years of progress', Guardian, October 13, 2000, and 
Dempsey, Judy, 'Israel blames television for adding to the violence'. The Financial Times, 
October 14-15, 2000. And: Editorial, 'A day of horror: Who can halt the slide to war'. Guardian, 
October 13, 2000. 
46 Some confusion has emerged concerning the identity and culpability of the alleged self-
confessed murderer. For instance the Guardian initially reported that the man responsible was 
one Thabit Abbas Aasi. See: Whitaker, Brian, 'Report of US plan to offer Arafat an instant mini-
state'. Guardian, October 28,2000. Yet, due to an attempt by the Israelis to send a warning to the 
Palestinians, through humiliation of the suspect, the man's identity is claimed, as one Aziz 
Tsalha. Granted the confusion may have been made through either a revision of Israeli supplied 
information to the journalists, or simply a journalistic error occurring in the first report. 
See: MacAskill, Ewan, Humiliation for Palestinian murder suspect, Guardian, June 27,2001. 
47 Goldenberg, Suzanne & Capella, Peter, 'Red Cross says fighters edging into all-out war.' 
Guardian, November 22, 2000. 
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Russian, or Chinese initiative. Or even, as the eminent scholar Edward Said 
consistently urges for, a Palestinian inspired initiative, conducted alongside an 
active Palestinian dialogue.48 At least then, the Palestinians, the Arabs, and other 
interested parties, could not claim, and perhaps legitimately, that U.S. and Israeli 
hegemonic interests shall always stand in opposition to the true interests of peace 
in the Middle East. And furthermore, that all the time that a Pax Americana 
Israelica exists, then the Palestinians and Arabs are always going to play a 
subservient role in the further shaping of the 'modem' Middle East, and be 
prevented from taking real control over their own destinies. 49 
48 Said, Edward, W. The Question of Palestine, p. xxxxiv. And: Ashrawi, Hanan, This Side of 
Peace, p. 94. 
49 New Internationalist, 'Power Pax': A brief history in megalomania'. Issue 330, December 
2000, p. 24. Pax Americana see Said, Edward, The Question of Palestine, p. 196. 
Conclusion(s) 
In general, the motive and character of the perpetrators is shrouded 
by rhetoric about their 'cowardice and their 'shadowy' character, 
almost as if they had not volunteered to immolate themselves in the 
broadest of broad blue daylight. On the campus where I am writing 
this, there are a few students and professors willing to venture about 
United States policy. But they do so very guardedly, and it would 
sound like vain apologetics if transmitted live. So the analytical 
moment, if there is to be one, has been indefinitely postponed.' 
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Today, as I write, fifty weeks exactly, since the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel 
Sharon wilfully violated the sanctity of the Al-Haram al-Sharif and Masjidi al-
Aqsa complex in the Holy City of Jerusalem, it falls upon me to offer my heart 
felt condolences to 'all' those victims who are inextricably bound up within the 
national tragedy that has befallen the United States, on this, a collective Day of 
National Remembrance i.e., September 14, 2001. And also, to offer my thoughts 
to those 'innocents' of all nations and religious denominations, who legitimately 
fear for their futures in this time of great sadness and uncertainty. 
Any analyst of the 'modem' history of the Middle East who contemplates upon 
the many intricacies and complications inherent within the dynamics of the 
Arab/Israeli conflict in particular, runs the risk of both exogenous and extraneous 
events, (regrettably, very often tragedies), overtaking his or her assessment, prior 
to either examination or publication, leaving them in possession of nothing more 
than a frustratingly incomplete analysis. Nevertheless, and in stark contradiction 
to Christopher Hitchin's 'postponement of the analytical moment' in the 
aftermath of such unfortunate and desperate circumstances, a conclusion must, 
and shall have to be drawn. 
1 Hitchins, Christopher, 'So is this war?' Guardian, G2, September 13, 2001. 
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Since the inevitable 'Death of Oslo', horrors unimaginable i.e., child murders, 
suicide bombers, 'targeted killings' (assassinations)2 as well as 'random killings' 
have been unleashed upon both parties to this protracted and internecine conflict. 
Indeed, it is perhaps a little ironic, if not saddening, that this thesis' secondary 
aim i.e., that the 'media frames' were selected because it was felt that they 
represented good examples of a particular dynamic or salient feature inherent 
within the Arab-Israeli conflict has been proven, regrettably, to be very true. A 
rapid analysis of the events of this last year will unquestioningly verify this 
observation.3 Indeed, it is arguable that every dynamic analysed in each chapter, 
bar possibly one, (assassination of a head of state, and this has certainly been 
mooted in some comers)4 has been tragically replicated. 
The consequences and ramifications of the 'Death of Oslo' and the ensumg 
violence have not yet been fully realised however, but history shows us that 
many things are cyclical in their nature, no less so 'peace processes' and 
conversely, 'death processes'. To consolidate this observation, Israeli military 
planners have forecast a 'worst case scenario' situation, estimating that the 
violence could rage on unabated for upwards of five years.5 Axiomatically, and 
discouragingly for the region's quest for peace, it also indicates that the Israeli's 
2 Reeves, Phi!, 'Gun battles erupt day after Israeli's call truce.' Independent, May 24, 2001. 
3 Regarding 'child killings' see: Greenberg, Joel, '2 Jewish teenagers are beaten to death in West 
Bank.' New York Times, May 10, 2001. And: Kiley, Sam, 'Two Israelis boys stoned to death in 
desert cave.' The Times, May 10, 2001. For 'targeted killings' (assassinations) see: Reeves, Phi!, 
'Israel accused over Palestinian 'assassinations.' Independent, February 21, 2001. And: Sontag, 
Deborah, 'Sharon orders air raids on Arafat's bases.' New York Times, March 29, 2001. 
Concerning 'random killings' see: Sontag, Deborah, 'Palestinians mark a bitter milestone amid 
violence.' New York Times, May 16, 2001. For 'settler violence' see: Goldenberg, Suzanne, 
'Israeli court paroles murderer.' Guardian, February 19, 2001. And: Sontag, Deborah, 'Israeli 
baby's funeral becomes focus of settlers militancy.' New York Times, April 2, 2001. For 'suicide 
terrorist attacks' see: Reeves, Phi!, 'Suicide bomb at rush hour kills three Israelis.' Independent, 
March 5, 2001. And: Sontag, Deborah, 'Suicide bomber kills five, Israeli retaliation jets kill 
twelve' New York Times, May 19, 2001. And: Haberman, Clyde, 'Day after bombing, Israelis 
grieve, and strike back.' New York Times, August 11, 2001. Concerning 'border incursions' see: 
Associated Press, 'Israeli's attack Syrian radars in Lebanon.' New York Times, April 16, 2001. 
And: Fisk, Robert, 'Israeli raid in Bekaa raises risk of Syrian war.' Independent, July 2, 2001. 
Concerning 'violation of religious sites' see: Kiley, Sam, 'Temple Mount dig provokes Israeli 
wrath.' The Times, March 9, 2001. For 'lntifada like conditions' see: 'Israeli's kill twelve year 
old protester, Palestinians in Gaza say,' New York Times, June 18, 2001. Etc. etc. 
4 Colvin, Marie, 'Wary Arafat gives Sharon a chance.' The Sunday Times, February 11, 2001. 
And: Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Israelis blast Arafat's HQ.' Guardian, March 29, 2001. 
5 Habermas, Clyde, 'Israelis and Palestinians prepare for a long struggle.' New York Times, 
August 18,2001. 
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have drawn up a plan of action, and this was well before the 'day of infamy' i.e., 
September 11, 2001. 6 
This thesis has argued consistently that throughout the ill-fated Oslo 'peace 
process' there has been a pro-Israeli, anti-Palestinian-anti-Arab discourse (a 
purposeful homogenisation) evident within the vast majority of U.S. mainstream 
media channels, which fluctuated in the strength of its denigration as the process 
careered inauspiciously from one dilemma to the next. In light of the 'day of 
infamy' and President Bush's ensuing 'War on Terrorism' it is considered that at 
least two things will now occur. The first and rather obviously, is that U.S. 
mainstream media portrayals of both the Palestinians and other Arabs can, for the 
time being, only worsen, although the U.S. Administration (and forming 
Coalition) has made it clear that it is not conducting a war against Islam per se. 
(Although if you had analysed the U.S. mainstream media after the February 
1993 attack on the World Trade Centre you might have thought otherwise, 
because at times the 'prestigious press' has presented its readership with a 
veritable 'rogues gallery'.) Nevertheless, this retrogressive media denigration of 
the Arab is an unfortunate truism, inasmuch as the U.S. Administration needs to 
act upon an immediate and already 'manufactured consensus' explicitly in order 
to wage its 'War on Terrorism'. 
The second inevitability, is that the fragile truce declared between the Israelis 
and Palestinians will eventually hold, (it is nai"ve to believe that all guns can be 
silenced at all times, however), and there can at last be some active dialogue 
(more than likely with some restrictions) with the reasonably level headed and 
potentially (if allowed to be) pragmatic Shimon Peres.7 Hopefully, then a series 
of 'confidence building measures' can be emplaced, finally facilitating 
movement towards a reconfigured fair and balanced 'peace process'. It is an 
irony not missed by many though, that this 'movement' could only happen after 
America had applied pressure upon the protagonists in the name of 'coalition 
6 Ibid. 
7 Reeves, Phil, 'Peres and Arafat reach 'flexible' deal as new violence threatens peace talks.'· 
Independent, September 27,2001. 
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building' and under the spectre of the threat of a possible global scale 
conflagration. 8 
America needs, and must, prosecute her, (our), war (noticeably not 'crusade') 
against 'global terrorism'. To suggest, as the likes of Shaikh Abu Harnza and an 
anonymous Palestinian West Banker have,9 that America 'had it coming' in the 
light of her duplicitous foreign policy is a wicked and unconscionable 
insinuation, although as this thesis has indicated, the warnings that something 
catastrophic could happen were clearly there. 10 It is a travesty of justice indeed, 
that it takes an 'apocalyptic' event, as 'epoch making' as the 'day of infamy' to 
bring about such transformations in policy, but in the immediate aftermath of the 
catastrophe many analysts and newscasters were at least beginning to raise 
questions concerning the United State's unequivocal support for Israel. In view 
of this, it is hoped that when America has slaked her justified thirst for revenge, 
she may take stock of how she is perceived by others in her role of 'global 
policeman' (the anomaly regarding America's gender here is recognised), and 
redress those aspects of her foreign policy that are causing so much pain and 
enmity, in this specific instance, towards those bound up in the revolutions of the 
Arab/Israeli conflict, but also of those in other corners of the world, where she 
has interests to protect. To conclude, there is a lesson for us all, brought to us in 
the wise words of Chief Seathl from the tribe of the Suqamish of the Sioux: 
Whatever befalls the earth befalls the sons of the earth. 
If men spit upon the ground, they spit upon themselves. 
This we know. 
The earth does not belong to man; man belongs to the earth. 
This we know. 
All things are connected like the blood, which unites one family. 
All things are connected. 
Whatever befalls the earth befalls the sons of the earth. 
Man did not weave the web of life; he is merely a strand in it. 
Whatever he does to the web he does to himself. 
Chief Seathl, 1855.ll 
8 Kiley, Sam, 'Why the hatred in Israel may give rise to peace.' Evening Standard, September 21, 
2001. 
9 Martin, Philips, & Rollings, Grant, 'Fanatics who shame Islam.' The Sun, September 14, 2001. 
And: Goldenberg, Suzanne, 'Palestinians joy- global condemnation.' Guardian, September 12, 
2001. 
10 See: Chapter Four, 'Sunday Bloody SJ.!ndays'. 
11 The Great Chief Sends Word, Chief Seathl's Testament. 
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(Francis Ford Coppola) 
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The Deer Hunter, U.S. 1978, Technicolour Panavision, Universal/Emi (Barry 
Spikings, Michael Deeley, Michael Cimino, John Peverall) 
Full Metal Jacket, GB, 1987, Rank Colour Warner, (Stanley Kubrick) 
The Godfather, U.S. 1972, Technicolour Paramount/Alfran, (Albert S. Ruddy) 
Godzilla, Japan, 1955, Toho, (Tomoyuki Tanaka) 
King Kong, U.S. 1933, RKO, (Merian C. Cooper) 
Lawrence of Arabia, GB, 1962, Technicolour Super Panavision, 70 
Columbia/Horizon, (Sam Spiegal) 
Scarface, U.S. 1983, Technicolour Panavision Universal, (Martin Bregman) 
Star Wars, U.S. 1977, Technicolour Panavision, TCF/Lucas Film, (Gary Kurtz), 
True Grit, U.S, 1969, Technicolour Paramount/Ha} B. Wallis, (Paul Nathan) 
Television and Radio: 
Bowen, Jeremy, Islamophobia, BBC2, transmitted August 18, 2001. 
Keanne, Fergal, The Accused, Panorama, BBC1, transmitted June 17, 2001. 
Lockerbie on Trial, Radio 4, broadcast, February 20, 2001. 
Nicholson, Michael, Back to the Front: Israel, ITV, transmitted August 12, 2001. 
Miscellaneous: 
The Economist, Vol. 357, (8191) 
History Today, Vol. 49, (3) March 1999. 
The Middle East, Issue 267, May 1997. 
National Graphic, Vol. 196 (1) July 1999. 
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New Internationalist: Issue 328, October 2000, and Issues 330, and 333, April 
2001. 
Orientalia, CMEIS Student Magazine, November 27, 1998. 
Prospect, November 2000, and June 2001. 
The Tablet, August 5, 2000. 
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